Filed July 24, 2013

In re Therese Cesar Garza
Attorney-Respondent

Commission No. 2012PR00035

Synopsis of Hearing Board Report and Recommendation
(July 2013)

The Administrator filed an eight-count Complaint against Respondent alleging Respondent failed to communicate plea offers to several clients, revealed confidential information, offered to post bond for a client, and engaged in conduct that disrupted the court. At all times alleged in the Complaint, Respondent was employed by the Cook County Public Defender's Office as an assistant public defender.

Respondent initially failed to participate in the disciplinary proceedings and the factual allegations and disciplinary charges of the Complaint were deemed admitted. Respondent appeared at the hearing and presented some evidence in mitigation.

The Hearing Board found Respondent engaged in the alleged misconduct and recommended a ninety-day suspension.

BEFORE THE HEARING BOARD
OF THE
ILLINOIS ATTORNEY REGISTRATION
AND
DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION

In the Matter of:

THERESE CESAR GARZA,

Attorney-Respondent,

No. 6180720.

Commission No. 2012PR00035

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE HEARING BOARD

INTRODUCTION

The hearing in this matter was held on March 12, 2013, at the Chicago offices of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission ("ARDC") before a Panel of the Hearing Board consisting of Brigid A. Duffield, Chair, Joseph J. Siprut1, and Robert D. Smith. Eunbin Rii and Melissa A. Smart appeared on behalf of the Administrator. Respondent, Therese Cesar Garza, appeared pro se.

PLEADINGS AND PRE-HEARING PROCEEDINGS

On April 25, 2012, the Administrator filed an eight-count Complaint against Respondent alleging Respondent failed to communicate plea offers to several clients, revealed confidential information, offered to post bond for a client, and engaged in conduct that disrupted the tribunal. At all times alleged in the Complaint, Respondent was employed by the Cook County Public Defender's Office as an assistant public defender.

Respondent was personally served with a copy of the Administrator's Complaint on May 1, 2012. On June 1, 2012, the Chair allowed Respondent's motion for an extension of time and

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ordered she file a responsive pleading to the Complaint on or before June 29, 2012. The Chair also set a pre-hearing conference for July 11, 2012.

Over the Administrator's objection, the Chair allowed Respondent's second request for an extension of time in an order entered July 3, 2012. In that order, the Chair gave Respondent until July 11, 2012, to answer or otherwise plead and to file her report pursuant to Commission Rule 253. The order also stated no further extensions would be allowed. The pre-hearing conference remained scheduled for July 11.

When Respondent was contacted for the July 11 pre-hearing conference, she advised she was unavailable and did not participate. The Chair set a second pre-hearing conference for August 15, 2012.

As Respondent failed to file a responsive pleading and failed to file a report pursuant to Commission Rule 253, the Administrator filed a Motion to Deem the Allegations of the Complaint Admitted Pursuant to Commission Rule 236 and a Motion to Bar Respondent from Presenting any Witnesses at Hearing. Respondent did not file a response to either motion. The Chair granted both motions on July 25, 2012.

Respondent did not participate in the August 15 pre-hearing conference. At that time, the Chair set the hearing for November 7, 2012. On October 26, 2012, the Administrator filed a motion to compel a mental health examination of Respondent. Noting Respondent's failure to file a response or objection to the motion, the Chair allowed the motion, ordered Respondent to submit to an examination by December 7, 2012, and vacated the November 7 hearing date. The Chair also scheduled a pre-hearing conference for December 11, 2012.

On November 16, 2012, Respondent filed a motion to reconsider the Chair's order compelling a mental health examination. Respondent participated in the December 11 pre-

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hearing conference and her motion to reconsider was granted. The Chair reset the hearing to January 22, 2012.

On January 9, 2013, Respondent filed a motion to allow her to present evidence in mitigation at the hearing. Over the Administrator's objection, the Chair allowed Respondent to offer documentary evidence in mitigation. The order barring Respondent from presenting witness testimony in mitigation remained in effect. Accordingly, on January 16, 2012, Respondent filed a motion to reconsider the denial of her motion to present witness testimony in mitigation.

