BEFORE THE HEARING BOARD

OF THE

ILLINOIS ATTORNEY REGISTRATION

AND

DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION

In the Matter of:

VINCENZO FIELD,

Attorney-Respondent,

No. 6305911.

Commission No. 2018PR00015

FILED --- February 8, 2019

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Jerome Larkin, Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission, by his attorney, Sharon D. Opryszek, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 753(b), complains of Respondent, Vincenzo Field, who was licensed to practice law in Illinois on November 10, 2011, and alleges that Respondent has engaged in the following conduct which subjects Respondent to discipline pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 770:

COUNT I
(Making false statements on a law school application)

1. Respondent received a bachelor of arts degree in history and political science from McGill University in May, 1998.

2. In October, 2005, Respondent registered to take the Law School Admission Test ("LSAT") but cancelled taking the test. In December, 2005, Respondent took the LSAT and scored 158. In September, 2006, Respondent retook the LSAT and scored 173.1

3. In late 2005, Respondent applied for admission to the University of Chicago Law School, but was denied admission to the 2006 entering class.

1 LSAT scores are based on the number of questions answered correctly and range from 120 to 180.

4. On or about December 4, 2006, Respondent submitted a second application for admission to the Juris Doctor program at the University of Chicago Law School. The application requested that Respondent submit, among other things, a resume and candidate statement as part of the application process. Respondent submitted his personal statement and an addendum which purportedly addressed gaps in Respondent's academic record.

5. In his personal statement addendum, Respondent stated that in 1999 he had been diagnosed with a leiomyosarcoma (a form of stomach cancer) that he had undergone four separate surgeries to have tumors removed from his stomach, as well as radiation therapy and what he referred to as "countless" minor procedures to stop gastric bleeding. Respondent stated that the disease delayed completion of his MA degree, stalled work in the McGill University Ph.D program, and forced his withdrawal from the University of Michigan, where he had taken courses as a visiting scholar toward completion of a doctoral degree.

6. In his personal statement addendum, Respondent further stated that although he had just undergone surgery in September, 2005 and was still receiving radiation therapy, he had sat for the October and December 2005 LSAT exams. Respondent explained that he was not healthy enough to have sat for the exams, but that in January, 2006, for the first time in six years, Respondent had been given a clean bill of health by his oncologist. As a result, he scored well on the LSAT, with a score of 173, and was finishing course work at the University of Michigan.

7. Respondent's statements that he had been diagnosed with and received treatment for leiomyosarcoma were false.

8. Respondent knew the statements that he had been diagnosed with and received treatment for leiomyosarcoma were false because at no time prior to submission of his application to the law school had Respondent been diagnosed with or received treatment for leiomyosarcoma or any other cancer, nor did Respondent have an illness that affected his LSAT performance, and did not take the LSAT exam in October, 2005.

9. At the time Respondent submitted the false information in his application for admission to the University of Chicago Law School, Respondent knew the information was false and intended to mislead the law school in order to advance his chances for admission to the Law School.

10. Based upon Respondent's false application to the University of Chicago Law School, Respondent was admitted to the school. At no time prior to the time he commenced his studies or since completion of his studies at the Law School did Respondent amend his application to provide truthful information to the Law School.

11. By reason of the conduct above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct:

  1. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, including, but not limited to Respondent's false statement that he was diagnosed with and received treatment for leiomyosarcoma, had an illness that affected his LSAT performance and had taken the LSAT exam in October, 2005, in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (1990).

COUNT II
(Misrepresentation on application to the Illinois Bar)

12. The Administrator repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-10 of Count I.

13. On or about May 31, 2011, Respondent filed with the Illinois Board of Admissions to the Bar, an agency of the Supreme Court of Illinois, both a character and fitness registration application ("application to the bar") and a separate application to take the bar examination. Respondent's applications to the Board of Admissions were made pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 703, which requires proof of an applicant's course of law studies and fulfillment of the requirements for and receipt of a first degree in law from a law school approved by the American Bar Association, and Supreme Court Rule 704, which requires each applicant to file with the Board of Admissions to the Bar both a character and fitness registration application and separate application to take the bar exam.

14. Respondent's application to the bar ("questionnaire") requested answers to 55 questions relating to his character and his potential fitness to practice law. Respondent completed the application, but did not disclose his false statement in his application to the University of Chicago Law School that he was diagnosed with and received treatment for leiomyosarcoma.

15. Question 55 of the questionnaire asked the following: "Do you understand that after your Character and Fitness Registration Application is filed, you will have a continuous reporting obligation and must notify the Board of Admissions of any changes or additions to the information provided in your application? This includes, but is not limited to, address changes, employment changes, criminal charges, disciplinary actions (educational, employment or other), and traffic violations, including any parking tickets that are not paid upon receipt."

16. Respondent answered "Yes" to Question 55 of the questionnaire.

17. Question 53 of the questionnaire asked the following: "Is there any additional information with respect to possible misconduct or lack of moral qualification or general fitness on your part that is not otherwise disclosed by your answers to questions in this application?"

18. Respondent answered "No" to question 53 of the questionnaire. At no time prior to the February 21, 2018 voting of a complaint by the members of Panel C of the Inquiry Board, did Respondent advise the Committee on Character and Fitness that he had submitted a false information in his application for admission to the University of Chicago Law School. At no time prior to his admission to the Bar in the State of Illinois did Respondent amend or change his answer to question 53 of the questionnaire to provide the Committee on Character and Fitness information about the false information he included in his application for admission to the University of Chicago Law School.

19. Respondent's preparation of his application to the bar, his answer to question 53 of the questionnaire, and his failure to advise the Committee on Character and Fitness of his conduct in submitting the false information in his application for admission for University of Chicago Law School were false and Respondent knew that his conduct was false because his application for admission to the Illinois Bar contained material omissions which were intended to deceive the Committee on Character and Fitness in order to advance Respondent's chances for admission to the Illinois Bar.

20. On or about May 31, 2011, Respondent submitted the questionnaire to the Committee on Character and Fitness together with the remainder of his application to the Illinois Bar. On or about November 10, 2011, Respondent was admitted in reliance on the entire application, which was not accurate.

21. As a result of the conduct set forth above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct:

  1. knowingly making a statement of fact known by the applicant to be false in his application to the Bar, and failing to update that information, including but not limited to Respondent's failure to reveal his false statement that he was diagnosed with and received treatment for leiomyosarcoma in his law school application, in violation of Rule 8.1(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct;

  2. failing to disclose a fact necessary to correct a material misapprehension in his application to the Bar, and failing to update that information, including but not limited to Respondent's false statement that he was diagnosed with and received treatment for leiomyosarcoma in his law school application, in violation of Rule 8.1(b) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; and

  3. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, including but not limited to Respondent's failure to disclose his false statement that he was diagnosed with and received treatment for leiomyosarcoma in his law school application in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct.

COUNT III
(Dishonesty to Court and Opposing Counsel-Sulemani Matter)

22. The Administrator repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-10 of Count I and paragraphs 13-20 of Count II.

