Filed December 10, 2013
In re Jesse Raymond Gilsdorf
Commission No. 2012PR00006
Synopsis of Review Board Report and Recommendation
This matter arises out of the Administrator's two count Complaint charging Respondent with misconduct with respect to his representation of a criminal defendant who had been charged with unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. The State's Attorney, before the preliminary hearing on the charge, gave Respondent a video depicting his client interacting with an undercover law enforcement officer at the time of the alleged offense. Respondent posted the video on Facebook and YouTube, misleadingly entitling the video "Cops and Task Force Planting Drugs". The Administrator charged Respondent with failing to consult with his client in violation of Rule 1.4; revealing information relating to the representation without informed consent in violation of Rule 1.6; making improper extrajudicial statements in violation of Rule 3.6; and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d).
The Hearing Board found that Respondent engaged in the misconduct alleged by the Administrator and recommended that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for five months.
Upon review, Respondent challenged the factual findings and the conclusions of misconduct found by the Hearing Board. The Review Board concluded that the Hearing Board's findings of fact were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Review Board overturned the finding that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d), but affirmed the Hearing Board's other findings of misconduct. The Review Board recommended that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for five months.
BEFORE THE REVIEW BOARD
ILLINOIS ATTORNEY REGISTRATION
In the Matter of:
JESSE RAYMOND GILSDORF,
Commission No. 2012PR00006
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE REVIEW BOARD
This matter arises out of Respondent's representation of a defendant charged with unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. The State's Attorney, before the preliminary hearing on the charge, gave Respondent a video depicting his client interacting with an undercover law enforcement officer at the time of the alleged offense. Respondent posted the video on Facebook and YouTube. The trial court sanctioned Respondent, ordered Respondent to remove the video, and reported his conduct to the ARDC.
The Administrator charged Respondent, in a two count Complaint, with violations of Rules 1.4(a)(2)(failure to consult with client); 1.6(a)(revealing information relating to the representation without informed consent); 3.6(making improper extrajudicial statements); and 8.4(d)(engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). The Hearing Board found that Respondent engaged in the misconduct alleged by the Administrator and recommended that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for five months.
On review, Respondent challenges the Hearing Board's factual findings and the findings of misconduct. He also argues that his posting of the video is within his rights under the
First Amendment, that the Hearing Board's finding of misconduct pursuant to Rule 1.6 was based on uncharged misconduct, and that the sanction recommendation was excessive. In addition, he contends that the Administrator violated due process by prosecuting him but failing to prosecute the Attorney General's Office, who he alleges also violated rules by posting a similar video. The Administrator asks this Board to affirm the Hearing Board findings of misconduct and adopt the Hearing Board's recommendation of a five month suspension. We affirm the Hearing Board's findings of fact. With the exception of the Hearing Board's findings of violations of Rule 8.4(d), we also affirm the Hearing Board's conclusions of misconduct. We recommend to the Court that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for five months.
In early March of 2011, Respondent agreed to represent Angela Fulmer ("Fulmer"), who had been charged in February 2011 with unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, a Class 2 felony, in Pike County, Illinois. Fulmer paid Respondent a flat fee of $2,500.
The criminal charges arose out of an Illinois State Police investigation wherein Fulmer allegedly sold Hydrocodone pain pills to an undercover confidential informant ("CI") in June 2010. Unbeknownst to Fulmer at the time of the transaction, the police filmed the transaction by way of a covert camera, as part of an undercover investigation of Fulmer. According to Respondent, the States Attorney's Office announced in the local newspaper Fulmer's arrest along with five other individuals and made a statement praising the work of the State Police in leading to the arrests. On March 4, 2011, the State turned over to Respondent the police report, lab reports, interview reports, and a DVD of the undercover drug transaction. On
March 29, Fulmer waived her right to a preliminary hearing, pled not guilty to the charge, and demanded a jury trial. The trial was ultimately set for October 2011.
