In re Craig Homer Greenwood
Commission No. 07 CH 1

NATURE OF THE CASE: 1) converting funds; 2) breaching a fiduciary duty; 3) failing to provide competent representation to a client; 4) failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; 5) failing to hold property of clients or third persons separate from the lawyer's own property; 6) failing to provide competent representation to a client; 7) failing to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; 8) failing to reduce the contingent fee agreement to writing; 9) failing to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of a client; 10) failing to promptly refund unearned fees paid in advance upon withdrawal from employment; 11) failing to respond to a lawful demand for information from the Commission; 12) engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; 13) engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and 4) engaging in conduct that tends to defeat the administration of justice or to bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute.

RULES DISCUSSED: Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.5(c), 1.15(a), 1.16(e), 3.2, 8.1(a)(2), 8.4(a)(4), and 8.4(a)(5) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct and Supreme Court Rule 770.

RECOMMENDATION: Suspended from the practice of law for nine months.

DATE OF OPINION: April 13, 2009.

HEARING PANEL: Michael C. Greenfield, Chair, Andrea D. Flynn, and Joseph J. Calvanico.

RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL: George B. Collins and Theresa M. Gronkiewicz.

ADMINISTRATOR'S COUNSEL: Marcia T. Wolf.

The hearing in this matter was held on June 5, October 14, and 15, 2008, at the Chicago offices of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission ("ARDC") before a Hearing Board Panel consisting of Michael C. Greenfield, Chair, Andrea D. Flynn, and Joseph J. Calvanico. Marcia T. Wolf appeared on behalf of the Administrator of the ARDC. Respondent appeared and was represented by George B. Collins and Theresa M. Gronkiewicz.

On January 16, 2007, the Administrator filed a three-count Complaint pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 753(b). On March 22, 2007, the Administrator filed a five-count amended Complaint. The Administrator alleged that Respondent converted client funds, failed to provide competent representation, neglected client matters, failed to return unearned fees, and failed to respond to a lawful demand for information from the Administrator. Respondent filed an Answer to the amended Complaint, admitting some of the factual allegations, denying some of the factual allegations, and denying all allegations of misconduct.

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The Administrator presented the testimony of six witnesses, including Respondent, and offered Administrator's exhibits 1 through 13, which were admitted into evidence. Respondent testified on his own behalf, presented the testimony of three witnesses, and offered Respondent's exhibits 1 through 15, which were admitted into evidence.

In May 2003, Respondent represented Reed Royem in the sale of Royem's home. The buyer of the home was Tom Nimoth, who was represented by Edward Lupa. Respondent agreed to accept $350 for representing Royem. At the closing, the parties agreed that Royem could continue to reside in the home, and pay rent to Nimoth. Respondent agreed to hold, as escrowee, $4,760 of the proceeds in trust, from which rents, utility payments, attorneys' fees and court costs were to be paid when the amounts of those payments had been resolved to the satisfaction of both parties.

On May 29, 2003, Royem received a check in the amount of $52,690.58, representing the proceeds from the sale of his home. The check included the $4,760 Respondent was to hold in escrow. On May 30, 2003, Respondent deposited the check into his attorney trust account. Between May 29, 2003 and June 4, 2003, Respondent distributed $48,148 of the proceeds, leaving a balance of $4,542.58 in his client trust account. As of July 5, 2005, the balance in Respondent's client trust account was $66.81. At no time between May 29, 2003 and July 5, 2003 did Respondent have authority from Royem or Nimoth to use any portion of the $4,760 for his business or personal expenses.

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In 2003, Thomas Nimoth purchased a house from Reed Royem. (Tr. 199). At the closing, the parties entered into a rental agreement allowing Royem to stay in the house and pay rent to Nimoth in the amount of $40 per day until June 30, 2003, and $60 per day after that date. (Tr. 200-202; Adm. Ex. 1). Respondent agreed to hold $4,700 in escrow, from which the agreed rent was to be paid or to guarantee the payment of such rent. (Tr. 203). Royem lived in the house until August 17, 2003, and Nimoth did not receive any rent from him. (Tr. 208-11; Adm. Ex. 5).

