In re Maureen Williams
Respondent-Appellee

Commission No. 2021PR00032

Synopsis of Review Board Report and Recommendation
(November 2022)

The Administrator brought a one-count complaint against Respondent, charging her with committing a criminal act (submitting a false report to the court) that reflects adversely on her honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer, and engaging in dishonest conduct, in violation of Rules 8.4(b) and 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct. The complaint alleged that Respondent, who was ordered to complete 20 hours of community service as part of her sentence for a traffic violation, submitted a report to the court in which she falsely represented that she had complied with the court's order by performing 20 hours of community service at a specific church, when, in fact, she had not performed any community service at that church.

The Hearing Board found that Respondent had committed the charged misconduct and recommended that Respondent be suspended for 90 days.

The Administrator appealed, challenging the Hearing Board's sanction recommendation and asking the Review Board to recommend a five-month suspension instead.

The Review Board agreed with the Hearing Board's recommendation that Respondent be suspended for 90 days. In addition, one Review Board member wrote a special concurrence relating to a public policy issue.

BEFORE THE REVIEW BOARD
OF THE
ILLINOIS ATTORNEY REGISTRATION
AND
DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION

FILED
November 28, 2022
ARDC CLERK

In the Matter of:

MAUREEN WILLIAMS,

Respondent-Appellee,

No. 6285393.

Commission No. 2021PR00032

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE REVIEW BOARD

SUMMARY

The Administrator brought a one-count complaint against Respondent, charging her with committing a criminal act (submitting a false report to the court) that reflects adversely on her honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer, and engaging in dishonest conduct, in violation of Rules 8.4(b) and 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct.

The complaint alleged that Respondent, who was ordered to complete 20 hours of community service as part of her sentence for a traffic violation, submitted a report to Woodford County Court Services, falsely representing that she had completed her community service by volunteering at St. Mark's Church, in Peoria, Illinois, when, in fact, she had not done any volunteer work for St. Mark's Church, thereby acting dishonestly and in a manner that reflected adversely on her honesty. Prior to the complaint being filed, Respondent was indicted for forgery, a felony, for submitting that false report (720 ILCS 5/17-3(a)(2)); she pled guilty to the indictment and was placed on Second Chance Probation for two years. (730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.4) (C. 21-24.)

Following a disciplinary hearing on November 30, 2021, at which Respondent was represented by counsel, the Hearing Board found that Respondent committed the charged

misconduct and recommended that she be suspended for 90 days. The Hearing Board's Report was filed on April 1, 2022.

At the disciplinary hearing, the Administrator offered one exhibit (the court file of Respondent's criminal case), which was admitted into evidence. The Administrator did not call any witnesses. Respondent testified on her own behalf and called eight character witnesses. Respondent also offered seven exhibits, which were admitted.

The Administrator appealed, challenging the Hearing Board's sanction recommendation of 90-days, and asking this Board to recommend a five-month suspension instead. Respondent did not file a cross-appeal. The only issue on appeal is the sanction. The Review Board heard oral arguments on September 9, 2022.

For the reasons that follow, we agree with the Hearing Board's recommendation that Respondent be suspended for 90 days. In addition, one Review Board member writes a special concurrence relating to a public policy issue.

BACKGROUND

Respondent

Respondent was licensed to practice law in Minnesota in 1991. Respondent practiced law in Minnesota, with a focus on criminal defense work, until 2004, when she moved to Peoria, Illinois. She was licensed to practice law in Illinois in 2005. Respondent is a solo practitioner in Peoria, with a focus on criminal defense work. She was 58 years old at the time of the disciplinary hearing. She has no prior discipline.

Respondent's Misconduct

In 2019, Respondent was ticketed for speeding, because she was driving 95 miles-an-hour in a 55 miles-an-hour zone. She pled guilty to a misdemeanor and was placed on court

supervision; she was also required to pay a fine and complete 20 hours of community service within a year. She was not required to perform the community service at a particular location. She paid the fine.

After the deadline relating to the community service had passed, Respondent contacted the prosecuting attorney and advised him that she had missed the deadline. The prosecutor told her to complete the hours as soon as she could.

In June 2020, Respondent submitted a public service worksheet to the Woodford County Court Services, falsely representing that she had performed 20 hours of community service at St. Mark's Church in Peoria. Respondent's close friend, who was the bookkeeper at St. Mark's, signed the worksheet, based on Respondent's direction. Respondent and her friend both knew that Respondent had not completed any service hours at St. Mark's.

