BEFORE THE HEARING BOARD

OF THE

ILLINOIS ATTORNEY REGISTRATION

AND

DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION

In the Matter of:

James Gordon Walker,

Attorney-Respondent,

No. 2922835.

Commission No. 2014PR00132

FILED --- November 5, 2014

COMPLAINT

Jerome Larkin, Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission, by his attorney, Peter L. Rotskoff, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 753(b), complains of Respondent, James Gordon Walker, who was licensed to practice law in the State of Illinois on October 15, 1968, and alleges that Respondent has engaged in the following conduct which subjects her to discipline pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 770:

(Allegations common to all counts)

1. On November 24, 2004, Michael Moncelle was fatally injured when his vehicle was struck by a truck driven by Matthew Gross, in Peoria County, Illinois.

2. On or before January 25, 2005, Respondent and Patricia Moncelle, Michael Moncelle's widow ("Moncelle"), agreed to represent in a wrongful death and property damage case arising from the incident alleged in paragraph 1 above, against Gross and his employer.

3. On January 25, 2005, Respondent filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of McLean County on behalf of Moncelle. The case was captioned as: Patricia Moncelle, Individually and as Special Administrator of the Estate of Michael Moncelle, deceased v. C.A.P. Air Freight Inc. (employer) and Matthew F. Gross. The case was transferred to Peoria County on September 12, 2005 and assigned the case number 05 L 337.

4. On November 7, 2005, the trial court dismissed the complaint in case number 05 L 337 for the failure to sufficiently plead willful and wanton misconduct.

5. On December 9, 2005, Respondent filed a first amended complaint in case number 05 L 337. On November 17, 2006, Respondent filed a ten-count second amended complaint adding the owner of the truck, Air Cap LLC, as a defendant.

6. On November 30, 2007, one business day before the trial was scheduled to begin, Respondent moved to voluntarily dismiss case number 05 L 337.

7. On January 16, 2008, Respondent filed another action in the Circuit Court of Peoria County on behalf of Moncelle. The case was docketed as Patricia Moncelle, Individually and as Special Administrator of the Estate of Michael Moncelle, deceased v. C.A.P. Air Freight, Inc.; Air Cap, LLC; and Matthew F. Gross, case number 08 L 17.

8. On June 30, 2008, the trial court dismissed case number 08 L 17 with prejudice and held that the 2008 complaint was barred by res judicata. On July 30, 2008, Respondent appealed the dismissal. The Third District Appellate Court docketed the case as case number 3-09-0074.

9. On November 25, 2008, Respondent filed a petition for relief from judgment under Section 5/2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure in case number 05 L 337. On January 2, 2009, the trial court denied the petition for relief from judgment.

10. On January 21, 2009, Respondent appealed the trial court's order denying the petition for relief from judgment in case number 05 L 337. On March 27, 2009, the Third District Appellate Court consolidated the appeals from case numbers 05 L 337 and 08 L 17.

11. On April 7, 2010, the Third District Appellate Court issued a Rule 23 order in case number 3-09-0074 affirming the trial court's order dismissing case number 08 L 17 with prejudice and the order denying the petition for relief from judgment in case number 05 L 337.

12. On July 14, 2010, Respondent filed a petition for leave to appeal case 3-09-0074 in the Supreme Court of Illinois. The Supreme Court denied the petition for leave to appeal on September 29, 2010.

13. On October 31, 2011, Respondent filed, on behalf of Moncelle, a complaint in the Circuit Court of Peoria County ("October 2011 complaint"). The case was docketed as: Patricia Moncelle, Individually, and as Special Administrator of the Estate of Michael Moncelle, deceased, Plaintiff, v. C.A.P. Air Freight, Inc., Air Cap LLC, and Matthew F. Gross, Defendants, Justice Mary McDade, Justice Vicki Wright, and Justice Mary K. O'Brien, Additional Defendants. Respondent used the previous case numbers, 05 L 337 and 08 L 17 in the caption.

14. In the October 2011 complaint, as set forth below, Respondent alleged that the three Third District Appellate Court Justices who decided the appeal described in paragraph 11 above, engaged in fraud, criminal conduct, and corruption. Respondent sought to vacate the Rule 23 order and sought money damages from the judicial defendants.