Charles Burch, an Assistant States Attorney in Pike County, testified that he was required to turn over the video and police report to Respondent prior to trial. While he testified he was not required to turn over the video prior to the preliminary hearing, he was not aware of any rule or procedure that prevented him from producing the information to defense counsel prior to the preliminary hearing. The custom in his office was usually to turn the information over prior to the preliminary hearing in cases where the public defender was representing defendants but not in cases where the defendant was represented by private counsel.
Some time after March 4, 2011, Respondent viewed the DVD. To Respondent, the transaction, at the time he first viewed the DVD, "looked like the police were planting drugs", although the police are shown only in the last 10 seconds of the 18 minute video. Fulmer also viewed the DVD in Respondent's office with her sister. Respondent told Fulmer he was going to "pre-jury" the video to gather further opinions about the transaction. Fulmer expressed no objection. According to Fulmer, Respondent did not tell Fulmer he intended to post the video on the internet. Fulmer did not give Respondent permission to post the video of the drug transaction on the internet.
In early April 2011, Respondent paid a service to post the video on YouTube. He broke the video into two parts and entitled the videos "Cops and Task Force Planting Drugs- Part 1" and "Cops and Task Force Planting Drugs- Part 2", respectively. Respondent then posted on his Facebook page a link to the videos on YouTube.
Respondent testified that Fulmer was aware he was posting the video on the internet and in support, Respondent's secretary testified, based on a phone message, that Fulmer
called the office once to see if the video had been posted. She also testified that Fulmer later called the office and laughed about the video and seemed excited and "very pleased". However, Fulmer testified that Respondent did not ask her permission to post the video on YouTube or discuss with her the ramifications of posting the video on the internet. She testified that after the video had been posted, Respondent called her, gave her the website address for the video, and told her he wanted the video to "go viral". She then went to her sister's house to view the video and testified that she was embarrassed by it. Respondent told Fulmer and her sister to post the videos on their Facebook pages and they did so, although Fulmer testified that "I wasn't sure how it was going to help me, but I guess that's why you hire an attorney because they know the law."
The State Police and the States Attorney's Office learned of the posting of the video on YouTube. Charles Burch took screen shots of the video, which indicated that the videos had each been viewed over 500 and 800 times, respectively. The office began to investigate how the video was placed on YouTube and discussed the posting with the Chief Judge of the Eighth Judicial Circuit, the Honorable Richard Greenlief. Officer Riley of the Illinois State Police testified that the posting of the video on the internet thereafter terminated the department's ability to work with the CI and undermined the department's credibility.
On April 2, 2011, the States Attorney communicated a plea offer to Respondent in the Fulmer matter, offering a sentence of 36 months probation and no jail time in exchange for a plea of guilty to delivery of a controlled substance, a Class 2 felony. Fulmer testified that she was not aware of the plea offer. Respondent testified that "we" had informed Fulmer of the offer but that Fulmer had rejected it.
In May 2011 the State's Attorney's Office filed a motion for sanctions against Respondent before Judge Michael Roseberry alleging that Respondent violated Supreme Court Rule 415(c) by posting the video on the internet. Rule 415(c) provides that any materials produced to defense counsel pursuant to the discovery rules "shall remain in his exclusive custody and be used only for purposes of conducting his side of the case." Respondent contended that he did not violate the Rule because the discovery rules only apply to discovery conducted after the preliminary hearing. Judge Roseberry concluded that Respondent violated Rule 415(c) finding that discovery was to be protected by Rule 415(c), regardless of when it was tendered to defense counsel, noting that it was not unusual for the State to provide information and materials to the defense before the preliminary hearing. Judge Roseberry testified that it is the current States Attorney's routine to produce discovery in advance of the preliminary hearing. Judge Roseberry ordered Respondent to remove the video from YouTube. Respondent did so. In February 2013, the Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed Judge Roseberry's sanction order.