Shortly after Respondent submitted the worksheet, someone from the probation department for Woodford County Court Services spoke to the pastor of St. Mark's Church to verify that Respondent had completed her 20 hours of public service there.

Respondent's friend told Respondent that a probation officer had contacted St. Mark's to verify Respondent's service hours. Respondent then contacted the probation department and told them that she had submitted a false report. Respondent also reported her misconduct to the ARDC.

After the probation department learned about the false report, Respondent asked for permission to submit a revised report showing that she had completed the necessary hours by volunteering at the Peoria Symphony Guild and St. Thomas Church. The probation department denied permission to file a revised report. (C. 153.)

At the disciplinary hearing, when Respondent was asked why she submitted a false report, Respondent testified that she "cut corners." (C. 151, 165.) She also testified that she justified it in her mind because she had performed enough volunteer work at the Peoria Symphony Guild to satisfy the court imposed requirement of 20 hours of community service. (C. 154-158, 165.)

In July 2020, Respondent was charged by the State of Illinois with one count of felony forgery for submitting a false report to Court Services concerning her community service. The forgery count alleged that Respondent, "with the intent to defraud, knowingly issued to Woodford County Court Services personnel a false document, a Woodford County Court Services public service worksheet, by claiming hours of public service work were completed at St. Mark's Church knowing the hours were not completed as stated, and that false document was apparently capable of defrauding another." (Adm. Ex. 1 at 3.) Respondent pled guilty to the forgery charge in February 2021. (*Id*. at 4.)

Respondent was placed on probation for two years and ordered to pay a fine of $3,500. She was also ordered to complete 150 hours of public service, and complete four hours of ethics classes. Pursuant to the Second Chance Probation program, if Respondent successfully completes her probation, which is scheduled to end in February 2023, the court will dismiss the proceedings against her and she will have no criminal conviction. *See* 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.4(g) ("A disposition of probation is considered to be a conviction for the purposes of imposing the conditions of probation and for appeal; however, a discharge and dismissal under this Section is not a conviction for purposes of this Code [of Unified Corrections] or for purposes of disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction of a crime.").

At the time of the disciplinary hearing, Respondent had paid the $3,500 fine, completed the ethics classes, and completed 100 hours of public service. According to Respondent's appellate brief, she has now completed the 150 hours of public service, as ordered.

HEARING BOARD'S FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATION

Misconduct Findings

The Hearing Board found that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(b), which prohibits an attorney from committing "a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." Respondent admitted that she pled guilty to one count of felony forgery for submitting a false report to Court Services concerning her community service, and admitted she violated Rule 8.4(b) by submitting that false report. (Hearing Bd. Report at 4.) (C. 81.)

The Hearing Board also found that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c), which prohibits an attorney from engaging in "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." Respondent admitted she engaged in dishonest conduct. The Hearing Board found that Respondent's submission of a false document was deceptive and dishonest, and concluded that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c). (Hearing Bd. Report at 4.) (C. 81.)

Mitigation and Aggravation Findings

In mitigation, the Hearing Board found that Respondent accepted responsibility, acknowledged that her misconduct was very serious, and expressed genuine remorse; Respondent reported herself to the ARDC and cooperated in her disciplinary proceedings; Respondent had no prior discipline; was active in several professional organizations; participated in community service and church activities; provided extensive *pro bono* legal services and received an award for her *pro bono* services. The Hearing Board also found that this was an isolated incident; the

misconduct did not involve the representation of clients; and Respondent presented favorable character testimony from eight witnesses, who testified concerning Respondent's community activities and her reputation for honesty and integrity. (Hearing Bd. Report at 4-7) (C. 81-84.)

Respondent asked the Hearing Board to consider in mitigation the evidence that Respondent had actually completed the required 20 hours of community service by volunteering for the Peoria Symphony Guild. The Hearing Board rejected that request stating, "Such evidence not only fails to lessen the seriousness of submitting a false report, it makes Respondent's decision to do so even more confounding. Consequently, we do not consider such evidence as mitigation." (Hearing Bd. Report at 7.) (C. 84.)