Respondent did not appear for the January 22, 2013 hearing due to illness. At a telephone status conference on that date, the Chair, over the Administrator's objection, allowed Respondent's motion to reconsider and gave her leave to present the testimony of Steven Shobat at the hearing. The hearing was then scheduled for March 12, 2013.

ALLEGED MISCONDUCT

The Administrator alleged Respondent engaged in the following misconduct: 1) failed to consult with a client concerning the objectives of the representation and as to the means by which they are to be pursued (Counts I, III); 2) failed to promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent is required (Counts I, III); 3) revealed information relating to the representation of a client without the client's informed consent (Count II, IV, V); 4) engaged in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal (Counts VI, VII,VIII); 5) engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice (Counts I-VIII); and 6) engaged in conduct that tends to defeat the administration of justice, or to bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute (Counts I-VIII) in violation of Rules 1.2(a), 1.4(a)(1), 1.6(a), 3.5(d), and 8.4(d) of the 2010 Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct.

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EVIDENCE

Administrator's Exhibits 1 through 6 were received in evidence. (Tr. 46). Respondent testified on her own behalf and presented the testimony of Steven Shobat.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

In attorney disciplinary proceedings the Administrator has the burden of proving the charges of misconduct by clear and convincing evidence. In re Ingersoll, 186 Ill. 2d 163, 710 N.E.2d 390 (1999). Clear and convincing evidence constitutes a high level of certainty, which is greater than a preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Williams, 143 Ill. 2d 477, 577 N.E.2d 762 (1991).

Count I

A. Admitted Facts and Additional Evidence Considered

On May 11, 2011, Juan Cortez and Nilton Barrientos, co-defendants in The People of the State of Illinois v. Nilton Barrientos, 11-MC1-196651 ("Barrientos matter"), appeared in the Circuit Court of Cook County, before the Honorable Anthony J. Calabrese on Class A misdemeanor theft charges. Respondent, an assistant public defender employed by the Cook County Public Defender's Office, represented both Mr. Cortez and Mr. Barrientos.

Before the May 11 hearing, the Cook County State's Attorney's office ("State") communicated a plea offer to Respondent for both Mr. Cortez and Mr. Barrientos. Respondent knew of the plea offer made by the State before speaking with both Mr. Cortez and Mr. Barrientos about their cases, but Respondent did not inform them of the State's plea offer.

When the clerk in Judge Calabrese's courtroom called the Barrientos matter, Judge Calabrese asked whether Respondent had informed Mr. Cortez and Mr. Barrientos of the State's plea offers. Respondent stated that she did not. As a result of Respondent's failure to inform her clients of the plea offer, Judge Calabrese passed the case. (Adm. Ex. 1).

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B. Conclusions

Based on the order deeming the factual allegations and disciplinary charges of the Complaint admitted and the evidence presented at hearing, we find the Administrator proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in the acts and committed the misconduct alleged in the Administrator's Complaint. Specifically, we find Respondent failed to consult with a client concerning the objectives of the representation and as to the means by which they are to be pursued in violation of Rule 1.2(a), failed to promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent is required in violation of Rule 1.4(a)(1), engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d), and engaged in conduct which tends to defeat the administration of justice or to bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute.

Count II

A. Admitted Facts and Additional Evidence Considered

On May 17, 2011, Gabriel Franco was arrested and charged with retail theft, a Class A misdemeanor, for allegedly taking six containers of baby formula from a grocery store. On May 18, 2011, Judge Calabrese appointed Respondent to represent Mr. Franco. Before the May 18 hearing, Respondent and Mr. Franco had a conversation regarding the alleged offense and the surrounding circumstances.

Before concluding the May 18 hearing, the court addressed the issue of probable cause to detain Mr. Franco. For purposes of setting bond, the State informed the court of Mr. Franco's criminal history and that he had an outstanding warrant.

Respondent then stated the following:

MS. CESAR:    Your Honor, he lives with his parents. And it is my understanding that there's a warrant and it is for retail theft. Mr. Franco did tell me that he is not working right now and he was stealing formula

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for his eight-month-old child. I know that that is not a defense, but it certainly is a mitigator. (Adm. Ex. 2).