15. On August 10, 2012, the trial court dismissed the October 2011 complaint against all of the defendants.

16. Respondent appealed the trial court's August 10, 2012 order dismissing the October 2011 complaint to the Third District Appellate Court. All of the justices from the Third District Appellate Court recused themselves, so the case was heard by the Second District Appellate Court. On March 19, 2014, the Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal of the October 2011 complaint, Patricia Moncelle, Individually, and as Special Administrator of the Estate of Michael Moncelle, deceased, Plaintiff, v. C.A.P. Air Freight, Inc., Air Cap LLC, and Matthew F. Gross, Defendants, Justice Mary McDade, Justice Vicki Wright, and Justice Mary K. O'Brien, Additional Defendants, case number 3-13-0121.

17. On September 7, 2012, Respondent, on behalf of Moncelle, filed another complaint in the Circuit Court of Peoria County against the Appellate Court Justices. The case was docketed as Patricia Moncelle, Individually and as Special Administrator of the Estate of Michael Moncelle, deceased v. Justice Mary McDade, Justice Vicki Wright and Justice Mary K. O'Brien, case number 12 L 269. Respondent again alleged that the three Justices engaged in fraud, corruption and criminal conduct.

18. On June 4, 2014, Respondent, on behalf of Moncelle, filed a petition for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court of Illinois in case number 3-13-0121.

19. On September 24, 2014, the Supreme Court of Illinois denied Respondent's petition for leave to appeal.

Count I
(False and/or reckless statements about judges - October 2011 Complaint)

20. In the October 2011 complaint that Respondent filed on behalf of Moncelle, Respondent made the following statements, inter alia, about Third District Appellate Court Justices McDade, Wright and O'Brien:

  1. Justices McDade, Wright and O'Brien committed the crime of Tampering with Public Records in that each of them knowingly, without lawful authority, and with the intent to defraud Plaintiff, altered the Record on Appeal while that Record was held by them, by fabricating an "order dismissing the counts in plaintiff's second-amended complaint against the corporate defendants premised on alleged violations of the FMCSR," when the Record on Appeal prepared by the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Peoria County did not contain such an order, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/32-8(c), a Class 3 felony. (Complaint at p. 15, par. 62)

  2. By this count Plaintiff and her counsel seek to expose, and obtain relief regarding, the corruption which pervades the Rule 23 Order filed by a panel of the Third District Appellate Court consisting of Justices Mary McDade, Vicki Wright and Mary K. O'Brien.

The corruption affects the entirety of the panel's actions regarding Plaintiff's appeals, but the expression of that corruption which Plaintiff will most discuss in this count is the panel's fabrication of a circuit court "order dismissing the counts in plaintiff's second-amended complaint against the corporate defendants, premised on alleged violations of the FMCSR." (Complaint at p. 17, par. 1-2)

  1. The natural effect of the assertions by Plaintiff's counsel that the panel intentionally misrepresented the record and cheated on the facts would be to embarrass the court and to derogate its honesty.

The panel became obligated to issue a rule against Plaintiff's counsel (James Walker) to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for making such charges.

Because the charges of intentional misrepresentation are true, and because the panel desires the least possible sunlight upon its misconduct, the panel has not issued a rule to show cause, or taken any other disciplinary action, against Plaintiff's counsel. (Complaint at p. 19, par. 64-66)

  1. Justices McDade, Wright and O'Brien committed the crime of official misconduct by knowingly performing acts which each of them knows she is forbidden by law to perform in violation of 720 ILCS 5/33-3(b), a Class 3 felony. (Complaint at p. 21, par. 80)

  2. When they decided to base their disposition of Plaintiff's appeals upon something other than an analysis of the facts and the law and when they decided to fabricate the circuit court "order dismissing the counts in plaintiff's second-amended complaint against the corporate defendants premised on alleged violations of the FMCSR," Justices McDade, Wright and O'Brien, each of whom are lawyers, violated Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct which provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation."

When they decided to base their disposition of Plaintiff's appeals upon something other than an analysis of the facts and the law and when they decided to fabricate the circuit court "order dismissing the counts in plaintiff's second-amended complaint against the corporate defendants premised on alleged violations of the FMCSR," Justices McDade, Wright and O'Brien violated Canon 3(A)(1) of the Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that a judge should be faithful to the law." (Complaint at p. 21-22, par. 81-82)

  1. The panel's repeated references to an "order dismissing the counts in plaintiff's second-amended complaint against the corporate defendants, premised on alleged violations of the FMCSR," was not due to negligence. To borrow from the Seventh Circuit, the panel's repeated references to the fabricated order "could not be accidental."