In aggravation, the Hearing Board found Respondent was an experienced criminal defense attorney who should have been particularly cognizant of her obligation to be truthful in complying with the conditions of her court supervision. The Hearing Board also found it aggravating that Respondent involved her friend in the deceptive conduct. *Id.*

Sanction Recommendation

The Hearing Board recommended that Respondent be suspended for 90 days. (Hearing Bd. Report at 8-9) (C. 85-86.)

SANCTION RECOMMENDATION

The only issue on appeal is the appropriate sanction for Respondent's misconduct. Neither party challenges the Hearing Board's findings.

The Administrator argues that a 90-day suspension is inadequate given the serious nature of Respondent's misconduct and urges this Board to recommend a five-month suspension.

Respondent argues that a five-month suspension would be excessive in light of the substantial mitigation in this case and asks this Board to adopt the Hearing Board's recommendation of a 90-day suspension.

We review the Hearing Board's sanction recommendations *de novo*. *See In re Storment*, 2018PR00032 (Review Bd., Jan. 23, 2020) at 15, *petition for leave to file exceptions denied*, M.R. 30336 (May 18, 2020). In making our recommendation, we consider the nature of the proved misconduct, and any aggravating and mitigating circumstances shown by the evidence, *see In re Gorecki*, 208 Ill. 2d 350, 360-61, 802 N.E.2d 1194 (2003), while keeping in mind that the purpose of discipline is not to punish but rather to protect the public, maintain the integrity of the legal profession, and protect the administration of justice from reproach. *See In re Timpone*, 157 Ill. 2d 178, 197, 623 N.E.2d 300 (1993). We also consider the deterrent value of attorney discipline and whether the sanction will help preserve public confidence in the legal profession. *See Gorecki*, 208 Ill. 2d at 361. We also seek to recommend a sanction that is consistent with sanctions imposed in similar cases, *see Timpone*, 157 Ill. 2d at 197, while considering the unique facts of each case. *See In re Witt*, 145 Ill. 2d 380, 398, 583 N.E.2d 526 (1991). Although our review is *de novo*, the Hearing Board's findings regarding candor, intent, understanding of the misconduct, and other fact-finding judgments are ordinarily entitled to considerable weight because the Hearing Board is able to observe the witnesses' demeanor and judge their credibility. *See In re Timpone*, 157 Ill. 2d at 196; *In re Martinez-Fraticelli*, 221 Ill. 2d 255, 280, 850 N.E.2d 155 (2006).

The Administrator argues that Respondent should be suspended for five months because her misconduct was very serious; specifically, Respondent was indicted and pled guilty to a criminal felony charge; she was acting for her own benefit; she was an experienced criminal defense attorney; she recruited a friend to participate in the misconduct; and she did not admit to

her wrongdoing until she was caught. The Administrator also argues that a five-month suspension is called for based on similar cases in which attorneys were convicted for making false statements.

The Hearing Board considered and weighed each of those factors, and reviewed relevant precedent, including cases involving convictions, and rejected the argument that a longer suspension was appropriate. Both sides make persuasive arguments. However, we agree with the Hearing Board's recommendation given the specific facts of this case. The Hearing Board's recommendation is based on a well-reasoned and thorough analysis, in which the Hearing Board properly identified and considered the relevant facts, gave appropriate weight to the evidence presented, carefully assessed Respondent's testimony and the testimony of the character witnesses, evaluated the parties' arguments, and reviewed applicable cases.

Although Respondent initially sought a censure, on appeal, she agreed that the recommended three-month suspension is appropriate. We concur with the Hearing Board's conclusion that a 90-day suspension, rather than a censure, is appropriate in light of the serious nature of the misconduct and the aggravating factors. As the Hearing Board pointed out, Respondent's misconduct was very serious. When a criminal defense attorney deliberately files a false document intended to deceive the court, it has the potential to tarnish the legal profession's reputation and undermine the public's confidence in the legal system.

There are also serious aggravating factors in this case. Significantly, Respondent recruited her friend to participate in the deceptive conduct, thereby exposing her friend to certain risks, including possible criminal charges and potential professional issues, such as being fired or demoted for dishonesty. Moreover, Respondent was an experienced criminal defense attorney, so she knew that lying to the court was absolutely prohibited and completely unacceptable. Additionally, Respondent was acting for her own personal interests, and Respondent did not admit

to her wrongdoing until she was caught. Finally, Respondent did not provide a justifiable explanation for her confounding misconduct, except to say that she was "cutting corners."