23. On November 28, 2014, Respondent filed a civil rights complaint on behalf of plaintiff Kahn Sulemani with the United States Court for the Central District of Illinois. The case was docketed as Kahn Sulemani v. Dr. Scott Moats, et al., docket number 14 CV 01453, and assigned to the Honorable James E. Shadid and Magistrate Jonathan E. Hawley. The defendants were represented by Assistant United States Attorneys for the Central District of Illinois.

24. During the pendency of the Sulemani case, Judge Hawley set discovery schedules in the matter, including on April 30, 2015, when Judge Hawley entered an order adopting the parties' proposed discovery plan and setting discovery deadlines and a trial schedule. Judge Hawley ordered fact discovery closed on January 31, 2016, disclosure of experts by May 31, 2106, all discovery including expert depositions to be completed by July 29, 2016, a final pretrial conference for November 15, 2016 and jury trial for January 9, 2017.

25. On December 15, 2015, Respondent sent an email to Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) Gerard Brost, who represented the defendants in the Sulemani case, describing Respondent's intention to file a motion for an extension of time to complete fact discovery, stating in part the following:

"...I know we had a lengthy fact discovery period in this case to begin with but I have been away from the office for most of the 4 months dealing with a serious medical issue (having tumors removed from my abdomen and stomach).

26. Respondent's statement to AUSA Brost, set forth in paragraph 25, that he had been away from the office for most of the previous four months dealing with a serious medical issue involving the removal of tumors from his abdomen and stomach was false.

27. Respondent knew the statement, set forth in paragraph 25, that he had been away from the office for most of the previous four months dealing with a serious medical issue involving the removal of tumors from his abdomen and stomach was false, because Respondent was not ill with a serious medical issue involving removal of tumors from his abdomen.

28. On December 8, 2015, AUSA Brost responded that he would have no objection to a motion filed by Respondent to request more time for discovery, "And, given your medical issues I would hope the judge will allow a decent continuance."

29. On December 16, 2015, Respondent filed a motion in the Sulemani case, on behalf of the plaintiff, that he identified as an "Agreed Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Fact Discovery," requesting an extension of time to April 29, 2016 to complete fact discovery, and extension of time to depose experts to September 12, 2016.

30. In the December 16, 2015 motion, identified in paragraph 29, Respondent stated in part, the following:

"While the Parties have diligently worked together to timely complete fact discovery in this case, counsel for Plaintiff has been unable to engage fully in discovery over the last three months due to serious illness requiring surgery beyond Plaintiff's control.

Despite Plaintiff's counsel's illness..."

31. In that same motion, identified in paragraph 30, Respondent stated that the motion was brought in good faith.

32. Respondent knew that the statements in the motion filed December 16, 2015, identified in paragraphs 30 and 31, concerning a purported "serious illness requiring surgery" that affected Respondent's ability to complete discovery and that the motion was brought in good faith in the Sulemani case were false.

33. Respondent knew the statements to the AUSA and as set forth in the motion, identified in paragraphs 30 and 31, were false because Respondent was not seriously ill, nor did he have an illness requiring surgery, nor was the motion brought in good faith.

34. On December 17, 2015, Judge Hawley granted the motion and allowed an extension for completion of non-expert discovery by April 29, 2016, completion of expert discovery by September 12, 2016, reset the final pretrial conference to February 3, 2017, and reset the jury trial to March 13, 2017.

35. On June 26, 2016, Respondent filed a document entitled "Motion for a Final Extension of Time to Complete Fact Discovery," requesting an extension to July 29, 2016 for closure of fact discovery, and completion of expert discovery by October 31, 2016.

36. On July 13, 2016, Respondent filed his motion to withdraw as Plaintiff's counsel.

37. On August 2, 2016, Judge Hawley granted Respondent's motion to withdraw and terminated Respondent's representation of Plaintiff in Sulemani v. Dr. Scott Moats, et al.

38. As no time prior to August 2, 2016 did Respondent advise Judge Hawley or opposing counsel that his statements to opposing counsel and the court regarding his health were false.

39. By reason of the conduct above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct:

  1. knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or failure to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer, including but not limited to filing a false pleading before Judge Hawley that a serious illness requiring surgery had prevented Respondent from compliance with the Court's discovery schedule in Sulemani v. Dr. Scott Moats, et al., in violation of Rule 3.3(a)(1) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct;

  2. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation, by conduct including but not limited to the filing a false pleading before Judge Hawley and making false statements to AUSA Brost to receive an extension of time in Sulemani v. Dr. Scott Moats, et al., in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; and

  3. conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, by conduct including but not limited to filing a false pleading before Judge Hawley and making false statements AUSA Brost to receive an extension of time in Sulemani v. Dr. Scott Moats, et al., in violation of Rule 8.4(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct.

COUNT IV
(Dishonesty to Court and Opposing Counsel-Harris Matter)

40. The Administrator repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-10 of Count I, paragraphs 13-20 of Count II, and paragraphs 23-38 of Count III.

41. On November 29, 2013, Respondent filed a civil rights complaint on behalf of plaintiff David Harris with the United States Court for the Northern District of Illinois, which was docketed as David Harris v. Larissa Baccus, John Rotunno, Kevin Cronin, et al., 13 CV 08584. The matter was assigned to Honorable John W. Darrah. The defendants were represented by Assistant United States Attorneys for the Northern District of Illinois.

42. During the pendency of the case, Judge Darrah ruled on various matters and set discovery schedules in the Harris case.

43. On September 2, 2015, Judge Darrah entered an order setting discovery deadlines and a trial schedule in the Harris case. Judge Darrah ordered discovery closed on June 30, 2016, a pretrial conference for January 18, 2017 and jury trial to commence on January 30, 2017.

44. On or about June 24, 2016, Respondent filed a motion on behalf of the plaintiff identified as an "Agreed Joint Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Fact Discovery," requesting a 60-day extension of time to August 30, 2016 to complete fact discovery, extension of time to complete expert discovery by September 30, 2016, and dispositive motion deadline of October 30, 2016 in the Harris case.

45. On or about June 28, 2016, Judge Darrah denied the Agreed Joint Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery identified in paragraph 44. Instead, the Judge allowed an extension to complete discovery until July 30, 2016 but ordered that all other dates, as set forth in paragraph 41, to remain as originally scheduled.

46. Pursuant to subpoenas issued by Respondent in the Harris case, defendants Kevin Cronin and John Rotunno were to appear for deposition on July 19, 2016 and July 20, 2016, respectively.

47. On July 19, 2016 at 7:38 a.m., Respondent sent an electronic communication ("email") to defense counsel Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA") Virginia Hancock and copied to AUSA Gina Brock regarding defendant Kevin Cronin's scheduled deposition in the Harris case, which stated, in part:

"I've had a family emergency this morning and will have to cancel agent Cronin's deposition. I understand we have limited time and this very likely means I will not have a chance to depose him again. I simply have no choice. We will go ahead with rotunno [sic] tomorrow even if I have to have a colleague cover for me. Sorry for short notice for today. Please confirm that you received this. Apologies, Vince"

48. On July 19, 2016 at 7:48 a.m., AUSA Hancock responded to Respondent's email set forth in paragraph 47 as follows:

"I just received your message. We will tell Kevin Cronin. Sorry to hear about your family emergency."