The panel's repeated references to an "order dismissing the counts in plaintiff's second-amended complaint against the corporate defendants, premised on alleged violations of the FMCSR," was an intentional misrepresentation. (Complaint at p. 22, par. 82-83)

  1. The panel's fabrication of an "order dismissing the counts in plaintiff's second-amended complaint against the corporate defendants premised on alleged violations of the FMCSR," was central to its fraud upon Plaintiff and the public and to its corruption of the legal process. (Complaint at p. 25, par. 86)

  2. A study of pages 8-13 of the Rule 23 Order reveals how skillfully the panel utilized its fabricated "order dismissing the counts in plaintiff's second-amended complaint against the corporate defendants premised on alleged violations of the FMCSR" in its fraud and deceit. (Complaint at p. 26, par. 90)

  3. Then, the panel gets to the most insidiously deceitful aspect of its Rule 23 Order. (Complaint at p. 28, par. 95)

  4. The Rule 23 Order is a fraud perpetrated by members of the panel and is not a decision at all. It is void. (Complaint at p. 33, par. 108)

  5. In this case the record demonstrates the corruptness of the panel's decision, although Plaintiff has yet to discover what motivated the panel to engage in that corruption.

In either situation, the result is corruption, and the defrauded party, the judges who have not engaged in such misconduct, and society as a whole, are damaged by the corruption. (Complaint at p. 34, par. 114-115)

  1. To further the policy of protecting judges from the burden of defending against civil suits alleging the same, Illinois reviewing courts have announced that as a general rule judges are immune from civil liability for misconduct which relates to or arises out of or in connection with her/his judicial office.

However, this grant of immunity does not extend to misconduct which the General Assembly has declared is a felony, as in the case of a judge who violates Subsection (c) of the Section of the Criminal Code labeled Tampering with Public Records. 720 ILCS 5/32-8(c). (Complaint at p. 37-38, par. 102-103)

21. Respondent made no allegations in the complaint concerning alleged wrongdoing by C.A.P. Air Freight Inc., Air Cap LLC or Matthew Gross.

22. Respondent's statements in paragraph 20 above, were false.

23. Respondent knew the statements in paragraph 20 were false or he made the statements with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity.

24. By reason of the conduct outlined above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct:

  1. making statements the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicative officer, or public legal officer by making the statements set forth in paragraph 20 above, in violation of Rule 8.2(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010);

  2. using means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, by making the statements set forth in paragraph 20 above, and by naming C.A.P. Air Freight Inc., Air Cap LLC and Matthew F. Gross, defendants in the October 2011 Complaint with making any specific allegations of wrongdoing against them in violation of Rule 4.4(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010); and

  3. conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by making the false and/or reckless statements set forth in paragraph 20 above, and by naming C.A.P. Air Freight Inc., Air Cap LLC and Matthew F. Gross, defendants in the October 2011 Complaint with making any specific allegations of wrongdoing against them in violation of Rule 8.4(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).

Count II
(False and/or reckless statements about judges in Respondent's
Response to the Motion to Dismiss
)

25. The Administrator realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-24, above.

26. On February 21, 2012, Defendants Justices McDade, Wright and O'Brien filed a motion to dismiss the October 2011 complaint.

27. On February 21, 2012, Respondent filed, on behalf of Moncelle, a response to the motion to dismiss. In the response Respondent alleged the following:

  1. Plaintiff alleges Defendants committed the crime of Tampering with Public Records in that each of them knowingly, without lawful authority, and with the intent to defraud Plaintiff, altered the Record on Appeal while that Record was held by them, by fabricating an "order dismissing the counts in plaintiff's second-amended complaint against the corporate defendants premised on alleged violations of the FMCSR," when the Record on Appeal prepared by the Circuit Clerk of Peoria County did not contain such an order, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/32-8(c), a Class 3 felony. (Response at p. 2)

  2. Plaintiff also alleges that by engaging in the same conduct, i.e., fabricating an "order dismissing the counts in plaintiff's second-amended complaint against the corporate defendants premised on alleged violations of the FMCSR," when the Record on Appeal prepared by the Circuit Clerk of Peoria County did not contain such an order, Defendants committed the crime of Official Misconduct in violation of 720 ILCS 5/33-3(b), also a Class 3 felony. (Response at p. 3)