We do not believe, however, that the sanction should exceed the recommended 90-day suspension. Respondent admitted wrongdoing in her testimony before the Hearing Board (C. 151, 165, 166), and apologized to the Hearing Board and the ARDC. (C. 174-175.) Respondent's counsel stated during oral argument before this Board that Respondent made a huge, horrible, stupid decision, which she seriously regrets. We agree with the Hearing Board that Respondent's horrible decision warrants a 90-day suspension but does not warrant a greater sanction. The Hearing Board explained its reasoning as follows:

> A suspension of ninety days fulfills the purposes of the disciplinary process. We are satisfied that Respondent takes responsibility for her error in judgment, understands the negative impact of her conduct on the administration of justice and the profession, and will not make a similar mistake in the future. We are also convinced that Respondent does not pose a risk to the public. On the contrary, she provides valuable representation to clients in criminal matters, and it would be a disservice to those clients if she were suspended for a lengthy period.

(Hearing Bd. Report at 8.) (C. 85.) We agree. We also believe that a longer suspension is not needed in light of the following:

- Respondent has had a distinguished, unblemished 30-year career in the legal profession. Six attorneys and two other individuals took the time out of their schedules to testify on Respondent's behalf concerning her good character. Many of the witnesses testified that Respondent has an excellent reputation for honesty and integrity and is well respected in the legal community. One attorney testified that Respondent is essentially the gold standard in the legal profession in terms of how she interacts with her clients and helps other attorneys. The overall portrait of Respondent that emerged at the disciplinary hearing is of an honest attorney who made

a grave error, for which she is sincerely sorry, rather than a portrait of an unethical lawyer, who routinely engages in unethical behavior.

- After observing Respondent testify, the Hearing Board found that Respondent accepted responsibility for her misconduct; she acknowledged that her misconduct was very serious; and she was genuinely remorseful for what she had done. Many of the character witnesses also testified that Respondent had expressed remorse to them and had taken responsibility for her misconduct. Under these facts, the Hearing Board was in the best position to evaluate remorse, and, in this case, remorse is a significant mitigating factor.

- Respondent's misconduct was a single isolated incident involving a lapse of sound judgment, and the evidence shows that her misconduct was an aberration. Nothing in Respondent's actions before or after her wrongdoing indicates that she has a propensity for this sort of conduct.

- Respondent's misconduct did not involve the representation of a client, or any attempt by Respondent to obtain a financial benefit.

- Respondent fully cooperated with the ARDC; she also self-reported the misconduct to the ARDC.

- Respondent pled guilty to the felony charge of submitting a false report, thereby acknowledging her wrongdoing, and preventing the expenditure of court resources to address the matter.

- The Hearing Board found that Respondent is not a risk to the public, and during oral argument before the Review Board, counsel for the Administrator – to his credit – agreed that Respondent does not pose an on-going risk to the public. Moreover, the Administrator did not seek an Interim Suspension under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 774.

- Although Respondent's involving her friend was an aggravating factor, there was no evidence that her friend was harmed in any fashion, either legally or professionally. Moreover, Respondent did not attempt to cover up, or ask her friend to cover up, Respondent's wrongdoing after it was discovered. Respondent also took full responsibility for directing her friend to sign the false report.

- Although not necessarily a mitigating factor *per se*, Respondent did perform 20 hours of community service, as ordered by the judge. She did not disregard the court's order or refuse to fulfill her obligation to perform community service.

- For years, Respondent has participated in community service and church activities, has been involved with professional organizations, and has provided extensive *pro bono* legal services; additionally, the Hearing Board found that Respondent's commitment to her clients was commendable.

None of those factors can excuse or eliminate the severity of submitting a false report to the court, but they are strong indicators that Respondent will not repeat her mistake, harm her clients or the public, or engage in other misconduct in the future.