Edward Lupa represented Nimoth in the purchase of the house from Royem. (Tr. 213). After Royem failed to move out, Lupa agreed to initiate an eviction proceeding, and called Respondent. (Tr. 216-17; Adm. Ex. 5). Lupa prepared the court documents, but his secretary failed to file them with the court. (Tr. 220). Lupa also sent several letters to Respondent requesting he pay $4,400 in rent to Nimoth from the escrow funds held by Respondent for that purpose. Lupa later determined that the correct amount of unpaid rent was $4,160. (Tr. 221-22, 230, 246). He testified that he never gave Respondent permission to disburse any of the escrow funds. (Tr. 225). Lupa's attorney fees after the closing amounted to $750. (Tr. 225-26). At the October 14, 2008, the disciplinary hearing, Respondent gave Lupa a check in the amount of $4,400. (Tr. 247; Resp. Ex. 7).

Respondent agreed to represent Royem in the sale of a house to Nimoth. (Tr. 250-51, 309). He had represented Royem and Royem's son in other legal matters. (Tr. 309-11; Resp. Exs. 3, 4, 5, 6). Respondent's fee for the closing was $350. (Tr. 251). At the closing, the parties

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entered into a rental agreement allowing Royem to continue living in the house and paying rent to Nimoth. (Tr. 251-53, 313; Adm. Ex. 1). Under the agreement, Respondent was to hold $4,760 in escrow until all rents, utility bills and attorney's fees were paid. (Tr. 253). Royem received proceeds in the amount of $52,690.58 at the closing, which included the $4,760 that was supposed to be held in escrow. (Tr. 254-55; Adm. Ex. 2). Royem gave the proceeds check to Respondent, and Respondent deposited it in his client trust account. (Tr. 255-56; Adm. Ex. 2).

In June 2003, Respondent wrote six checks on behalf of Royem from Respondent's client trust account totaling $48,148. (Tr. 256-59; Adm. Ex. 2). After writing those checks, $4,542.58 from the closing proceeds remained in his client trust account. (Tr. 259, 313). As of July 5, 2005, the balance in Respondent's client trust account was $66.81. Respondent and Royem agreed that Respondent could use the remaining $4,500 for his legal fees that accrued in the other cases in which he represented Royem or Royem's son. (Tr. 318-20). At that time, Respondent had given no money to Nimoth or Lupa, and had not been authorized to use any portion of the escrow funds for his own purposes. (Tr. 259-62; Adm. Exs. 4, 5).

As of June 18, 2004, Royem informed Respondent that he had paid no money to Nimoth or Lupa. (Tr. 264-65; Adm. Ex. 5). In a letter dated July 9, 2004, Respondent informed Lupa that he would send him a certified check for the undisputed amount of money owed by Royem. Some of the amount Nimoth claimed Royem owed him was in dispute. (Tr. 265-66, 320-21; Adm. Ex. 5; Resp. Ex. 2). Respondent did not send the check, and did not pay Nimoth any money, until October 14, 2008, the second day of the disciplinary hearing. (Tr. 266). Respondent understands that he owed Nimoth the money because he improperly handled the escrow money, but he did not intend to steal the money. He said he had been mistaken and thought Royem was going to pay Nimoth. (Tr. 324-27). Also, during 2003 and 2004,

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Respondent failed to give the case his full attention because his health was worsening, culminating with suffering a stroke in the September 2004. (Tr. 327-28).

On January 16, 2004, Zoschke & Company, a property management company, filed a breach of contract complaint against Salije and Zijadin Krasniqi, alleging that the Krasniqis failed to pay $5,225 in rent owed under a lease agreement. Prior to March 16, 2004, Respondent agreed to represent the Krasniqis in the case for a fee of 30 per cent of any savings he obtained for them. On March 23, 2004, Respondent appeared in court on behalf of the Krasniqis, at which time the court entered an agreed order scheduling the matter for arbitration on June 15, 2004.