  3. Plaintiff is alleging Defendants "decided to base their disposition of Plaintiff's appeals upon something other than an analysis of the facts and the law, and fabricated the "order dismissing the counts in plaintiff's second-amended complaint against the corporate defendants premised on alleged violations of the FMCSR," to fit within the rationale Defendants chose to offer for that disposition. (Response at p. 3)

  4. Its general statement that judges are not immune from our criminal laws, when combined with its specific mention of "judges" in subsection (c) of the Tampering with Public Records section of our Criminal Code, constitute a clear expression by the General Assembly that judges are not immune from criminal liability for altering court records. (Response at p. 18)

  5. The duty which Plaintiff alleges Defendants breached was owed to the public generally independent of the state employment. The statutory provisions against altering court records apply to everyone and are for the benefit of society as a whole in addition to the parties in any particular case. (Response at p. 19-20)

The complained-of actions, Defendants' alteration of court records, are not within the normal and official functions of the State. The normal and official functions of the state are to preserve and protect the integrity of court records. (Response at p. 20)

28. Respondent's statements in paragraph 27 above, were false.

29. Respondent knew the statements set forth in paragraph 27 above were false or he made the statements with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity.

30. By reason of the conduct outlined above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct:

  1. making statements the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicative officer, or public legal officer by making the statements set forth in paragraph 27 above, in violation of Rule 8.2(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010); and

  2. conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by making the false and/or reckless statements set forth in paragraph 27 above, in violation of Rule 8.4(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).

Count III
(False and/or reckless statements about judges in Respondent's
Motion to Reconsider
)

31. The Administrator realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-30 of Counts I and II, above.

32. On August 10, 2012, the trial court dismissed the three Appellate Court Justices from the October 2011 complaint.

33. On September 7, 2012, Respondent, on behalf of Moncelle, filed a "Motion to Reconsider Order of 8/10/12, or in the Alternative, Motion for Leave to File the Attached First Amended October 2011 Complaint."

34. In the Motion to Reconsider, Respondent alleged inter alia:

  1. The Court opined that if a circuit court were to vacate a decision of the appellate Court, such action "would turn the appellate process on its head."

The corruption of the Judicial Defendants has already turned the appellate process in the litigation on its head. (Motion to Reconsider at p. 2-3, par. 9-10)

  1. Nevertheless, in violation of their oaths of office and in violation of the criminal statutes set forth in the October 2011 Complaint, the Judicial Defendants fabricated an "order dismissing the counts in plaintiff's second-amended complaint against the corporate defendant's premised on alleged violations of the FMCSR" and then held that the entry of this fabricated "order" justified affirmation of the circuit court's dismissal of the corporate defendants. (Motion to Reconsider at p. 3, par. 14)

  2. To provide a rationale for the result they were corrupted to issue, the panel of McDade, Wright and O'Brien turned this process on its head. Instead of addressing the issue raised by Plaintiff, i.e., did the circuit court's oral and written rulings purporting to dismiss some subparagraphs from some of the counts against the corporate defendants without dismissing the entirety of any counts, constitute a final judgment, the panel created a "record" consistent with the rationale they chose to offer for their corrupt decision, but which was totally inconsistent with what happened in the circuit court.

The "record" the panel created was that the trial court entered an "order dismissing the counts in plaintiff's second-amended complaint against the corporate defendant's premised on alleged violations of the FMCSR," when in fact the trial court never dismissed any count.

Because the panel turned the appellate process on its head by "fabricating" a record to fit its corrupt decision, rather than "reviewing" the record that existed, it is the responsibility of the judicial system, starting with this Court, to turn this litigation back on its feet. (Motion to Reconsider at p. 3-4, par. 16-18)

  1. Here, the panel has done nothing to uphold the dignity of the court because the last thing the panel wants is additional sunlight on the question of whether it fabricated the "order dismissing the counts in plaintiff's second-amended complaint against the corporate defendant's premised on alleged violations of the FMCSR."

Is it possible that one or more Illinois judges could be corrupted to issue a decision that is contrary to the law and the facts and fabricate an order to provide a rationale for that corrupt decision? Of course it is. Then the questions becomes, is the Illinois court system willing to provide the party harmed by that corruption relief from that corrupt decision?