At the time Respondent made the above statements, Respondent knew that her client had yet to enter a plea. Without her client's consent, Respondent conceded facts that the State had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt by revealing that Mr. Franco did in fact commit the crime of retail theft and revealing his motive to commit the crime. Respondent knew or should have known that without Mr. Franco's consent, Respondent should not have revealed such information.

B. Conclusions

Based on the order deeming the factual allegations and disciplinary charges of the Complaint admitted and the evidence presented at hearing, we find the Administrator proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in the acts and committed the misconduct alleged in the Administrator's Complaint. Specifically, we find Respondent revealed information relating to the representation of a client without the client's informed consent in violation of Rule 1.6(a), engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d), and engaged in conduct which tends to defeat the administration of justice or bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute.

Counts III and IV

A. Admitted Facts and Additional Evidence Considered

On May 18, 2011, Judge Calabrese appointed Respondent to represent Pierre Penny, who was charged with criminal trespass to real property. At that time in Judge Calabrese's courtroom, all plea offers were written by the State on the "passed cases offer sheet" for the assistant public defenders to review and then inform their clients.

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On May 18, 2011, the State, Respondent, and Mr. Penny appeared before Judge Calabrese for a hearing. The State wrote a plea offer in Mr. Penny's matter on the "passed cases offer sheet." Respondent saw or should have seen the plea offer.

At the May 18 hearing, the State advised Judge Calabrese that a plea offer had been made on the "passed cases offer sheet." Respondent initially advised Judge Calabrese that she did not communicate the State's offer to Mr. Penny because she had not seen it. Later, Respondent stated that because Mr. Penny told her he had a witness she advised him not to accept the plea offer. Respondent also stated that "it is not my practice to necessarily ask for an offer immediately. I did not do so at traffic court. I would see whether or not there was a triable case." Respondent then apologized to Mr. Penny and told Judge Calabrese, "Judge, we were being offered a conviction. I have strong feelings when somebody is telling me I didn't do something." (Adm. Ex. 3).

Respondent's statement that she did not see the offer was false and Respondent knew it was false because she had seen the offer on the "passed cases offer sheet." Respondent then asked Mr. Penny in open court whether he wanted to go to trial or take the offer. Mr. Penny stated, "I'll take the offer." (Adm. Ex. 3).

Also during the May 18, 2011 hearing, Respondent made inculpatory statements on the record regarding Mr. Penny. Without Mr. Penny's consent, Respondent revealed facts that the State had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt including his whereabouts and other circumstances regarding the alleged crime. Respondent knew or should have known that without Mr. Penny's informed consent, Respondent should not have revealed information relating to the criminal charges against him.

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B. Conclusions

Based on the order deeming the factual allegations and disciplinary charges of the Complaint admitted and the evidence presented at hearing, we find the Administrator proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in the acts and committed the misconduct alleged in the Administrator's Complaint. Specifically, we find Respondent failed to consult with a client concerning the objectives of the representation and as to the means by which they are to be pursued in violation of Rule 1.2(a), failed to promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent is required in violation of Rule 1.4(a)(1), revealed information relating to the representation of a client without the client's informed consent in violation of Rule 1.6(a), engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d), and engaged in conduct which tends to defeat the administration of justice or to bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute.

Counts V and VI

A. Admitted Facts and Additional Evidence Considered

On May 11, 2011, Judge Calabrese appointed Respondent to represent Warren Poole, who was charged with violating probation and criminal trespass to real property. On that same date, Mr. Poole's matter was called for a hearing before Judge Calabrese. Respondent, Mr. Poole, and the State appeared.

Prior to the hearing, Respondent and Mr. Poole had a conversation regarding the alleged offense and the surrounding circumstances. During the May 11 hearing, Respondent revealed facts on the record that the State had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt including that Mr. Poole was present at the alleged location of criminal trespass, entered the building of the alleged trespass, and revealed his motive for being present at the place of criminal trespass.

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Respondent also revealed on the record that Mr. Poole was "going to" accept the plea and that "he didn't try to get away with this charge." Respondent stated:

MS. CESAR:    He didn't try to get away with this charge. Your Honor, I'm asking you to set - - if you're going to set anything other than an I-bond, I would ask that you notice everything he was before this except for visiting a friend at CHA housing. (Adm. Ex. 4).