Some time prior to October 12, 2011, the States Attorney communicated another plea offer to Respondent, offering a sentence of 24 months first offender supervision probation in exchange for a guilty plea to a Class 4 felony charge of possession of a controlled substance. During a discussion with the Assistant States Attorney, Respondent told the Assistant that the State would be "laughed out of the courtroom" once the video was shown. The Assistant States Attorney suggested that Respondent watch the video again. Respondent then carefully watched the video on a larger screen and saw that the video depicted an exchange of drugs and money. The video clearly showed Fulmer give something to the CI in exchange for money. Respondent changed his mind about what was depicted on the video. Respondent told Fulmer that he "had
missed something on the video" and that the video proved that Fulmer was guilty. Respondent then advised Fulmer to take the plea offer from the State. Fulmer then accepted the plea offer. On October 12, 2011, Fulmer pled guilty.
Fulmer testified that the posting of the videos had an adverse effect on her life. She described the publicity regarding the video as devastating for her. While she acknowledged that her arrest was published in area newspapers, she testified that after the posting of the videos, the matter became a "media storm" and that her name was on the news. She stated "people that have known me my whole life don't speak to me now."
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Respondent asks that this Board review the findings of the Hearing Board de novo. However, Respondent primarily disputes the factual findings of the Hearing Board and the findings of credibility. Upon review, the factual findings of the Hearing Board are entitled to deference, and they are not to be disturbed unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Timpone, 157 Ill.2d 178, 196, 623 N.E.2d 300 (1993). For a finding on this basis, the opposite conclusion must be clearly evident. That the opposite conclusion is reasonable is not sufficient. In re Winthrop, 219 Ill. 2d 526, 542, 848 N.E. 2d 961(2006). Witnesses' credibility is to be determined by those who have heard and observed the testimony; the Hearing Board thus "stands in a superior position to judge credibility." In re Woldman, 98 Ill. 2d 248, 254, 456 N.E.2d 35 (1983). On the other hand, upon review, questions of law, including determinations as to whether or not there have been violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, have been considered by this Board under a de novo standard of review. See, e.g., In re Hoffman, 08 SH 65 (Review Bd., June 23, 2010) at 12, recommendation adopted, No. M.R. 24030 (Sept. 22, 2010).
WHETHER RESPONDENT VIOLATED CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY
THE VIDEO OF HIS CLIENT'S DRUG TRANSACTION ON THE INTERNET
Rule 1.6(a), as charged by the Administrator, provides that a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted or required by the exceptions set out in Rule 1.6(b). The disclosure in this matter does not fall within any of the exceptions of Rule 1.6(b). Nor was the disclosure impliedly authorized by the representation. The disclosure was not required to represent Fulmer and the posting of the videos did not clearly advance the client's interest. See, e.g., ABA Formal Ethics Op. 08-450 (2008); In re Kesinger, 2011PR00025 (Review Bd., Oct. 24, 2012), recommendation adopted, No. M.R. 25702 (Jan. 18, 2013).
Thus, the only remaining issue is whether Respondent obtained informed consent to disclose the information. Respondent claims upon appeal that he was not aware that informed consent was at issue. In a disciplinary proceeding, due process requires that a respondent receive notice of the allegations against him and a fair opportunity to defend against those allegations. In re Chandler, 161 Ill.2d 459, 470, 641 N.E.2d 473 (1994). Here, the Administrator alleged in the Complaint that Respondent did not inform Fulmer that he intended to post the videos on YouTube, that at no time did Fulmer authorize Respondent to post the videos and that he engaged in conduct violating Rule 1.6. Fulmer was asked about her conversations with the Respondent, including whether Respondent disclosed any possible ramifications of posting the videos, prior to the posting of the videos. Respondent was clearly aware that the Administrator was charging him with a violation of Rule 1.6 and that the elements of the Rule would be at issue.
The record is clear that Respondent failed to obtain his client's informed consent to post the videos on YouTube. Fulmer testified that Respondent did not ask for her permission to post the videos or explain any of the possible ramifications of posting the videos, which clearly show Fulmer exchanging something in exchange for money, on the internet. Respondent insists he informed Fulmer he intended to post the videos and that Fulmer was aware that the videos would be posted to the internet. The Hearing Board concluded that Fulmer's testimony was more credible than that of the Respondent or of his secretary as to this issue. We give deference to the Hearing Board's findings of credibility and we see no basis to overturn their credibility findings.