A recent article refers to the joke in Mexico that you can tell times are tough when a certain drug dealer has to lay off ten judges. Tab A at 47.

A gardener who refuses to pull weeds, will have more weeds.

If we announce that the court system will provide no relief to a party harmed by the entry of a corrupt appellate court decision, we will have more corrupt appellate court decisions. (Motion to Reconsider at p. 5, par. 23-27)

35. Respondent's statements in paragraph 34 above, were false.

36. Respondent knew the statements in paragraph 34 above were false or he made the statements with reckless disregard for their truth and falsity.

37. By reason of the conduct outlined above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct:

  1. making statements the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicative officer, or public legal officer by making the statements set forth in paragraph 34 above, in violation of Rule 8.2(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010); and

  2. conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by making the false and/or reckless statements set forth in paragraph 34 above, in violation of Rule 8.4(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).

Count IV
(False and/or reckless statements about judges in Respondent's Brief
filed in the Appellate Court
)

38. The Administrator realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-37 of Counts I, II, and III, above.

39. On February 14, 2013, Respondent filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's order of August 10, 2012, dismissing the Justices from the October 2011 complaint.

40. On September 6, 2013, Respondent, on behalf of Moncelle, filed his "Revised Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant." In the brief, Respondent made the following statements, inter alia about the Third District Appellate Court Justices:

  1. Given that a judgment based on fraud and corruption is void, that a court has a duty to vacate void judgments, and that under the present posture of the pleadings Plaintiff's allegations that the Rule 23 Order is based on fraud and corruption must be taken as true, if the circuit court doesn't have jurisdiction to vacate the Rule 23 Order, who does? Surely it is not the law that any court can vacate a circuit court judgment that is the product of fraud and corruption, but no court has jurisdiction to vacate an appellate court judgment that is the product of fraud and corruption. (Brief at p. 28)

  2. Although the Rule 23 Order dated 4/7/10 purports to be the judgment of the Third District Appellate Court regarding Plaintiff's appeals from orders of the Circuit Court of Peoria County, it is, for the reasons stated herein, a corrupt judgment, the legal equivalent of no judgment at all.

Just as the constitutional right to counsel has been construed to mean the right to "effective" counsel, the constitutional right to appeal has been construed to mean the right to have the issues raised in the appeal decided by competent jurists who are "faithful to the law" and who decide the isses based upon an analysis of the facts and the law and not upon fraud, deceit, and official misconduct.

The Rule 23 Order is a fraud perpetrated by members of the panel and is not a decision at all. It is void. (Brief at p. 41-42)

41. Respondent's statements in paragraph 40 above, were false.

42. Respondent knew that the statements in paragraph 40 above were false or he made the statements with reckless disregard of their truth or falsity.

43. By reason of the conduct outlined above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct:

  1. making statements the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicative officer, or public legal officer by making the statements set forth in paragraph 40 above, in violation of Rule 8.2(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010); and

  2. conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by making the false or reckless statements set forth in paragraph 40 above, in violation of Rule 8.4(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).

Count V
(False and/or reckless statements about judges in
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing
)

44. The Administrator realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-43 of Counts I, II, III, and IV, above.

45. On March 19, 2014, the Appellate Court, Second District, issued a Rule 23 order affirming the trial court's dismissal of the October 2011 complaint.

46. On April 9, 2014, Respondent, on behalf of Moncelle, filed a Petition for Rehearing in the Appellate Court.

47. In the Petition for Rehearing, Respondent stated, inter alia:

  1. There is something rotten in Ottawa . . .

The panel asserts that "[t]he October 2011 complaint completely fails to allege specific facts regarding any purported corruption or tampering with the record." (emphasis by the panel) Rule 23 Order at 69.

This statement is an outrageous misrepresentation of the October 2011 Complaint. This statement is a lie. The October 2011 Complaint contains verified allegations of "specific facts" which more than adequately support the conclusion that the Judicial Defendants were corrupted to rule for the Trucking Defendants and against Plaintiff and [fabricated] [misrepresented the existence of] (sic) the "order dismissing the counts in plaintiff's second amended complaint against the corporate defendants premised on alleged violations of the FMCSR" to provide a rationale which would reduce the risk that the supreme court would grant Plaintiff leave to appeal from the corrupt ruling. (Petition for Rehearing at p. 12-13)