On April 28, 2004, Patrick Williams, counsel for Zoschke, served Respondent with a first request for production of documents and interrogatories. At no time between April 28, and June 7, 2008, did Respondent comply with these discovery requests. On June 11, 2004, the court entered an agreed order directing the Krasniqis to comply with discovery by July 2, 2004, vacating the arbitration date and setting the matter for status on July 8, 2004.

Respondent again failed to comply with the discovery requests. On July 8, 2004, Respondent informed the court that he had not received the discovery responses from his clients. The court directed the Krasniqis to comply with the outstanding discovery by July 22, 2004. Shortly before appearing in court on July 28, 2004, Respondent served Williams with the defendants' answers to the interrogatories. The court set the matter for an arbitration hearing on October 5, 2004 and barred two of defendants' witnesses from testifying because Respondent failed to provide their complete contact information in the interrogatories.

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On August 6, 2004, Williams served Respondent with a notice of deposition to depose the Krasniqis on August 11, 2004. On the date of the scheduled deposition, Respondent informed Williams that the Krasniqis would not be available for the depositions, and he would contact Williams to reschedule. At no time between August 11, 2004, and September 15, 2004 did Respondent contact Williams to reschedule the depositions. On September 15, 2004, Williams sent Respondent a letter requesting possible dates for the Krasniqis' depositions, and the disclosure of relevant information known by the defendants. Respondent failed to respond to the letter.

On September 30, 2004, Respondent did not appear in court and Williams informed the court that Respondent was ill. On October 28, 2004, the date of the next status hearing, Williams informed the court that he had not heard from Respondent, and the matter was continued to November 9, 2004. Shortly after the October 28, 2004, hearing, Respondent informed Williams that he was unable to attend to his law practice due to personal medical issues and would be withdrawing as counsel for the Krasniqis. On November 9, 2004, Respondent informed the court that he intended to withdraw, and the court set the matter for a status hearing on November 17, 2004, for Respondent to present a motion to withdraw. At no time before November 17, 2004, did Respondent file a motion to withdraw. He did not appear in court on that date, and the matter was set for a hearing on sanctions against the defendants. On January 3, 2005, Respondent did not appear, but his clients were present.

Williams served Respondent with a motion for sanctions, requesting that the court strike defendants' Answer and enter judgment for plaintiffs. The motion was set to be heard on January 27, 2005. On January 26, 2005, Respondent informed Williams that he and his father were ill, but Williams would not agree to a continuance. Respondent failed to appear in court on

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January 27, 2005. The court granted plaintiffs' motion, entered a default judgment against defendants, and scheduled the matter for a prove-up hearing on the motion for sanctions. On February 3, 2005, the court entered a judgment in favor of plaintiffs in the amount of $4,925, plus attorney's fees in the amount of $5,425 plus costs. On February 28, 2005, Respondent filed a motion to vacate the default order and the judgment order.

On April 25, 2005, Respondent served Williams with a notice of motion scheduling a hearing on the motion to vacate for April 28, 2005. Respondent's motion described his health problems, and requested that the matter be transferred to small claims court. On April 28, 2005, the court set a briefing schedule for the motion.

On June 16, 2005, the court struck Respondent's appearance, chastised him for his conduct in the case, and found that Respondent's continued involvement in the case created a conflict of interest with his clients. The court also vacated the default and judgment orders, and directed Williams to file a supplemental motion for sanctions against Respondent. On July 19, 2005, Respondent appeared at the hearing on the supplemental motion for sanctions and the matter was continued to August 18, 2005. On August 17, 2005, Respondent filed a motion for extension of time, stating that he was unable to respond to the pending sanctions motion because of his son's illness. Respondent failed to appear in court on August 18, 2005 and the court struck Respondent's motion and entered a default against him. The matter was set for a prove-up on September 8, 2005.