More importantly, Respondent concedes he did not discuss with Fulmer the possible consequences or risks of posting the videos. Accordingly, the Hearing Board found that, even if the Board accepted Respondent's testimony that Fulmer had concurred with Respondent's decision to post the videos on the internet, Fulmer did not give informed consent as required by Rule 1.6. Comment 2 to Rule 1.6 provides, "A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the client's informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information relating to the representation. See Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of informed consent. This contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship. The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter." Rule 1.0(e) defines informed consent as "the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct."
In In re Ingersoll, 186 Ill.2d 163, 710 N.E. 2d 390 (1999), the Illinois Supreme Court faced a similar issue. In that case, Ingersoll represented a client, Nikia Perry, who had been charged with murder. Perry had confessed to the murder but the police had not disclosed the confession to the public. At a meeting with his client, Perry told Ingersoll he had confessed and said he had been ordered to commit the murder to retaliate for the death of a fellow gang member. Ingersoll then decided upon a strategy to make Perry's confession public, but to attempt to garner public sympathy for his client by revealing that the client had been ordered to commit the crime. Perry denied giving Ingersoll permission to reveal this information. Ingersoll later contacted a local television station and disclosed the information he had received from Perry.
Ingersoll argued that he had discussed the planned strategy with Perry and Perry consented. The Court concluded that, even accepting the respondent's testimony, he had not obtained Perry's informed consent, and accordingly violated his professional obligations, because, by his own admissions, he had not fully explained to Perry the possible ramifications of his plans. The Court stated, "Even if respondent's testimony is accepted as true, it fails to demonstrate that respondent apprised Perry of the potential consequences of the strategy. Through this course of action, Perry gave up a challenge to the voluntariness of his confession without respondent having investigated the circumstances surrounding the statement. For these reasons, we conclude that the Administrator established by clear and convincing evidence the charges of misconduct found by the hearing panel."
In In re Kesinger, 2011PR00025 (Review Bd., Oct. 24, 2012), recommendation adopted, No. M.R. 25702 (Jan. 18, 2013), Respondent represented a criminal defendant, Juvon Mays, in a murder charge arising out of the shooting of Mays' neighbor. Mays initially claimed to Respondent that he was not present at the time of the shooting. However, shortly before trial,
Mays disclosed to Respondent that he was present during a robbery to the neighbor's apartment but that another individual shot the neighbor. Respondent was excited by the disclosure as, in his view, it provided his client with a defense to the murder charge. He then delivered to the prosecutor on the case a letter setting forth his client's disclosure in an attempt to get a plea agreement. He also sent letters to two prosecution witnesses setting forth the disclosures. He admitted that he did not obtain specific permission to disclose the information to the prosecutor but contended that the consent to do so was "implied all over the place." After receipt of the letter, the prosecutor amended the charges against Mays to include a charge of felony murder, and Mays was ultimately convicted of felony murder. While Kesinger was charged with, and was found to have violated, an earlier version of Rule 1.6, this Board noted that Kesinger failed to provide adequate information to the client so that the client could provide consent.
Respondent also contends that he did not violate Rule 1.6 because he claims he did not violate Supreme Court Rule 415(c). Respondent contends that the video was not "discovery" within the meaning of Supreme Court Rule 415(c), despite the trial court and appellate court opinions to the contrary, because the state tendered the video to him prior to his client's preliminary hearing. However, the analysis as to whether the video is discovery pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 415 has no bearing as to whether Respondent violated his duty of confidentiality under Rule 1.6. Rule 1.6 provides no exception allowing for disclosure of information obtained from an opposing party pursuant to discovery. Indeed, Comment 3 to the rule notes that the rule applies "not only to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source."
The Hearing Board also found Respondent violated Rules 1.4(a)(2) and 8.4(d). Rule 1.4(a)(2) provides that a lawyer shall reasonably consult with a client about the means by
which the client's objectives are to be accomplished. The Hearing Board noted that Respondent failed to explain to Fulmer and to the Hearing Board the benefits and risks of his planned strategy of posting the video on the internet. The Hearing Board was puzzled as to why Respondent thought his strategy was reasonable when he could have chosen to go to trial and introduce the video at that time. We agree that Respondent's conduct violated Rule 1.4(a)(2).