  1. Is the panel implying that the right to relief from a corrupt judgment depends upon what motivated the court to act corruptly? Would you issue an opinion declaring that the law provides that relief will be granted if the motivation were the acceptance of $100,000 or more, but denied if the amount were less than $100,000? Or that relief would be granted if the court used the bribe to pay gambling debts, but denied if used to pay for medical care? Or that relief would be granted if the motivation were prejudice against a party or her counsel, but denied if the motivation were prejudice in favor of a party or her counsel? Of course not! A judgment which is the product of corruption is void and must be set aside because it is based upon something other than the law and the record. A corrupt judgment is void because it is no "judgment" at all, regardless of what motivated the court to act corruptly. (Petition for Rehearing at p. 19-20)

48. Respondent's statements in paragraph 47 above, were false.

49. Respondent knew his statements in paragraph 47 above were false or he made the statements with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity.

50. By reason of the conduct outlined above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct:

  1. making statements the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicative officer, or public legal officer by making the statements set forth in paragraph 47 above, in violation of Rule 8.2(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010); and

  2. conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by making the false and/or reckless statements set forth in paragraph 47 above, in violation of Rule 8.4(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).

Count VI
(False and/or reckless statements about judges in September 2012 complaint)

51. The Administrator realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-50 of Counts I, II, III, IV and V, above.

52. On September 7, 2012, Respondent, on behalf of Moncelle, filed another complaint against Justices McDade, Wright and O'Brien in the Circuit Court of Peoria County ("September 2012 complaint").

53. In the September 2012 complaint, Respondent made the following statements, inter alia, about the Appellate Court Justices:

  1. Justices McDade, Wright and O'Brien committed the crime of Tampering with Public Records in that each of them knowingly, and without lawful authority, altered the Record on Appeal while that Record was held by them, by fabricating the "order dismissing the counts in plaintiff's second-amended complaint against the corporate defendants premised on alleged violations of the FMCSR," when the Record on Appeal prepared by the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Peoria County did not contain such an order, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/32-8, as in effect in 2009 and 2010, a Class 4 felony. (Complaint at p. 20, par. 82)

  2. Justices McDade, Wright and O'Brien committed the crime of official misconduct by knowingly performing acts which each of them knows she is forbidden by law to perform in violation of 720 ILCS 5/33-3(b), a Class 3 felony. Section 33-3(b) requires that the "act" be one which the actor is forbidden by law to perform, and our supreme court has held that a "tenet of a professional code" can be the source of such a prohibition. (citation omitted)

When they decided to base their disposition of Plaintiff's appeals upon something other than an analysis of the facts and the law and when they decided to fabricate the circuit court "order dismissing the counts in plaintiff's second-amended complaint against the corporate defendants premised on alleged violations of the FMCSR," Justices McDade, Wright and O'Brien, each of whom are lawyers, violated Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct which provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation" (Complaint at p. 21, par. 85-86)

  1. The panel's fabrication of an "order dismissing the counts in plaintiff's second-amended complaint against the corporate defendants premised on alleged violations of the FMCSR," was central to its fraud upon Plaintiff and the public and to its corruption of the legal process (Complaint at p. 25, par. 91)

  2. A study of pages 8-13 of the Rule 232 Order reveals how skillfully the panel utilized its fabricated "order dismissing the counts in plaintiff's second-amended complaint against the corporate defendants premised on alleged violations of the FMCSR" in its fraud and deceit. (Complaint at p. 27, par. 95)

54. Respondent's statements in paragraph 53 above, were false.

55. Respondent knew the statements in paragraph 53 above were false or he made the statements with reckless disregard of their truth or falsity.

56. By reason of the conduct outlined above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct:

  1. making statements the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicative officer, or public legal officer by making the statements set forth in paragraph 53 above, in violation of Rule 8.2(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010); and

  2. conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by making the false and/or reckless statements set forth in paragraph 53 above, in violation of Rule 8.4(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).

WHEREFORE, the Administrator requests that this matter be assigned to a panel of the Hearing Board, that a hearing be held, and that the panel make findings of fact, conclusions of fact and law, and a recommendation for such discipline as is warranted.

Peter L. Rotskoff
Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission
3161 W. White Oaks Drive, Suite 301
Springfield, Illinois 62704
Telephone: (217) 546-3523

Respectfully submitted,

Jerome Larkin, Administrator
Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission

By:  Peter L. Rotskoff
Counsel for the Administrator