49. Respondent's statement to AUSA Hancock and AUSA Brock, as set forth in paragraph 47, that he had to cancel agent Cronin's deposition due to a family emergency, was false.

50. Respondent knew the statement, as set forth in paragraph 47, that he had to cancel agent Cronin's deposition due to a family emergency, was false as there was no family emergency necessitating a last-minute cancellation of agent Cronin's deposition in the Harris case.

51. On July 19, 2016 at 1:22 p.m., Respondent sent an email to AUSA Hancock, and copied to AUSA Brock, the following message related to rescheduling depositions:

"Just checking in on this. Sorry only have occasional access to my phone. Have a child about to have surgery. A little stressed out. Let me know as soon as you can. Thanks."

52. Respondent's statement to AUSAs Hancock and Brock, as set forth in paragraph 51, that he had a child about to have surgery, was false.

53. Respondent knew his statement to AUSAs Hancock and Brock, as set forth in paragraph 51, that he had a child about to have surgery, was false because Respondent had no children, nor any child about to have surgery.

54. On July 19, 2016 at 1:37 p.m., AUSA Hancock responded to Respondent's emails as follows, in part:

"We're very sorry to hear that and hope the surgery goes well. Unfortunately, given the current summary judgment schedule, we cannot agree to reschedule Rotunno's deposition. Our backs are against a wall as our summary judgment motion is due to be filed on Friday.
We have no problem if you want to contact Judge Darrah's chambers and ask if we can rework our summary judgment schedule because of the emergency."

55. On July 19, 2016, Respondent spoke to Judge Darrah's clerk, Melanie Foster, and advised her that due to a family emergency, Respondent would be requesting an extension of time to complete discovery in the Harris case.

56. Respondent's statement to Melanie Foster, that he had a family emergency for which he would be requesting an extension of time to complete discovery, as set forth in paragraph was false.

57. Respondent knew that his statement to Melanie Foster, as set forth in paragraph 54, that he had a family emergency for which he would be requesting an extension of time to complete discovery was false, because Respondent knew that he had no family emergency that would justify an extension of the discovery schedule in the Harris case.

58. On July 19, 2016 at 2:01 p.m., Respondent sent an email to AUSA Brock, and copied to AUSA Hancock, the following message, in part, about his conversation with Judge Darrah's clerk related to extending discovery deadlines:

"Just spoke to clerk. She asked me to file motion and said she'd have decision within 24 hours but probably sooner. Also said based on circumstances she thought he would grant it. Two questions. Can I file as agreed? And if we don't get a decision before the dep tomorrow but still get an extension will you still allow me to depose rotunno [sic]?"

59. On July 19, 2016 at 2:20 p.m., AUSA Hancock responded, in part, to Respondent's email, as set forth in paragraph 58, as follows:

"We just got back from speaking with the clerk. We went up to see her and to tell her that you would probably call. Apparently she had just hung up with you when we arrived. We told the clerk that we do not oppose the motion and that it can be agreed. She said she is going to recommend the court set following briefing schedule: MSJ due 9/1, response due 9/22, reply due 10/6. All other deadlines to remain the same."

60. On July 19, 2016 at 2:22 p.m., Respondent sent an email to AUSA Brock, and copied to AUSA Hancock, containing the following message related to filing a motion for an extension in the Harris case:

"My paralegal has drafted motion seeking up to thirty days extension. Makes clear this is due to family emergency. Let me know ASAP re my questions above. I have to email clerk once filed. Thanks."

61. On July 19, 2016, Respondent filed a purported "agreed emergency motion for extension" in the Harris case, docket number 126, which stated, in part:

(5) "Counsel for Plaintiff has a family emergency that requires his son to have urgent surgery. That surgery will take place this afternoon."

(7) "As such, due to the emergent nature of the circumstances, counsel for Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant an up to 30-day extension of time to submit dispositive motions to August 30, 2016 so that counsel can be with his son during the above-described family emergency without losing the opportunity to complete the remaining two depositions in this matter."

(8) "This motion is brought in good faith and no party will be prejudiced by the requested extension."

62. On July 20, 2016, Judge Darrah granted Respondent's purported agreed emergency motions for extension, as set forth in paragraph 61. Judge Darrah ordered that dispositive motion be filed on September 1, 2016, responses by September 22, 2016, and replies by October 6, 2016.

63. Respondent's motion, as set forth in paragraph 61, alleging that he had a family emergency, requiring his son to have urgent surgery on the afternoon of July 19, 2016 which requested an emergent extension to submit dispositive motions in the Harris case, so that Respondent could be with his son during a family emergency, and that the motion was brought in good faith were false.

64. Respondent knew his motion, as set forth in paragraph 61, alleging that he had a family emergency requiring his son to have urgent surgery on the afternoon of July 19, 2016, which requested an emergent extension to submit dispositive motions in the Harris case so that Respondent could be with his son during a family emergency, was false because there was no family emergency, Respondent had no son, and the motion was not brought in good faith.

65. On July 25, 2016 at 9:45 a.m., Respondent sent an email to AUSA Brock, and copied to AUSA Hancock, the following message related to Respondent's purported reason for requesting an extension to complete discovery in the Harris case:

"Yes, all went well. Thanks so much for asking. He has leiomyosarcoma, a form of stomach cancer, and had to have a small portion of his stomach and GI tract removed. It sounds terrible but apparently it is a rare but also highly treatable disease. My fiance [sic] and I have fostered kids on and off for the last 5 or so years. The only downside is that these incredible kids are often in this situation in the first place because they have one or more serious illnesses/conditions. I normally wouldn't share such personal information but I really do feel so grateful for yours and Gina's support last week and think it's important that you know what it actually meant to me."

66. Respondent's statements to AUSAs Brock and Hancock, as set forth in paragraph 64, that his son's surgery went well, that Respondent's son had leiomyosarcoma which required surgery to remove a small portion of his stomach and GI tract, and that Respondent and his fiance [sic] had fostered children for the last five years were false.

67. Respondent knew his statements to AUSAs Brock and Hancock, as set forth in paragraph 65, that his son's surgery went well, that Respondent's son had leiomyosarcoma which required surgery to remove a small portion of his stomach and GI tract, and that Respondent and his fiance [sic] had fostered children for the last five years, were false because Respondent had no child or foster child, therefore no diagnosis of leiomyosarcoma, and no surgery.

68. On August 31, 2016, Respondent, through counsel, filed docket number 133, what he referred to as an "emergency motion to correct pleading by Vince Field," in which Respondent admitted making false statements in Respondent's July 19, 2016 "agreed emergency motion for extension," as set forth in paragraph 61. Additionally, Respondent admitted the statements he made to Judge Darrah's clerk, Melanie Foster, and opposing counsel about a family emergency were false. Further, Respondent stated that "this is something that I have never done before." The document contained the following statements:

(2) "This pleading contains a number of false statements that I would like to correct and/or withdraw."