Relying on the same facts as set forth above, the Hearing Board also found that Respondent engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The Hearing Board concluded that Respondent's conduct violated Rule 8.4(d) for several reasons. First, the posting of the videos caused otherwise unnecessary additional judicial proceedings including the filing of the sanctions motions against Respondent. Secondly, the posting of the videos delayed Fulmer's trial by several months. Finally, the Hearing Board found that the posting of the videos resulted in the disclosure of the CI for the police. While Respondent contends that the identity of the CI was subject to becoming public had the matter proceeded to trial, Respondent's conduct precluded the State from taking any action to further protect the identity of the CI since Respondent had already posted the videos. While we do not disagree with the Hearing Board's findings, we note that, in both counts, the Administrator failed to clearly and unambiguously plead what specific acts of the Respondent had a prejudicial effect on the administration of justice. Pursuant to the Court's recent decision in In re Karavidas, 2013 IL 115767 para. 97(Nov. 15, 2013), we must therefore overturn the Hearing Board's findings that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d).
WHETHER RESPONDENT ENGAGED IN IMPROPER PRE-TRIAL PUBLICITY
Rule 3.6 provides that a lawyer who is participating in litigation "shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated
by means of public communication and would pose a serious and imminent threat to the fairness of an adjudicative proceeding in the matter."
Posting the videos on YouTube and Facebook was unquestionably dissemination by means of public communication. Similarly, the posting of videos prior to trial showing either the client clearly exchanging drugs in exchange for money or, as originally intended by Respondent, depicting possible improper behavior by the police in a drug transaction, presents a serious threat to the fairness of the adjudicative proceeding. As found by the Hearing Board, Respondent knowingly entitled the videos to imply that the police had engaged in improper behavior in the prosecution of Fulmer and that, therefore, Fulmer was innocent. As set forth in Comment 5 to Rule 3.6, "any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case" is a subject that would pose an imminent or serious threat to the fairness of the proceeding.
Respondent contends he was justified in posting the videos, relying on Rule 3.6(c), which states that, a lawyer "may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client." Respondent argues that he was countering a statement made by the prosecutor upon the arrest by his client, reporting his client's arrest with others and thanking the police for their efforts. However, Respondent never introduced into evidence the statements of the prosecutor. Rule 3.6 further states, "A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity." Without any evidence of the alleged adverse publicity, we cannot find that Respondent's conduct fell within the parameters of Rule 3.6(c).
Respondent also argues that his posting of the video was protected speech under the First Amendment. Rule 3.6, as currently worded, has never been found to be unconstitutional under the First Amendment. In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991), the United States Supreme Court struck down as vague a portion of Nevada's rule against pre-trial publicity which allowed a lawyer to "state without elaboration?the general nature of the ?defense". The United States Supreme Court and the Illinois Supreme Court, however, have never concluded that the other provisions of Rule 3.6 are unconstitutional and we decline to so find without any authority.
Finally, Respondent argues that he is the subject of a selective prosecution by the Administrator. In support, Respondent contends that various other attorneys who have allegedly engaged in similar improper behavior, or who have engaged in other conduct in violation of the Rules, have not been prosecuted for their allegedly unethical acts. Clearly, prosecutors who engage in improper pre-trial publicity in violation of Rule 3.6 and 3.8 should be equally subject to disciplinary prosecutions. But those cases are not before this Board. The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that each disciplinary case must be decided on its own merits and "identical treatment is not required, since the conditions and circumstances under which categorical misconduct may occur vary widely." In re Damisch, 38 Ill.2d 195, 205, 230 N.E.2d 254 (1967)(citations omitted).
In determining the appropriate sanction, this Board considers the nature of the misconduct charged and proved, and any aggravating and mitigating circumstances shown by the evidence. In re Gorecki, 208 Ill. 2d 350, 360-61, 802 N.E.2d 1194, 1200 (2003). As found by the Hearing Board, Respondent's misconduct in violating his client's confidentiality is serious.