The Administrator argues that a five-month suspension, rather than a 90-day suspension, is the appropriate sanction based on similar cases in which attorneys were convicted for making false statements. *See In re Braverman*, 1999PR00081, *discipline on consent allowed*, M.R. 16883 (Sept. 22, 2000) (attorney convicted of removing country-of-origin markings from imported products; the attorney, who was the president of an automotive product company, shipped 40,000 tire pressure gauges to K-Mart, over a nine-month period, which were falsely identified as having been made in the United States, and K-Mart paid for those products); *In re Pritchett*, 2011PR00034, *discipline on consent allowed*, M.R. 25248 (May 22, 2012) (attorney

convicted of attempted financial identity theft; for more than a year, the attorney used his secretary's name and personal information, without her knowledge or permission, for his own business purposes, including to obtain a contract, open a bank account, sell life insurance, and receive commission payments; and the secretary's credit rating was harmed); *In re Luce*, 2009PR00031, *discipline on consent allowed*, M.R. 24074 (Oct. 13, 2010) (attorney convicted of obstruction of justice for falsely representing to the SEC that an individual would not voluntarily appear for an interview, where the SEC was investigating whether the attorney's clients had fraudulently inflated the value of stock); *In re Gabriele and Villadonga*, 1989PR00469 (Review Bd., Jan. 23, 1992), *approved and confirmed*, M.R. 8236 (March 20, 1992*)* (two attorneys convicted for participating in a false mortgage loan application scheme that involved submitting false information in three separate loan applications in order to obtain a pay-off of a $500,000 loan).

The attorney's misconduct in each of those cases, however, was substantially more serious than Respondent's misconduct in this case. Three of those cases, *Braverman, Pritchett*, and *Gabriele and Villadonga*, involved complicated financial fraud schemes that involved multiple false statements and took place over an extended period of time, unlike this case, which involved an isolated incident and a single false statement that involved no financial benefit.

In *Luce*, the attorney's false representations interfered with a federal investigation concerning possible stock fraud by two companies and two individuals. The attorney's misconduct involved the representation of clients, who were being investigated, and constituted an illegal attempt by the attorney to shield those clients from federal action against them. The attorney pled guilty to intending to impede the SEC investigation by limiting its ability to interview a former employee of the companies under investigation, regarding information the former employee may

have possessed concerning the matters at issue in the SEC investigation. That misconduct was also more serious than Respondent's misconduct.

In support of its recommendation for a 90-day suspension, the Hearing Board cited four cases in which the attorneys made false statements and were suspended for 90 days. We agree with the Hearing Board that those cases provide guidance in this matter. *See In re Sutton*, 2012PR00156, *discipline on consent allowed*, M.R. 26134 (Oct. 16, 2013) (attorney and his client signed three quitclaim deeds that were falsely backdated, and the attorney subsequently lied about doing so); *In re Mays*, 2000PR00008, *discipline on consent allowed*, M.R. 17247 (Jan. 19, 2001) (attorney misrepresented his client's identity to a process server and made false statements to the court about the incident; and in a separate matter, the attorney notarized a signature on a deed even though he had not witnessed the deed being signed); *In re Heyl*, 1996PR00690, *discipline on consent allowed*, M.R. 12944 (Nov. 26, 1996) (attorney, who was in a car accident, agreed with the other driver to lie about the date of the accident, so that the other driver, who was uninsured, could obtain insurance to cover the accident; the attorney falsely represented the date of the car accident to the police department and her insurance company, and during an arbitration hearing); *In re Grosky*, 1996PR00624, (Review Bd., May 13, 1998), *approved and confirmed*, M.R. 15043 (Sept. 28, 1998) (attorney sent a letter to opposing counsel containing false information, and subsequently testified falsely to the ARDC about the incident).

The Administrator argues that those and other cases cited by Respondent are distinguishable because the misconduct in those cases did not involve ARDC charges under Rule 8.4(b) or result in criminal convictions. The Administrator further argues that because Respondent was convicted, her conduct is more egregious. Those arguments are not persuasive.

For example, in determining the appropriate sanction, a criminal conviction may support the conclusion that the attorney's misconduct is serious. A conviction, however, does not make the misconduct more serious, and is not outcome determinative in terms of the sanction. Conversely, a conviction is not needed to establish that an attorney's misconduct is serious. The misconduct in this case would be just as serious without a conviction, as it is with a conviction.