(3) "Specifically, paragraph 5 states that "Counsel for Plaintiff has a family emergency that requires his son to have urgent surgery. That surgery will take place this afternoon." In addition, paragraph 7 states that "due to the emergent nature of the circumstance" counsel for Plaintiff was requesting an extension of time to complete discovery "so that [he] could be with his son during the above-described family emergency..." Finally, paragraph 8 represented that the motion was "brought in good faith."

(4) "Prior to filing the motion, I contacted the Clerk of this Court, Melanie Foster, and similarly informed her that I was having a family emergency requiring me to request an extension of time to complete discovery."

(5) "All of these statements were false as there was no family emergency."

(7) "I also misled opposing counsel before and after the filing of the motion."

(9) "I would like to note that this is something that I have never done before."

69. Respondent's statement, set forth in paragraph 68, of his "emergency motion to correct pleading by Vince Field," that "this is something that I have never done before" was false.

70. Respondent knew his statement, set forth in paragraph 68, of his "emergency motion to correct pleading by Vince Field," that "this is something that I have never done before" was false because Respondent knew he previously falsely stated that he suffered from leiomyosarcoma, for which he had received surgery and treatment, in his 2006 application to University of Chicago Law School, his 2011 application to take the Illinois Bar and in a December 16, 2015 motion in the Sulemani matter.

71. On September 1, 2016, Judge Darrah ruled that Respondent's "Emergency motion [133], as set forth in paragraph 68 was taken under advisement. As of the March 20, 2018 date of the filing of the complaint, Respondent's emergency motion in the Harris case had not been corrected or withdrawn.

72. By reason of the conduct above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct:

  1. knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or failure to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer, including but not limited to filing false pleadings before Judge Darrah that there was a family emergency preventing him from compliance with the Court's discovery schedule and, in the docket number 133 filing, that he had never done anything like that before in Harris v. Baccus, et al., in violation of Rule 3.3(a)(1) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct;

  2. knowingly making a false statement of material fact or law to a third person, by conduct including but not limited to his representation to clerk Melanie Foster, AUSA Hancock and AUSA Brock that there was a family emergency preventing him from compliance with the Court's discovery schedule in Harris v. Baccus, et al., in violation of Rule 4.1(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct;

  3. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation, by conduct including but not limited to the filing a false pleading before Judge Darrah, and making false statements to clerk Melanie Foster, AUSA Hancock, and AUSA Brock to receive an extension of time in Harris v. Baccus, et al., in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; and

  4. conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, by conduct including but not limited to filing a false pleading before Judge Darrah, and making false statements to clerk Melanie Foster, AUSA Hancock, and AUSA Brock to receive an extension of time in Harris v. Baccus, et al., in violation of Rule 8.4(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct.

COUNT V
(Making false statements in connection with a disciplinary matter)

73. The Administrator repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-10 of Count I, paragraphs 13-20 of Count II, paragraphs 23-38 of Count III, and paragraphs 41-71 of Count IV.

74. On October 21, 2016, Respondent appeared before counsel for the Administrator at the Commission's Chicago office and gave sworn testimony relating to the matters described in the preceeding counts of this complaint.

75. During his sworn statement, Respondent was asked the following questions by counsel for the Administrator and gave the following answers:

Q: So are there cases other than this matter involving Mr. Harris that you fell behind in relation to whether there were discovery issues or dispositive motions? (P. 36, L. 4-7)

A: Yes. (P. 36, L. 8)

Q: Were you granted extensions in those other cases? (P. 36, L. 16-17)

A: Yes. (P. 36, L. 18)

Q: All right. So am I correct in assuming that this is the only false pleading that you filed with the Court? (P. 36, L. 19-21)

A: Yes. (P. 36, L. 22)

Q: Okay. And as to your representations for extensions to whoever the defense attorney may be, were there any false representations made for the reason why you had to file for an extension to anyone other than those involved in the Harris case? (P. 36-37, L. 23-24, 1-4)

A: In the other cases you mean? ( P. 37, L. 5)

Q: Yes. (P. 37, L. 6)

A: No. It was just about having a lot of additional work. There really wasn't even an explanation that was necessary. It was just like I can't meet this deadline. Do you have a problem with me asking for a short extension and there was never any issue. (P. 37, L. 7-12)

76. The answers given by Respondent during his sworn statement on October 21, 2016, as set forth in paragraph 75, above, were false, and were intended to mislead the Administrator, because Respondent did make misrepresentations to opposing counsel about the reason for requesting extensions to complete discovery and filed other false pleadings with the Court, in the Sulemani case, then pending before Judge Hawley in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois.

77. Respondent knew his statements, as set forth in paragraph 74, were false because Respondent did make misrepresentations to opposing counsel about the reason for requesting extensions to complete discovery and filed other false pleadings with the Court, in the Sulemani case, then pending before Judge Hawley in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois.

78. By reason of the conduct outlined above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct:

  1. knowingly making a statement of material fact known by the lawyer to be false in connection with a lawyer disciplinary matter, including but not limited to Respondent's false statement that he had not misrepresented requests for extensions to complete discovery to opposing counsel or filing false pleadings with the Court in matters other than Harris v. Baccus, et al., in violation of Rule 8.1(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct;

  2. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, including but not limited to Respondent's false statement that he had not misrepresented requests for extensions to complete discovery to opposing counsel or filing false pleadings with the Court in matters other than Harris v. Baccus, et al., in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct.

COUNT VI
(Dishonesty to Court and Opposing Counsel-Johnson Matter)

79. The Administrator repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-10 of Count I, paragraphs 13-20 of Count II, paragraphs 23-38 of Count III, paragraphs 41-71 of Count IV, and paragraphs 74-77 of Count V.

80. On October 11, 2011, Lee Andrew Johnson, then an Illinois Department of Corrections inmate at Pinckneyville Correctional Center, filed a civil rights complaint with the United States Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The case was docketed as Lee Andrew Johnson v. Winnebago County Jail, et al., docket number 11 CV 50294, and assigned to the Honorable Frederick J. Kapala. The case was later referred to the Honorable P. Michael Mahoney. Defendants were represented by Assistant States Attorneys from Winnebago County, and attorneys at the Cassiday Schade LLP and Mulerin, Rehfeldt & Varchetto, PC law firms ("defense attorneys")

81. On April 18, 2012, Respondent filed his appearance in the Johnson case on behalf of plaintiff Johnson.

82. During the pendency of the case, Judge Mahoney ruled on various matters and set discovery schedules in the Johnson case.

83. On October 12, 2012, Judge Mahoney entered an order setting discovery deadlines and a trial schedule in the Johnson case. Judge Mahoney ordered fact discovery closed by May 31, 2013, dispositive motions to be filed by June 28, 2013, and a discovery hearing set for January 18, 2013.

84. On May 3, 2013, the Johnson matter was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Iain D. Johnston pursuant to an executive committee order.

85. On May 13, 2013 at 4:26 p.m., Respondent sent the following email message to defense counsel Assistant States Attorney William Emmert ("ASA Emmert") and Joseph Lombardo ("Lombardo") concerning Respondent's delay in contacting Lombardo about discovery matters in the Johnson case:

"Sorry for not getting back to you sooner. I have been away from the office on and off for the last few weeks due to illness. I am back in the office full time and will have a draft status report for your review tomorrow afternoon. ...Thanks so much for your patience."