On September 7, 2005, Respondent filed a motion to vacate the default order, citing his son's illness as his reason for missing the court date. On September 8, 2005, Respondent filed a response to the supplemental motion for sanctions and appeared at the hearing on the motion. Respondent told the court that he would provide medical records to substantiate his and his son's

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health issues. The court vacated the default order, allowed the filing of his response, and ordered Respondent to provide medical records by October 6, 2005. At no time prior to that date did he provide medical records or otherwise respond to the court. On October 24, 2005, Respondent filed a "proffered report," stating he would not provide his medical records and was unable to provide the medical records of his son and father. On October 25, 2005, the court noted that Respondent could have provided his own medical records for an in camera inspection, and entered sanctions against Respondent in the amount of $6,000 for plaintiff's attorney's fees. On December 1, 2005, Respondent paid Williams the $6,000.

Patrick J. Williams represented Zoschke in a lawsuit against the Krasniqis to recover unpaid rent. (Tr. 133-35; Adm. Ex. 7). Williams reiterated the details of events that occurred in the Circuit Court. (Tr. 135-67). Respondent never produced any medical records regarding his health problems. (Tr. 147, 170-71). On August 3, 2005, after Respondent withdrew from the case, Shefik Idrizi filed an appearance on behalf of the Krasniqis. (Tr. 167; Adm. Ex. 7 at 27). Williams does not speak Albanian, but the Krasniqis' son spoke English, and Williams spoke to him. (Tr. 373-74). Williams saw Respondent in court on one occasion, and he thought Respondent looked ill. (Tr. 374, 379).

Shefik Idrizi represented the Krasniqis after Respondent withdrew from the case. (Tr. 185). Mr. Krasniqi was born in Kosovo. He primarily speaks Albanian, and limited English. (Tr. 184). Idrizi speaks English and Albanian. (Tr. 185). Idrizi determined that the Krasniqis did not have a defense to the lawsuit and settled the matter. (Tr. 185-88, 195). The Krasniqis paid Idrizi a fee of $700 for his legal services in defending that action. (Tr. 188). He testified

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that an individual who did not speak Albanian would have been unable to explain the matter to the Krasniqis. (Tr. 194-97).

Respondent represented the Krasniqis in a landlord/tenant dispute. Respondent does not speak Albanian, but he understood their defense was that the landlord had interfered with their attempts to sublet the apartment. (Tr. 328-29). The Krasniqis communicated with Respondent through their son, who spoke English. (Tr. 337). The Krasniqis did not pay Respondent a fee for his legal services rendered in connection with that case. (Tr. 329-30).

Respondent admitted he did not properly represent the Krasniqis in the fall of 2004. (Tr. 331, 406-407). Although Respondent told the court he would withdraw from the case, he failed to file the motion to do so and he failed to appear in court on January 3, 2005, because he was taking care of his father, who was ill and could not be left alone. (Tr. 332-33). Respondent also failed to appear in court on a subsequent date for a hearing on sanctions because his son was hospitalized with a brain cyst. (Tr. 335-36). Respondent did not produce medical records to the court because he wanted to protect his privacy, and did not have access to his son's medical records. (Tr. 338). After the Krasniqis hired Idrizi, Respondent, along with Idrizi, attempted to settle the matter and made an offer to Williams. (Tr. 392-399, 408-409; Resp. Ex. 15). Respondent ultimately paid Williams $6,000 in sanctions. (Tr. 400-401).

In 1995, Medwin Gob was arrested for battery, and in 1996 he was arrested for disorderly conduct. Both charges were subsequently dismissed. On May 14, 2004, Respondent agreed to represent Gob in attempting to expunge Gob's arrest records, for which Gob paid Respondent a

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partial fee of $200. In October or November 2004, Gob requested the return of the $200. On November 10, 2004, Gob submitted a request for investigation to the ARDC concerning Respondent's failure to communicate with him or refund the $200. On March 11, 2005, Respondent sent a written response to the ARDC offering to either complete the expungement matter or refund the $200 partial fee. On March 22, 2005, Gob sent a letter to the ARDC stating that he had retained a different attorney to expunge his records and requested a refund. On March 29, 2005, the ARDC forwarded Gob's letter to Respondent. At no time did Respondent refund the $200 to Gob or complete the expungement.