There are just too many factors that impact on whether or not an attorney is convicted, including whether the misconduct is referred to a prosecutor's office for review; whether the prosecutor's office has the resources or interest in prosecuting the matter; and whether a judge or jury returns a conviction in cases where there is no guilty plea. Ultimately, in determining the appropriate sanction, the issue is not whether the attorney was convicted, but rather whether the misconduct is serious, along with the facts and circumstances of the matter, as in any disciplinary case. *See In re Rolley*, 121 Ill. 2d 222, 233, 520 N.E.2d 302 (1988) (stating "[i]t is not the conviction of the crime which justifies discipline, but the commission of the act. The attorney is being disciplined not because of his conviction but because of the conduct."); *see also In re Schluckebier*, 2006PR00049 (Hearing Bd., Oct. 11, 2007) at 5, *approved and confirmed*, M.R. 22054 (Jan. 23, 2008) (stating "[t]he fact that Respondent was neither criminally prosecuted for nor criminally convicted of money laundering is irrelevant to our finding. A finding of misconduct may be based upon an attorney's commission of a criminal act even if the attorney was not charged with or convicted of the crime as long as the criminal conduct is proved by clear and convincing evidence.").

Accordingly, we recommend that Respondent be suspended for 90 days. We believe the recommended sanction serves the goals of attorney discipline by acting as a deterrent to other attorneys and helping to preserve public confidence in the legal profession. *See Gorecki,*

208 Ill. 2d at 360-61. We find that the recommended sanction is commensurate with Respondent's misconduct and consistent with discipline that has been imposed for comparable misconduct, without being so harsh that it constitutes punishment.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the Hearing Board's recommendation that Respondent be suspended for 90 days.

Respectfully submitted,

George E. Marron III
Bradley N. Pollock
Scott J. Szala

Scott J. Szala, specially concurring:

I join in the Review Board's thorough analysis and its recommendation of a 90-day suspension for Respondent under the specific facts.

However, I write separately to bring to the Court's attention an issue regarding the Second Chance Probation statute which may not fully protect the public from a lawyer's misconduct. To be clear, I do not allege any wrongdoing here on anyone's part, only that the existing Illinois Supreme Court Rules may need further consideration to protect the public.

Although Respondent notified the ARDC of her guilty plea (Rule 761), according to her counsel during oral argument, she was not required to report this plea to her existing clients and, by implication, future clients, because of the Second Chance Probation statute. Unlike Illinois Supreme Court Rule 764, which requires attorneys who are disbarred or suspended for six months or more to notify their clients of their discipline, or Rule 774(d)(1), which may require attorneys under interim suspensions to notify their clients of the suspension, the language of the Second Chance Probation statute expressly provides that a "discharge and dismissal" is "not a conviction"

under the Code of Unified Corrections or "for purposes of disqualification or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction of a crime." 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.4(g).

Accordingly, under Illinois law, Respondent can credibly argue that she was not required to report her felony guilty plea of forgery to her existing or future clients. However, since the long-standing purpose of ARDC discipline is, in part, to "protect the public," *In re Timpone*, 157 Ill. 2d 178, 197 (1993), some existing or future clients could be troubled to learn that their attorney pled guilty to a felony under the Second Chance Probation statute but was not required to disclose that guilty plea to them. Accordingly, from a public policy standpoint, I bring this issue to the attention of the Court for its consideration.

CERTIFICATION

I, Michelle M. Thome, Clerk of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois and keeper of the records, hereby certifies that the foregoing is a true copy of the Report and Recommendation of the Review Board, approved by each Panel member, entered in the above entitled cause of record filed in my office on November 28, 2022.

/s/ Michelle M. Thome
Michelle M. Thome, Clerk of the
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois

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BEFORE THE REVIEW BOARD
OF THE
ILLINOIS ATTORNEY REGISTRATION
AND
DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION

In the Matter of: **MAUREEN WILLIAMS,** Respondent-Appellee, No. 6285393.	Commission No. 2021PR00032

PROOF OF SERVICE
OF THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE REVIEW BOARD

I, Michelle M. Thome, hereby certify that I served a copy of the Report and Recommendation of the Review Board on the parties listed at the addresses shown below by email and by regular mail, by depositing it with proper postage prepaid, by causing the same to be deposited in the U.S. Mailbox at One Prudential Plaza, 130 East Randolph Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60601 on November 28, 2022, at or before 5:00 p.m. At the same time, a copy was sent to Counsel for the Administrator-Appellant by e-mail service.

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Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument are true and correct, except as to matters therein stated to be on information and belief and as to such matters the undersigned certifies as aforesaid that she verily believes the same to be true.

Michelle M. Thome,
Clerk

/s/ Michelle M. Thome
By: Michelle M. Thome
Clerk

FILED

November 28, 2022

ARDC CLERK