Respondent did not have Mr. Poole's consent to inform the court of this information. Respondent knew or should have known that without his consent, Respondent should not have revealed information relating to the criminal charge against her client.

At all times alleged in this complaint, the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure, 725 ILCS 5/110-13, provided:

No attorney at law practicing in this State and no official authorized to admit another to bail or to accept bail shall furnish any part of any security for bail in any criminal action or any proceeding nor shall any such person act as surety for any accused admitted to bail.

At the May 11 hearing, Judge Calabrese set Mr. Poole's bond at $1,000.00. At that time, Respondent offered, on the record and in open court, to pay and post $100.00 towards Mr. Poole's bond in order for her client to be released. Judge Calabrese then stated, "Ms. Cesar, I think you'll put yourself in an ethical dilemma by doing that. I would hate to see you make a mistake like that." (Adm. Ex. 4).

Judge Calabrese then ordered that the next hearing would be May 25, 2011. Respondent then requested that Mr. Poole be brought back to court the next day. Judge Calabrese denied Respondent's request. Respondent then replied to Judge Calabrese, on the record: "Oh, that's lovely." Respondent's conduct was disruptive and was intended to disrupt the court. (Adm. Ex. 4).

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B. Conclusions

Based on the order deeming the factual allegations and disciplinary charges of the Complaint admitted and the evidence presented at hearing, we find the Administrator proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in the acts and committed the misconduct alleged in the Administrator's Complaint. Specifically, we find Respondent revealed information relating to the representation of a client without the client's informed consent in violation of Rule 1.6(a), engaged in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal in violation of Rule 3.5(d), engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d), and engaged in conduct which tends to defeat the administration of justice or to bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute.

Count VII

A. Admitted Facts and Additional Evidence Considered

On May 18, 2011, Judge Calabrese appointed Respondent to represent defendant Monica Boyd, who was charged with theft, a Class A misdemeanor. Ms. Boyd appeared with Respondent before Judge Calabrese and the matter was set for trial later that same day. However, when the matter was called for trial, Ms. Boyd was not present. Respondent stated that Boyd had left the court to pick up her child.

Because Ms. Boyd was not present for her trial, Judge Calabrese issued a warrant for her arrest. At that time, the following exchange occurred:

MS. CESAR:     Oh shit.

THE COURT:    What did you say, Ms. Cesar?

MS. CESAR:      Oh shoot, I said. Oh shoot. I'm sorry I didn't talk to her, Judge. I'm just - - it's my fault. I'm running around, talking to people.

THE COURT:     I don't think that's what you said.

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MS. CESAR:    Whatever. I know the word you think I said. My mother never let me say that, and I'll tell you why. But I said shoot, darn it. (Adm. Ex. 5).

Respondent's conduct was disruptive to the court and had no purpose other than to disrupt the court.

B. Conclusions

Based on the order deeming the factual allegations and disciplinary charges of the Complaint admitted and the evidence presented at hearing, we find the Administrator proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in the acts and committed the misconduct alleged in the Administrator's Complaint. Specifically, we find Respondent engaged in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal in violation of Rule 3.5(d), engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d), and engaged in conduct which tends to defeat the administration of justice or to bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute.

Count VIII

A. Admitted Facts and Additional Evidence Considered

On June 7, 2011, Respondent appeared before Judge Calabrese on behalf of defendant Tony Rivera. At that time, Respondent requested a reduction of Mr. Rivera's bond arguing that a witness would appear later and present testimony in favor of a bond reduction. After hearing Respondent's argument, Judge Calabrese denied Respondent's request to present the witness's testimony and to reduce the bond. Respondent then began yelling in court, stating:

MS. CESAR:    If I could correct the record, I told the Court at about 11:00 o'clock I had trouble getting people.

And when I finally got through, I talked to [the witness]. He said he was going to try to come.

THE COURT:   Excuse me. I did not lose my hearing.

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MS. CESAR:    I did not say he was on the way. He indicated that he would come.

THE COURT:    Let me just indicate again, you are yelling on the record. This happens all the time when you don't get your way.