In 2004, Medwin Gob hired Respondent to expunge his arrest record. (Tr. 43-44). Respondent agreed to handle the matter for $550 and Gob gave him an initial payment of $200. (Tr. 45-46). Gob called Respondent approximately twice per month for six months to find out the status of his case, and Respondent returned only one of his calls. (Tr. 46-47). After not hearing from Respondent, Gob hired a different attorney. Gob paid that attorney $600 to complete the expungement. (Tr. 47-48, 51). As of June 5, 2008, Gob had not received a refund of the $200 he paid Respondent. (Tr. 48-49). His experience with Respondent negatively affected his opinion of attorneys. (Tr. 49).

Respondent testified he spoke with Gob about his case several times by telephone, but never met with him. (Tr. 339). Respondent received a $200 partial fee to represent Gob in expunging his arrest record. (Tr. 340). Respondent went to the Criminal Court building and located Gob's files, but, he said, did not complete the expungement. (Tr. 340). Respondent said he was overwhelmed by health issues at the time, and with his divorce and ailing parents. (Tr.

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340-41). Respondent did not refund Gob's $200 fee payment until October 2008, the week before the second day of the disciplinary hearing, when he mailed Gob a check for $250. (Tr. 341).

On August 13, 2003, Respondent agreed to represent Dorothy Ciura in a claim to recover insurance proceeds from a $50,000 life insurance policy on the life of their deceased son Steven, issued by First Colony Life Insurance Company. The named beneficiary on the policy was Steven's estranged former fiancé. On August 13, 2003, Ciura paid Respondent a $2,000 retainer and agreed to pay Respondent one-third of any recovery on the insurance policy. The fee agreement was not reduced to writing. On June 3, 2005, Respondent filed a lawsuit on behalf of Ciura. On March 1, 2006 the court ordered Respondent to issue a summons and place it for service by March 3, 2006. On April 18, 2006, Respondent failed to appear in court on a status call and the court dismissed the case for want of prosecution. On May 3, 2006, on Respondent's motion the court vacated the April 18th order and dismissed the case without prejudice.

Respondent agreed to represent Ciura in an action to obtain life insurance proceeds for a policy owned by and on the life of her son. (Tr. 266-67, 342-43; Adm. Ex. 10). Respondent filed a lawsuit on Ciura's behalf. (Tr. 268-69; Adm. Ex. 12). On May 3, 2006, the case was dismissed without prejudice. (Tr. 270; Adm. Ex. 12). Respondent said he did not cause the named beneficiary on the policy to be served because he did not know where she was, and, further, a delay in service would help his case. (Tr. 343-44). Respondent refiled the case after it had been dismissed without prejudice. He also returned $1,372.50 to Ciura, that amount being

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the remainder of the $2,000 fee she had paid to him, after deducting court costs relating to one of the filings. (Tr. 345-46; Resp. Ex. 11).

Respondent currently represents Ciura in a federal court case relating to the same subject matter. He filed the case on her behalf after she was unable to obtain other counsel. (Tr. 347-51; Resp. Exs. 10, 13).

On October 6, 2006, the Administrator received a communication from Dorothy Ciura, who claimed that Respondent had neglected her case and failed to refund an unearned fee. On October 16, 2006, counsel for the Administrator sent Respondent a letter requesting he submit information regarding Ciura's claim within 14 days. On November 7, 2006, a second request for information was sent to Respondent. Respondent failed to respond to either request. On January 3, 2007, counsel for the Administrator served Respondent with a subpoena to appear for a sworn statement on February 6, 2007 and to produce documents relating to Ciura's claim on that date. On February 6, 2007, Respondent informed the Administrator that he was unable to appear for the sworn statement, and agreed to appear on March 6, 2007. On March 6, 2007, Respondent informed the Administrator that he was unable to appear for the sworn statement due to an unspecified medical condition. He also failed to produce the requested documents.