86. Respondent's statement to ASA Emmert regarding his purported illness and that he had been unable to communicate with opposing counsel sooner because he had "been away from the office on and off for the last few weeks due to illness," set forth in paragraph 83, above, was false.

87. Respondent knew his statement, as set forth in paragraph 85, was false because Respondent knew he had not been away from the office for the last few weeks due to illness.

88. On May 21, 2013, Judge Johnston conducted a status hearing in the Johnson matter and ordered the discovery deadline extended to August 31, 2013, and required dispositive motions to be filed on October 15, 2013.

89. On August 12, 2013 at 11:21 a.m., Respondent sent the following email message, in part, to defense counsel ASA Emmert and Lou Varchetto ("Varchetto") related to Respondent's delay in completing discovery matters in the Johnson case:

"I apologize for not getting back to you sooner regarding the above captioned case. Unfortunately, I have been out of the office most of the last two months dealing with a serious medical issue that necessitated twice having surgery to have tumors removed from my stomach. While still receiving treatment, I am back in the office near full time. I realize that fact discovery in this case closes on August 31 but at this point I feel I have no choice but to file for a short extension of that deadline. ...Please let me know if you agree to allow me to file this motion as unopposed."

90. Respondent's statement to ASA Emmert and Varchetto, as set forth in paragraph 89, regarding Respondent's alleged absence from the office for the last two months due to a serious medical illness requiring Respondent to have surgery on two occasions, as the reason for delay in engaging in discovery is false.

91. Respondent knew his statements to ASA Emmert and Varchetto, as set forth in paragraph 89, were false because Respondent had not been from the office for most of the last two months with a serious medical condition requiring surgery.

92. On August 12, 2013, at 11:32 a.m., Varchetto sent an email to Respondent and ASA Emmert in response to Respondent's email, identified in paragraph 89:

"Of course I will not object to your motion. I would only ask that all of the other scheduling dates (for example, deadline for dispositive motions) also be pushed back."

93. On August 12, 2103, at 11:51 a.m., ASA Emmert sent an email to Respondent and Varchetto in response to Respondent's email, identified in paragraph 89:

"I also have no objection to pushing everything back 30 to 45 days."

94. On August 12, 2013, Respondent filed a motion identified as "Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for an Extension of Time to Complete Discovery," in the Johnson case, requesting an extension of time to October 15, 2013, to complete discovery.

95. In the August 12, 2013 motion, identified in paragraph 94, Respondent stated in paragraph two, the following:

"While the Parties have engaged in written discovery, including the limited exchange of documents, the Parties have not been able to engage fully in discovery over the last two months because of medical circumstances beyond Plaintiff's control."

96. In that motion, as set forth in paragraph 95, Respondent's statement to the court that medical circumstances beyond Plaintiff's control hampered his ability to proceed with discovery over the last two months was false.

97. Respondent knew his statement to the court, as set forth in paragraph 95, was false because Respondent did not have a medical condition which delayed him from engaging in discovery over the last two months.

98. On August 16, 2013, in reliance on Respondent's false statements about his health, Judge Johnston granted Respondent's motion and extended the discovery cutoff date in the Johnson matter to October 15, 2013, with dispositive motions to be filed by November 29, 2013.

99. On October 14, 2013 at 11:24 a.m., Respondent sent the following email message, in part, to defense counsel ASA Emmert and copied to defense counsel Varchetto, related to Respondent's delay in completing discovery matters in the Johnson case:

"I apologize for the short notice on this but I would like your permission to request an additional 45 day discovery extension in this case. This week is my last week at the office as I will be taking an indefinite leave of absence related to my health. I have surgery scheduled for next week and don't anticipate being back at work until the new year. We have a new attorney starting this week who will be taking over a couple of my cases including this one. ...I understand that that you need to represent your clients' best interests but would very much appreciate you allowing me to file a motion for a discovery extension as unopposed."

100. Respondent's statements to ASA Emmert and Varchetto, as set forth in paragraph 99, regarding Respondent's purported upcoming surgery, his purported indefinite leave of absence from his office for health reasons, and a new attorney taking over the Johnson matter, were false.

101. Respondent knew his statements to ASA Emmert and Varchetto, as set forth in paragraph 99, were false because Respondent did not have upcoming surgery schedule for which he would take an indefinite leave of absence from the office requiring the reassignment of the Johnson case to a new attorney, nor did a new attorney file an appearance on behalf of plaintiff in the Johnson matter from October 14, 2013 through the conclusion of the case on March 31, 2015.

102. On October 14, 2013 at 2:51 p.m., ASA Emmert sent an email to Respondent in response to Respondent's email, identified in paragraph 99:

"Given the circumstances I have no objection. I hope everything goes well with your surgery."

103. On October 15, 2013, Respondent filed a motion, identified as "Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for an Extension of Time to Complete Discovery," in the Johnson case, requesting an extension of time to November 29, 2013, to complete discovery.

104. In the October 15, 2013 motion, identified in paragraph 103, Respondent stated in paragraph two, the following:

"While the Parties have engaged in written discovery, including the limited exchange of documents, the Parties have not been able to engage fully in discovery over the last two months because of serious medical circumstances beyond Plaintiff's control."

105. Respondent's statements to the court, as set forth in paragraph two of the motion, identified in paragraph 104, that the parties had not been able to fully engage in discovery in the Johnson matter because the Respondent was seriously ill over the last two months, were false.

106. Respondent knew the statements to the court, as set forth in paragraph 104, were false because Respondent was not seriously ill over the last two months such that he was not able to fully engage in discovery in the Johnson matter.

107. On October 16, 2013, in reliance on Respondent's false statements about his health, Judge Johnston granted Respondent's motion and extended the discovery cutoff date in the Johnson matter to December 5, 2013, with dispositive motions to January 15, 2014.

108. On November 26, 2013, Respondent filed a motion in the Johnson case, identified as "Plaintiff's Corrected Unopposed Motion for an Extension of Time to Complete Discovery," requesting an extension of time to March 5, 2014, to complete discovery.

109. In the November 26, 2013 motion, identified in paragraph 108, Respondent stated in paragraph two, the following:

"While the Parties have engaged in written discovery, including the limited exchange of documents, the Parties have not been able to engage fully in discovery over the last two months because of serious medical circumstances beyond Plaintiff's control."

110. Respondent's statements to the court, as set forth in paragraph two of the motion, identified in paragraph 109, that the parties had not been able to fully engage in discovery in the Johnson matter because the Respondent was seriously ill over the last two months, were false.

111. Respondent knew the statements to the court, as set forth in paragraph 109, were false because Respondent was not seriously ill over the last two months such that he was not able to fully engage in discovery in the Johnson matter.

112. On November 26, 2013, in reliance on Respondent's false statements about his health, Judge Johnston granted Respondent's motion and extended the discovery cutoff date in the Johnson matter to March 5, 2014, with dispositive motions to be filed by April 15, 2014.

113. On February 28, 2014, Respondent filed a motion, identified as "Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for an Extension of Time to Complete Discovery," in the Johnson case, requesting an extension of time to May 4, 2014, to complete discovery.