He published damning evidence on the internet with little to no thought or discussion of the possible consequences to his client. His conduct threatened the fairness of a criminal proceeding and harmed his client.
Although we overturned the findings of the Hearing Board that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d), we must look at Respondent's conduct as a whole. In re Gerard, 132 Ill. 2d 507, 532, 548 N.E.2d 1051, 1061 (1989)("When sanctioning respondent, however, we do not count the number of ethical rules which he violated concurrently by the same conduct, and increase the severity of the sanction the higher the number. Instead, we analyze and pass judgment upon the unethical nature of respondent's conduct as a whole.")
In mitigation, the Hearing Board noted that Respondent's misconduct was isolated and involved only one client. Respondent was licensed in 1994 and has not been previously disciplined. He presented no other evidence in mitigation, such as character testimony or evidence of pro bono or charitable work.
Respondent disputes the Hearing Board's finding in aggravation of his misconduct that Respondent failed to inform Fulmer of the first plea offer from the Assistant States Attorney. Although this conduct was not charged by the Administrator, the Hearing Board concluded that pursuant to In re Storment, 203 Ill.2d 378, 400, 786 N.E.2d 963 (2003), the Board could consider such evidence in aggravation because it was "similar to the current charges and established by evidence in the record." While we do not find that the Hearing Board's consideration of this evidence was improper or against the manifest weight of the evidence, we note that consideration of this factor does not change the sanction recommendation in any significant way.
While there is not a disciplinary case that is precisely on point, the range of sanctions for similar violations has varied. In In re Ingersoll, 186 Ill.2d 163, 710 N.E. 2d 390 (1999), as discussed above, the attorney was disbarred in part for disclosing his client's confession to the press. However, Ingersoll engaged in other additional misconduct. In In re Kesinger, 2011PR00025 (Review Bd., Oct. 24, 2012), recommendation adopted, No. M.R. 25702 (Jan. 18, 2013), also discussed above, the attorney was suspended for six months. However, again, Kesinger engaged in additional misconduct and had been previously censured. He did offer evidence of pro bono work and community service in mitigation.
In In re O'Connor, 01 CH 96 (Hearing Bd., Jan. 21, 2004), approved and confirmed, No. M.R. 19328 (May 17, 2004), the Court suspended the attorney for 30 days for disclosing to opposing counsel information regarding what the client would accept in settlement of a case. In In re Nelson, 02 CH 12 (Review Bd., July 8, 2004), recommendation adopted, No. M.R. 19657 (Nov. 17, 2004), the attorney was suspended for ninety days for taking confidential documents from her employer, the CTA and later trying to use the documents in her litigation against the CTA. She expressed remorse for her actions, presented evidence of volunteer work and good character, and was relatively inexperienced at the time of her misconduct. Finally, in In re Peshek, 09 CH 89, petition to impose discipline on consent allowed, No. M.R. 23794 (May 18, 2010), the attorney was suspended for sixty days for disclosing confidential client information on a personal blog. While she did not identify the clients by their full names, she identified them in ways that could have allowed others to determine the identity of the clients. In mitigation, she was remorseful for her conduct and lost her job as an assistant public defender. She started the blog as therapy after she suffered from severe stress following an incident where one of her clients punched her in the face.
Accordingly, given the precedent and the circumstances surrounding Respondent's misconduct, we conclude that the five month suspension recommended by the Hearing Board is appropriate and just. We affirm the factual findings of the Hearing Board. With the exception of the finding that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d), we affirm the findings of misconduct of the Hearing Board. We recommend to the Court that Respondent, Jesse Raymond Gilsdorf, be suspended from the practice of law for five months.
Richard A. Green
I, Kenneth G. Jablonski, Clerk of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois and keeper of the records, hereby certifies that the foregoing is a true copy of the Report and Recommendation of the Review Board, approved by each Panel member, entered in the above entitled cause of record filed in my office onDecember 10, 2013.
Kenneth G. Jablonski, Clerk of the