Because you lose something doesn't mean you have to start yelling at me. I haven't gotten deaf over the course of the time I have listened to your argument. I just don't agree with you. And it's okay that people don't agree. (Adm. Ex. 6).

Respondent's conduct was disruptive and was intended to disrupt the court.

In June 2011, Respondent was removed from her assignment and placed on office duty. On July 29, 2011, Respondent's employment with the Cook County Public Defender's office was terminated.

B. Conclusions

Based on the order deeming the factual allegations and disciplinary charges of the Complaint admitted and the evidence presented at hearing, we find the Administrator proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in the acts and committed the misconduct alleged in the Administrator's Complaint. Specifically, we find Respondent engaged in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal in violation of Rule 3.5(d), engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of Rule 8.4(d), and engaged in conduct which tends to defeat the administration of justice or to bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute.

EVIDENCE OFFERED IN AGGRAVATION AND MITIGATION

Respondent has not been previously disciplined.

Steven Shobat

Steven Shobat is an attorney licensed to practice law in Illinois since 1985. He is currently in private practice concentrating in criminal defense and also teaches at John Marshall.

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Mr. Shobat met Respondent in 1988 when he joined the U.S. Attorney's Office. He described Respondent as a mentor and tried several cases with her. According to Mr. Shobat, Respondent was tireless in her commitment to her job and was a model AUSA. Respondent had a reputation as an ethical, honest, and passionate attorney while at the U.S. Attorney's Office. (Tr. 48-52).

Respondent and Mr. Shobat then went into private practice together in 1994. They were close friends as well as partners. (Tr. 49-50). The partnership lasted for approximately 18 months, but he and Respondent remained friends. (Tr. 56-57). Mr. Shobat is not aware of any instance, other than the allegations of the complaint in this proceeding, in which Respondent's ethics or honesty has been questioned. (Tr. 58-60). However, Mr. Shobat was generally aware that Respondent had been suspended from her employment at the Cook County Public Defender's Office on four separate occasions. (Tr. 63-65).

Respondent

Respondent completed her undergraduate studies and law school while raising six young children. She was admitted to practice in Illinois and Indiana in 1981 and began working for the Lake County Indiana Prosecutor's Office. (Tr. 28-31). Three years later, Respondent began employment with the United States Department of Justice doing civil rights work. She then worked for the U.S. Attorney's Office in Chicago. (Tr. 31-32). In 1995, she went into private practice with Steven Shobat. (Tr. 35). She joined the Cook County Public Defender's Office in 2004. (Tr. 35-36). Respondent acknowledged she was fired from that office in 2012. (Tr. 73).

During the time of the conduct alleged in the disciplinary complaint, Respondent was grieving the loss of her mother. (Tr. 73-74). She was also newly assigned to the courtroom and was feeling overwhelmed. (Tr. 84-85). Her intentions were to help her clients; she did nothing for personal gain. (Tr. 113).

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RECOMMENDATION

In determining the proper sanction, we consider the purposes of the disciplinary process. The goal of these proceedings is not to punish, but rather to safeguard the public, maintain the integrity of the profession, and protect the administration of justice from reproach. In re Timpone, 157 Ill. 2d 178, 623 N.E.2d 300 (1993). We also take into account those circumstances that may mitigate and aggravate the misconduct. In re Witt, 145 Ill. 2d 380, 583 N.E.2d 526 (1991).

In mitigation, it is clear Respondent was a talented trial attorney who enjoyed an accomplished career. Prior to this proceeding she had an unblemished record in over 30 years of practice. Mr. Shobat testified to Respondent's reputation as a passionate and ethical advocate.

In aggravation, Respondent showed no remorse and never acknowledged her misconduct. See In re Lewis, 138 Ill. 2d 310, 562 N.E.2d 198 (1990). Her arguments and demeanor at this hearing demonstrated she has no appreciation of her transgressions. Instead of accepting responsibility, Respondent rationalized her misconduct and blamed others. We are also troubled by Respondent's failure to participate fully in these proceedings and consider it a significant factor in aggravation.