114. In the February 28, 2014 motion, identified in paragraph 113, Respondent stated in paragraph two, the following:

"While the Parties have engaged in written discovery, including the limited exchange of documents, the Parties have not been able to engage fully in discovery over the last two months because of serious medical circumstances beyond Plaintiff's control."

115. In that same February 28, 2014 motion, identified in paragraph 113, Respondent stated in paragraph four, that the motion was not made for purpose of delay.

116. Respondent's statements to the court as set forth in paragraphs two and four of the motion, identified in paragraphs 114 and 115, and in conversations with the defense attorneys, that the parties had not been able to fully engage in discovery in the Johnson matter because the Respondent was seriously ill over the last two months, and that the motion was not made for purposes of delay, were false..

117. Respondent knew the statements to the court as set forth in paragraphs two and four of the motion, identified in paragraphs 114 and 115, and in conversations with the defense attorneys, were false because Respondent was not ill over the last two months with a serious medical condition which delayed engaging in discovery, and the motion was made with the purpose of delay to allow Respondent additional time to complete discovery.

118. On March 3, 2014, in reliance on Respondent's false statements about his health and that the motion was not made for purpose of delay, Judge Johnston granted Respondent's motion and ordered that fact discovery close on May 4, 2014 in the Johnson matter, with dispositive motions to be filed by June 13, 2014.

119. On May 13, 2014 at 9:01 a.m., Respondent sent an email to defense counsel David Jasinski ("Jasinski,) and copied to defense counsels ASA Emmert, Kristopher A. Capadone ("Capadona,") and legal assistant Jennifer Rini ("Rini,") the following message related to Respondent's purported reason for a last minute cancellation of plaintiff's deposition in the Johnson case:

"I apologize for having to do this at the last minute but I will not be able to go forward with the deposition of Plaintiff tomorrow afternoon as scheduled. I had moved my regular weekly treatment to Friday to accommodate the deposition but was just informed a few minutes ago that it has to be moved back to Wednesday because my physician is no longer available on Friday. I explained my situation to his assistant but was told there is nothing that can be done at this point. ...If we cannot find a date before June 2 I will of course explain to the Judge that the failure to the Judge that the failure to get Plaintiff's deposition completed was my fault."

120. Respondent's statements to the defense attorneys, and Rini, as set forth in paragraph 119, that Respondent was unable to go forward with a plaintiff's deposition because Respondent was undergoing a regular weekly medical treatment on the date of the deposition was false.

121. Respondent knew his statements to the defense attorneys, and Rini, as set forth in paragraph 119, that Respondent was unable to go forward with a plaintiff's deposition because Respondent was undergoing a regular weekly medical treatment on the date of the deposition was false because Respondent was not undergoing a medical treatment necessitating cancellation of plaintiff's deposition on the scheduled date.

122. On May 13, 2014 at 10:04 a.m., Rini responded to Respondent's email as follows:

"I have cancelled this deposition with the sheriff's office. We are available on May 23. Would this date work for all?"

123. On May 22, 2014, Respondent filed a motion, identified as "Joint Motion for an Extension of Time to Complete Discovery," in the Johnson case, requesting an extension of time to complete the depositions of Dr. Schwartz and the plaintiff Lee Andrew Johnson.

124. In the May 22, 2014 motion, identified in paragraph 123, Respondent stated in paragraph three, in part, the following:

"Unfortunately, however, the Parties will not be able to complete the depositions of Plaintiff or of Dr. Schwartz prior to the May 23, 2014 deadline. ... while Plaintiff was scheduled to be deposed at the DuPage County Jail on May 14, 2014, this deposition was canceled by counsel for Plaintiff on May 13, 2014 because counsel for Plaintiff had a necessary weekly medical treatment re-scheduled to that same day. "

125. Respondent's statements to the court, as set forth in paragraph three of the joint motion, identified in paragraph 124, that Respondent's purported "necessary weekly medical treatment" having been scheduled for the date of the plaintiff's deposition, had purportedly hampered his ability to proceed with the plaintiff's deposition, was false.

126. Respondent knew his statements to the court, as set forth in paragraph three of the joint motion, identified in paragraph 124, that Respondent's purported "necessary weekly medical treatment" having been scheduled for the date of the plaintiff's deposition, had purportedly hampered his ability to proceed with the plaintiff's deposition, were false because Respondent was not undergoing a weekly necessary medical treatment on the same date as plaintiff's deposition was scheduled.

127. On May 27, 2014, in reliance on Respondent's false statements about his health, Judge Johnston granted Respondent's motion and extended the discovery deadline to June 19, 2014 solely to allow for the depositions of the plaintiff and Dr. Schwartz.

128. On July 31, 2014, defendants filed a motion, in the Johnson case, requesting an extension of time in which to file dispositive motions.

129. On August 5, 2014, Judge Johnston granted the defendants' motion and ordered dispositive motions to be filed by September 15, 2014 and set a briefing schedule ordering responses to any such motions to be filed by October 20, 2014, with any replies due by November 7, 2014.

130. On September 15, 2014, the defendants in the Johnson case filed their motions for summary judgment.

131. On October 13, 2014, Respondent filed a motion, identified as "Plaintiff's Corrected and Unopposed Motion for an Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment" in the Johnson case, requesting an extension to respond to defendants' motions for summary judgment.

132. On October 14, 2014, Judge Johnston granted Respondent's motion and ordered plaintiff's responses to the motions for summary judgment due on November 17, 2014, with defendants' reply briefs to be filed by December 3, 2014.

133. On November 9, 2014, at 7:07 p.m., Respondent sent an email to defense counsel ASA Emmert and Jasinski, the following message related to Respondent's purported reason for requesting an extension to file plaintiff's response to defendants motion for summary judgment in the Johnson case:

"I unexpectedly have to return home to Montreal for a funeral this week. I will be gone for 2 days and would like to ask the Court to extend my deadline to respond by the two days that I will miss. Please let me know if I can represent to the Court that you either agree.do not oppose the request."

134. Respondent's statements to defense counsel, as set forth in paragraph 133, that Respondent had to return home to Montreal to attend a funeral was false.

135. Respondent knew his statements to the defense counsel, as set forth in paragraph 133, that Respondent had to return home to Montreal to attend a funeral was false because Respondent did not need to travel to Montreal to attend a funeral, as none of his family or acquaintances had died and no funeral was scheduled at which Respondent's appearance was necessary in Montreal.

136. On November 10, 2014 at 7:31 a.m., defense counsel Jasinski responded to Respondent's email as follows:

"No objection on my end. Sorry for your loss."

137. On November 10, 2014 at 9:14 a.m., defense counsel ASA Emmert responded to Respondent's email as follows:

"My condolences, Vince. Take the time you need."

138. On November 10, 2014, Respondent filed a motion, identified as "Plaintiff's Agreed Motion for an Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment," in the Johnson case, requesting a three-day extension to file plaintiff's response to the motion for summary judgment.

139. In the November 10, 2014 motion, identified in paragraph 138, Respondent stated in paragraph three, the following:

"Counsel for Plaintiff must unexpectedly travel home to Montreal for a funeral."