Respondent admitted that he received the two letters from the Administrator, that he failed to respond to either of them, and that he twice failed to appear for a sworn statement for which he had received notice. (Tr. 271). However, he did give four sworn statements or

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depositions and answered all of the Administrator's questions relating to other counts of the disciplinary complaint. (Tr. 359-60).

Meghan Schroeder is a member of the District 99 School Board. Respondent is also a member of the School Board. (Tr. 277-78). She has known Respondent since 2002 and knows others in the community who know him. She opined that Respondent has a very good reputation for honesty, integrity and truthfulness. (Tr. 278-79). Additionally, she said Respondent performs an active and valuable role with the school board. (Tr. 279). Respondent has missed some School Board meetings because of his health, and Schroeder has driven him to some of the meetings when he was unable to drive himself. (Tr. 281). She was not familiar with the disciplinary charges pending against Respondent. (Tr. 279-80).

Julia Beckman is also a member of the School Board and has known Respondent since 1993. (Tr. 282-83). Beckman believes that Respondent has a very good reputation in the community for honesty and integrity. (Tr. 284). Respondent has missed several School Board meetings due to his health issues, but would sometimes participate by telephone. (Tr. 284-85). Beckman is vaguely familiar with the disciplinary charges against Respondent. (Tr. 285).

Richard Voogd is a chief engineering technician at the Argonne National Laboratory. He met Respondent six years ago while attending the same church, and they are friends. (Tr. 287-

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89). Voogd believes Respondent has a good reputation for honesty. (Tr. 289). He was not familiar with the disciplinary charges against Respondent. (Tr. 291).

Respondent is 62 years old and was licensed to practice law in Illinois in 1973 (Tr. 250, 294, 299). Since 1985, Respondent has been a sole practitioner with a diverse practice. (Tr. 294-97). Respondent was married and had six children. He separated from his wife in the summer of 2001 and they were later divorced. (Tr. 300-302).

In September 2000, his mother died. Prior to her death, Respondent took care of her in her home. (Tr. 301). Subsequently, Respondent's father became ill and Respondent took care of him until January 2005. (Tr. 302-303). During this period of time, Respondent had his own health issues. In the late 1990s, Respondent developed type 2 diabetes. (Tr. 299). Before his mother died, he had a stroke. He had another stroke in September 2004 and developed blood pressure problems. (Tr. 302-303). In December 2007, Respondent gave the Administrator signed consent forms so she could obtain his medical records. He also gave her an outline of the history of his medical issues. (Tr. 303-307; Resp. Ex. 12).

Respondent's health issues affected his law practice and he began to wind down his practice in 2001. (Tr. 308-309). He currently has one case pending in federal court, and three cases, involving his family members, pending in state court. (Tr. 351). Respondent plans to rebuild his practice slowly, so he can ensure he is able to handle new cases. (Tr. 354-55, 366-68).

Respondent has served on the School Board for three terms and is an active participant in the meetings. (Tr. 300, 357-58). He also provides the School Board with pro bono legal advice

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and monitors litigation involving the board. (Tr. 362). He was also active in his church before it was dissolved. (Tr. 363).

On June 25, 1992, the Illinois Supreme Court censured Respondent after finding that he failed to communicate a settlement offer to a client and voluntarily dismissed the client's case without authority. In re Greenwood, 91 CH 395, M.R. 8243 (June 25, 1992). The underlying client matter in that disciplinary case began in 1983, when Respondent filed a lawsuit on behalf of Everett Wells in McLean County Illinois. One of the defendants offered to settle the matter for $1,000, but Respondent failed to communicate the offer to Wells. Subsequently, Respondent failed to respond to discovery requests and a motion to compel. Instead, Respondent filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss the lawsuit, about which motion Wells had no knowledge. After the motion was granted, Respondent failed to inform Wells that the action had been dismissed. Respondent also failed to respond to Wells' calls regarding the status of the case, and failed to notify Wells that he had relocated his office from Bloomington to Downers Grove.

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In this case, based on the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, we find that the Administrator proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in most, but not all, of the misconduct alleged in the Amended Complaint.