Respondent argues her conduct caused no actual harm to any client. However, we may consider in aggravation the potential harm to Respondent's clients. See In re Saladino, 71 Ill. 2d 263, 375 N.E.2d 102 (1978) (discipline should be closely linked to the harm caused or the unreasonable risk created by attorney's lack of care). To that end, it is well settled that more severe discipline is warranted to deter misconduct in criminal cases. In re Hall, 95 Ill. 2d 371, 447 N.E.2d 805 (1983).

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Respondent suggests a reprimand is the appropriate sanction. The Administrator recommends that the misconduct in this case warrants a six-month suspension. In addition to considering the parties' recommendations, we rely on the following cases. While no case involves all the misconduct present in this matter, we find them instructive.

In In re Carroll, 09 CH 78, M.R. 25952 (May 22, 2013) respondent failed to communicate plea offers to two criminal defendants and improperly advanced funds to be used for a client's bond. Noting respondent's prior discipline and its reservations about his honesty and integrity, the Review Board recommended a ninety-day suspension. The Court affirmed.

The attorney in In re Daley, 98 SH 2, M.R.17023 (Nov. 27, 2000) represented several clients in criminal matters. He entered guilty pleas on behalf of two clients and filed jury waivers and motions on behalf of other clients without consulting any of them. He also engaged in a conflict of interest and failed to report the misconduct of another attorney in his firm. In mitigation, he presented character testimony and evidence of charitable and pro bono work. In aggravation, he had been disciplined previously. He was suspended for nine months.

In re Rossiello, 03 CH 33, M.R. 21894 (Jan. 23, 2008) involved an attorney who failed to communicate a settlement offer in a civil case. He had no prior discipline, but showed no remorse. The Court imposed a four-month suspension.

In In re Peshek, 09 CH 89, M.R. 23794 (May 20, 2010) the respondent, an assistant public defender, wrote and published a "blog" that disclosed confidential information about her clients' cases and discussions she had with them. She also made derogatory remarks about judges before whom she appeared. She was diagnosed with acute stress disorder after being punched in the face by a client while in court. She began "blogging" shortly after that incident.

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She expressed remorse for her conduct and had no prior discipline. She was suspended for 60 days.

The attorney in In re Kesinger, 2011 PR 25, M.R. 25702 (Jan. 18, 2013) disclosed confidential information during a criminal proceeding causing significant harm to his client. He also converted funds, engaged in overreaching and breached his fiduciary duty during representation of another criminal defendant. He had been previously disciplined and was suspended for six months. See also In re O'Connor, 01 CH 96, M.R. 19328 (May 19, 2004) (disclosing confidential information in a civil matter warranted 30 day suspension where attorney expressed regret for his error, presented evidence of his good character, and had no prior discipline).

In contrast to some of the cases discussed, Respondent did not act dishonestly and has not been disciplined previously. Unlike Carroll, Respondent did not actually post bond for her client. She offered to do so and was properly admonished by the court. She also did not engage in other serious misconduct as found in Daley and Kesinger.

On the other hand, Respondent's conduct was serious and involved several clients. She expressed no remorse and seemed unable to appreciate her professional responsibilities. While she did not actually post bond for a client, her attempt to do so demonstrates a considerable lapse of judgment. We find it difficult to believe that an attorney with Respondent's experience in criminal matters would be unaware of the prohibition against posting bond for a client. We are also troubled by Respondent's failure to participate fully in these proceedings and by her demeanor at the hearing.

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Accordingly, having considered the misconduct, the aggravating and mitigating factors, and the relevant case law, we recommend that Respondent, Therese Cesar Garza, be suspended for ninety days.

Respectfully Submitted,

Brigid A. Duffield
Joseph J. Siprut
Robert D. Smith

CERTIFICATION

I, Kenneth G. Jablonski, Clerk of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois and keeper of the records, hereby certifies that the foregoing is a true copy of the Report and Recommendation of the Hearing Board, approved by each Panel member, entered in the above entitled cause of record filed in my office on July 24, 2013.

Kenneth G. Jablonski, Clerk of the
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois

__________________________________

1 Mr. Siprut was not present at the hearing, but reviewed the transcript of the proceedings, participated in the Panel's deliberations, and participated in the preparation of this report.