140. Respondent's statement to the court, as set forth in paragraph three of the motion, identified in paragraph 139, that he had to unexpectedly travel home to Montreal for a funeral was false.

141. Respondent knew his statement to the court, as set forth in paragraph three of the motion, identified in paragraph 139, was false because Respondent did not need to travel to Montreal to attend a funeral, as none of his family or acquaintances had died and no funeral was scheduled at which Respondent's appearance was necessary in Montreal.

142. On November 10, 2014, in reliance on Respondent's false statements about his travelling to Montreal to attend a funeral, Judge Johnston granted Respondent's motion and ordered plaintiff's responses to the motions for summary judgment in the Johnson case to be filed by November 20, 2014 and defendants' reply briefs to be filed by December 8, 2014.

143. On November 17, 2014, at 8:59 a.m., Respondent sent an email to defense counsel ASA Emmert and Jasinski, containing the following message related to Respondent's purported reason for requesting an additional extension to file plaintiff's response to defendants motion for summary judgment in the Johnson case:

"I hate to come to you again with this but I got stuck in Montreal helping my mom get her affairs in order after the funeral. I was hoping to contact the court and get my response deadline extended until Monday instead of this Thursday. However, I understand that you have to represent the interests of your clients and that you have been very generous to me throughout this case with extensions. As such, if you cannot agree to this I completely understand. Indeed, if you don't think that you can agree I am happy to put in the motion that you needed to check with your clients regarding the extension and were not able to get back to me prior to me filing the motion. Please let me know wither [sic] way. Thank you."

144. Respondent's statements to defense counsel, as set forth in paragraph 143, that Respondent was stuck in Montreal helping his mom get her affairs in order after a funeral was false.

145. Respondent knew his statements to the defense counsel, as set forth in paragraph 143, were false because Respondent was not in Montreal helping his mom get her affairs in order after a funeral because Respondent did not travel to Montreal to attend a funeral or assist his mother to get her affairs in order after the purported funeral.

146. On November 17, 2014 at 9:56 a.m., defense counsel ASA Emmert responded to Respondent's email as follows:

"Under the circumstances I have no objection."

147. On November 17, 2014 at 10:05 a.m., defense counsel Jasinski responded to Respondent's email as follows:

"No objection on our end. Take care."

148. On November 17, 2014, Respondent filed a motion, identified as "Plaintiff's Second Agreed Motion for an Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment," in the Johnson case, requesting an additional four-day extension to file plaintiff's response.

149. In the November 17, 2014 motion, identified in paragraph 148, Respondent stated in paragraph two, the following:

"Counsel for Plaintiff requested that extension because he unexpectedly had to travel home to Montreal for a funeral. Counsel for Plaintiff remained in Montreal for longer than anticipated in order to help his mother get her affairs in order after the funeral."

150. Respondent's statement to the court, as set forth in paragraph two of the motion, identified in paragraph 149, that Respondent had to remain in Montreal longer than expected to assist his mother to get her affairs in order after the purported funeral..

151. Respondent knew his statement to the court, as set forth in paragraph two of the motion, identified in paragraph 149, was false because Respondent did not travel to or remain in Montreal to assist his mother to get her affairs in ordered after the purported funeral.

152. On November 17, 2014, in reliance on Respondent's false statements about his remaining in Montreal to assist his mother to get her affairs in order after a purported funeral, Judge Johnston granted Respondent's motion and ordered plaintiff's responses to the motions for summary judgment to be filed by November 24, 2014, with defendants' reply briefs to be filed by December 12, 2014 in the Johnson case. The order was marked as the final extension.

153. On November 26, 2014, Respondent filed, instanter, the plaintiff's response to defendants' motions for summary judgment in the Johnson case.

154. As of October 31, 2018, the date the Administrator's investigation of Respondent's conduct in the Johnson case was referred to the members of Panel C of the Inquiry Board, Respondent had not advised the Court or defense counsel of his false statements.

155. By reason of the conduct above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct:

  1. knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or failure to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer, by conduct including but not limited to filing false pleadings before Judge Johnston regarding Respondent's purported medical condition and a purportedly unexpected trip to Montreal to attend a funeral preventing him from compliance with the Court's discovery schedule in Johnson v. Winnebago County Jail, et al., in violation of Rule 3.3(a)(1) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct;

  2. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation, by conduct including but not limited to the filing false pleadings before Judge Johnston, and making false statements to defense attorneys to receive extensions of time in Johnson v. Winnebago County Jail, et al., in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; and

  3. conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, by conduct including but not limited to filing false pleading before Judge Johnston, and making false statements to defense attorneys to receive extensions of time in Johnson v. Winnebago County Jail, et al., in violation of Rule 8.4(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct.

COUNT VII
(Dishonesty)

156. The Administrator repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-10 of Count I, paragraphs 13-20 of Count II, paragraphs 23-38 of Count III, paragraphs 41-71 of Count IV, paragraphs 74-77 of Count V, and paragraphs 80-154 of Count VI.

157. On August 1, 2011, counsel for Respondent's employer, the law firm of Loevy & Loevy, including Trent McCain, Thomas Kayes ("Kayes"), Michael Kanovitz, Samantha Liskow, and Sarah Copeland Grady ("Grady"), filed a prisoner civil rights complaint on behalf of plaintiff Damien Powell with the United States Court for the Northern District of Indiana. The case was docketed as Damien Powell v. John Buncich, et al., docket number 11 CV 00277, and assigned to the Honorable Philip P. Simon and Magistrate Judge Paul R. Cherry. The defendants were represented by John P. Bushemi, Michael J. Bolde, Patricia Roman Haas, and John M. Kopack.

158. During the pendency of the Powell case, Judge Cherry set discovery schedules in the matter, including on May 22, 2014, when Judge Cherry ordered that Sheriff Buncich's deposition take place on June 6, 2014, that the deadlines for non-expert discovery be extended to July 27, 2014, with disclosure of plaintiff expert witnesses by July 27, 2014 and defense expert witnesses by August 22, 2014, and closure of expert discovery by October 15, 2014. The Court further stated that any further requests for extension would be viewed with disfavor.

159. On June 6, 2014, Grady filed her appearance as additional plaintiff's counsel in the Powell matter.

160. On June 16, 2014, Respondent filed his appearance as additional plaintiff's counsel in the Powell matter.

161. On July 18, 2014, Grady filed motion for an extension of time to complete discovery and for leave to conduct additional depositions in the Powell matter. Grady's motion was the third such motion filed by counsel for the plaintiff in the Powell case.

162. On August 4, 2014, Judge Cherry denied plaintiff's July 18, 2014 motion for an extension of time to complete discovery. The Court ordered that the deadlines for non-expert discovery be extended to August 12, 2014, with disclosure of plaintiff expert witnesses by September 11, 2014 and closure of defense expert witnesses by October 13, 2014.

163. Sometime before August 26, 2014, Respondent falsely told Grady that he had retained an expert named Fred McClinton to offer an opinion concerning violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").

164. On August 26, 2014, Grady sent an email to Respondent and Kayes, regarding plaintiff's purported expert witness, McClinton, stating in part the following:

"Vince, you're gonna send me the list of materials that you sent Fred McClinton, the ADA expert, tonight when you get to Indy. Can you please give me his contact information, including his address and/or phone number too? We need to send him more documents and Melissa and I are going to do it tomorrow."