We find that the Administrator proved that Respondent engaged in the following misconduct alleged in Count I of the Amended Complaint: 1) converting funds; 2) breaching of fiduciary duty; 3) failing to hold property of clients or third parties separate from the lawyer's own property; 4) failing to provide competent representation to a client; 5) failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; 6) engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; and 7) engaging in conduct which tends to defeat the administration of justice or brings the courts or the legal profession into disrepute in violation of Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.15(a) and 8.4(a)(4) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct and Supreme Court Rule 770.

Respondent admitted, and the Administrator proved, that Respondent acted improperly when holding the escrow funds from the sale of Royem's house to Nimoth. At the closing, on May 29, 2003, Nimoth agreed to allow Royem to stay in the house, and Royem agreed to pay rent. Respondent agreed to hold $4,760 in escrow until all rent and related expenses were paid. As of July 5, 2005, the balance in Respondent's client trust account, where he deposited the escrow funds, was $66.81. At that time, Royem was still living in the house, and neither Nimoth nor his attorney had authorized Respondent to use any portion of the escrow funds for any other

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purposes than paying, or guaranteeing the payment of, Royem's rent. In addition, neither Royem nor Respondent had given Nimoth the required rent payments.

It is clear that Respondent's improper use of the escrow funds amounted to conversion, the failure to hold property of his client or a third person separate from his own property, and a breach of his fiduciary duty. Conversion is defined as any unauthorized act that deprives someone of their property permanently or for an indefinite period of time. In re Rosin, 156 Ill. 2d. 202, 206, 620 N.E.2d 368 (1993). Additionally, Respondent, as escrowee, had a fiduciary duty to hold the money under the terms agreed to and for the benefit of both Nimoth and Royem. See In re Menegas, 03 CH 106, M.R. 21124 (November 17, 2006). The parties agreed that Respondent would hold the money to pay rent and other expenses, and he used the money for his own purposes. When Respondent used the escrow funds for his own purposes and without authority from those for whom he held it, he breached his duty to them and converted the funds.

Respondent argues that Royem authorized him to use the funds to pay legal fees Royem had incurred in other legal matters. We find Respondent's testimony on this issue immaterial and not credible. Although it is possible that Royem owed Respondent legal fees for other matters, there is no documentary or other evidence to support this claim. Moreover, whether or not Royem owed Respondent legal fees or anything else, the escrowed funds entrusted to Respondent could not be used to satisfy such debts without the consent of those for whom he held it, and, therefore, the existence of such other indebtedness is immaterial. Additionally, Respondent's testimony is undermined by the timing of the events. Royem received $52,690 from the sale of the house from which Respondent could have been paid. Yet, Respondent concedes that Royem only authorized him to use the last $4,500. These facts, along with our observations of Respondent, support the finding that Respondent was not credible on this point.

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In re Smith, 168 Ill. 2d 269, 283, 659 N.E.2d 896 (1995) (the Hearing Board is in the best position to determine the credibility of the witnesses).

Furthermore, Respondent's argument, even if credible, would be insufficient to change our findings of conversion, breach of fiduciary duty and failure to properly hold the escrow funds. As discussed, the funds were held in escrow for the benefit of both Royem and Nimoth, and with the agreement that they would be used solely to pay rent and expenses. Royem lacked the authority to unilaterally direct Respondent to use the money to pay Royem's legal fees, even if he had authorized or consented to the escrowed funds being used for that purpose with Nimoth's concurrence. Respondent, as escrowee, needed consent from both Royem and Nimoth, and failed to explain how he could have used that money without Nimoth's consent. Further, he admitted he had not spoken with either Nimoth or his attorney about obtaining such consent. Accordingly, even if we believed Respondent on this factual issue, which we do not, our findings would remain the same.

We also find that Respondent failed to provide competent representation to a client, and failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing. We find no misconduct in relation to Respondent's representation of Royem in the closing. However, we find that he engaged in misconduct in relation to events occurring after the closing. Respondent had a duty to carry out the terms of the escrow agreement and protect Royem from any subsequent legal action. By failing to retain the escrow funds, Respondent had no money to pay the rent owed to Nimoth, and Royem was exposed to possible legal action. Also, even after Respondent learned that Royem owed Nimoth money, he failed to do anything to protect his client. In fact, he paid nothing to Nimoth between July 2004 and October 2008.