165. On August 27, 2014, the following email exchange occurred between Respondent and his co-counsel Grady related to Grady's email identified in paragraph 164, regarding the purported expert witness Fred McClinton, stating in part the following:

RESPONDENT: "There's no need. Get the docs you want them to look at ready. I just got off the phone with them. They are coming to meet with us in the office tomorrow. They will be there at 130. I am going to work with them on putting report together on the spot and they will take away whatever additional docs we want them to look at. "

RESPONDENT: "Also I already sent them the complaint, doj2 reports, my own summary of the case, and all defendants disco responses."

GRADY: "Who is they? I thought there was just one guy. I'll make time tomorrow. Are we writing the report tomorrow in the office? I'm confused."

RESPONDENT: "Ps they are working for a flat fee so feel free to take as much time as you want with them and pile on the docs."

RESPONDENT: "It's him and his assistant. No we are giving them guidelines on what we want report to look like, talking to them about the case, and giving them more docs. The assistant worked as an administrator for the health care unit for a prison in Florida so she has some good inside info."

GRADY: "What's the flat fee? I've never heard of an expert charging a flat fee before. Have McClinton ever written an expert report before?"

RESPONDENT: "He doesn't usually do flat fee but I convinced him to do a report for us for 4000. He has done many Ada reports. He has done free reports for pro se plaintiffs. He's a prisoner advocate of sorts as his own son who has mental illness is in prison on drug charges."

166. Respondent's statements to Grady, as set forth in paragraph 165, that he retained an ADA expert witness Fred McClinton and his assistant for a flat fee in the Powell matter, that

2 Department of Justice

Respondent had spoken to the purported expert McClinton, provided documents to the purported expert to review, scheduled a meeting with Respondent and Grady, and that the purported expert had prepared free reports for pro se plaintiff because the purported expert's son was incarcerated and suffered from a mental illness were false.

167. Respondent knew the statements, as set forth in paragraph 165, were false because there was no ADA expert named Fred McClinton, nor did the nonexistent expert have an assistant, whom Respondent retained for purposes of providing an expert opinion in the Powell matter, because Respondent made up the name Fred McClinton and had not retained an ADA expert witness at that time.

168. On August 28, 2014, Respondent sent an email to Grady and Kayas, regarding a meeting with plaintiff's purported ADA expert witness, McClinton, stating in part the following:

" Just talked to McClinton (fee Tom he's our ADA expert). He's out for tomorrow. His fam emergency was that his daughter was hit by a car while riding her bike. Broken bones and bruising but she's home and ok. He invited me to come to his place in Dolton on Saturday am. One of both of you are welcome to come with if you would like. We could meet at office. No worries if not I'm happy to do it myself (read Tom you should enjoy your weekend and not worry about this). He said we can send him extra docs if we want but he probably wont get to new docs until the weekend."

169. Respondent's statements to Grady and Kayes, as set forth in paragraph 168, that the purported ADA expert witness McClinton cancelled a meeting due to a family emergency involving McClinton's daughter were false.

170. Respondent knew the statements, as set forth in paragraph 168, were false because there was no ADA expert named Fred McClinton and no family emergency involving the purported expert's daughter necessitating cancellation of a purported meeting.

171. On August 30, 2014, Respondent sent an email to Grady and Kayes, regarding the availability of plaintiff's purported expert witness McClinton, stating, in part, the following:

"Bad and Great news:
Bad: McClinton is out. His daughter is in worse shape than they thought and he will not have time to get this done for us on time.
Great: He provided some recommendations and despite me thinking I was going to have a hard time finding someone on short notice I actually had to turn people away. ...I am going to send McClinton an email later telling him we appreciate his efforts during his family crisis and that we hope all is well with his daughter and look forward working with him in the future should the need arise. I will copy the both of you on that email as well. He seemed genuinely disappointed that he could not help us and I want to make sure he knows we found another expert so all is well on our end."

172. Respondent's statements to Grady and Kayes, as set forth in paragraph 171, that the purported ADA expert witness McClinton was unavailable as an expert in the Powell matter due to the worsening medical condition of McClinton's daughter were false.

173. Respondent knew the statements, as set forth in paragraph 171, were false because there was no ADA expert named Fred McClinton nor a worsening medical condition of the purported expert's daughter necessitating his unavailability.

174. On August 30, 2014, Respondent sent an email to the purported
ADA expert witness McClinton, at a purported email address of fdmconsultants.com, Grady, and Kayes, stating, in part, the following:

"Dear Mr. McClinton, I just wanted to say again how sorry I am about your daughter. I have copied my colleagues here because we would like to wish your daughter a speedy recovery and would like to thank you for your efforts on this case. I would also like to thank you for your recommendations for other experts..."

175. Respondent's statements and email address of ADA expert witness McClinton, as set forth in paragraph 174, about the purported ADA expert witness McClinton's daughter and email address to the purported ADA expert witness McClinton at fdmconsultants.com, and copied to Grady, and Kayes at McClinton's purported email address were false.

176. Respondent knew his statements, as set forth in paragraph 174, to Grady and Kayes about the purported ADA expert witness McClinton's daughter and that the expert's email address was fdmconsultants.com were false because there was no ADA expert named Fred McClinton with a recovering daughter and the email address of fdmconsultants.com.

177. On August 30, 2014, after receipt of the purported ADA expert witness McClinton's email address, fdmconsultants.com, identified by Respondent in paragraph 174, Grady sent the following email to fdmconsultants.com, believing it was McClinton's email address:

"Mr. McClinton: My condolences to you and your family. I hope that your daughter has a speedy recovery."

178. The email, as set forth in paragraph 177, which Grady sent to fdmconsultants.com, was returned as undeliverable because the email address provided by Respondent, for the purported ADA expert witness McClinton, was a false email address.

179. Respondent knew the email address fdmconsultants.com, identified in paragraph 174, as the email address for the purported ADA expert witness McClinton, was a false email address because there was no ADA expert named Fred McClinton retained by plaintiff in the Powell matter.

180. By reason of the conduct above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct:

  1. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation, by conduct including but not limited to the advising co-counsels Sarah Grady and Thomas Kayes that an ADA expert witness Fred McClinton was retained, then subsequently unavailable to provide an expert opinion in Powell v. Buncich, et al., due to a worsening medical condition of the expert's daughter, all in an attempt to receive additional time in which to seek and retain an ADA expert in Powell v. Buncich, et al., in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct.

WHEREFORE, the Administrator requests that this matter be assigned to a panel of the Hearing Board, that a hearing be held pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 753, and that the panel make findings of fact, conclusions of fact and law, and a recommendation for such discipline as is warranted.

Sharon D. Opryszek
Counsel for Administrator
Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission
130 East Randolph Drive, Suite 1500
Chicago, Illinois 60601-6219
Telephone: (312) 565-2600
E-mail: sopryszek@iardc.org

Respectfully submitted,

Jerome Larkin, Administrator
Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission

By:  Sharon D. Opryszek