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We further find that Respondent's conduct involved dishonesty, deceit or misrepresentation, and tended to defeat the administration of justice and bring the legal profession into disrepute. Not only did Respondent act dishonestly when he converted the escrow funds, he also was dishonest with Lupa, Nimoth's attorney, after the conversion. On July 9, 2004, Respondent sent Lupa a letter stating he would send him money for the rent owed. He did not send any money and did not pay Nimoth until October 2008, immediately before the start of the hearing in this case. Failing to pay Nimoth, especially when he was supposed to hold the money in escrow, brings the legal profession into disrepute. See Menegas, 03 CH 106.

We find that the Administrator proved some, but not all, of the misconduct alleged in Count II of the Amended Complaint. Specifically, we find that the Administrator proved that Respondent: 1) failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; 2) failed to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of a client; 3) failed to reduce a contingent fee agreement to writing; 4) engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and 5) engaged in conduct that tends to defeat the administration of justice or to bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute in violation of Rules 1.3, 1.5(c), and 8.4(a)(5) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct and Supreme Court Rule 770.

Respondent failed to represent the Krasniqis with reasonable diligence and failed to make reasonable efforts to expedite the matter consistent with their interests. In March 2004, Respondent agreed to defend the Krasniqis in an action involving the breach of a lease. In April 2004, Respondent was served with a request for production of documents and interrogatories. He failed to comply with the request. On June 11, 2004, the court entered an agreed order directing Respondent to comply by July 2, 2004. Respondent again failed to comply with the

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discovery requests. On July 8, 2004, the court ordered Respondent to comply with the discovery requests by July 22, 2004. Respondent answered some of the interrogatories. The court barred two of the Krasniqis' witnesses because Respondent had failed to provide the complete contact information in the interrogatories.

The Krasniqis were scheduled to give their depositions on August 11, 2004. On that date, Respondent informed Williams, plaintiff's counsel, that the Krasniqis would not be available for their depositions and he would contact Williams to reschedule. On September 15, 2004, after Respondent failed to contact him, Williams sent Respondent a letter requesting dates for their depositions. After Respondent failed to respond to that letter, Williams filed a motion to compel. On September 30, 2004, Respondent failed to appear in court and the matter was continued. Respondent also failed to appear in court on the next court date. On November 9, 2004, Respondent informed the court that he intended to withdraw from the case. Respondent failed to file the motion or appear at the next court date.

Respondent failed to appear in court on January 27, 2005, and the court entered a default judgment against the Krasniqis and scheduled a date for the prove-up. On February 3, 2005, the court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in the amount of $4,925. Respondent filed a motion to vacate the default judgment, and on June 16, 2005, the court granted that motion. The Krasniqis hired a different attorney and paid the unpaid rent. These facts establish that Respondent failed to timely comply with discovery requests, failed to produce his clients for depositions, and failed to withdraw from the matter after telling the court he would withdraw. As a result of Respondent's conduct, a default judgment was entered against his clients.

We also find Respondent's conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice and tended to defeat the administration of justice and bring the legal profession into disrepute.

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Respondent's lack of diligence in representing the Krasniqis unnecessarily delayed the court proceedings and cast attorneys in a negative light. Respondent's lack of diligence unnecessarily delayed the proceedings, caused the court to issue otherwise unnecessary orders, and lead to a default judgment being entered against his clients.

We further find the Administrator proved that Respondent failed to put the contingent fee agreement in writing. Respondent agreed to represent the Krasniqis on a contingent fee basis for 30 per cent of any savings he obtained for them. He admitted that he did not put this agreement in writing. Rule 1.5(c) requires that contingent fees be in writing. Accordingly, Respondent violated this Rule.

We further find that the Administrator did not prove that Respondent failed to provide competent representation to the Krasniqis and failed to keep them reasonably informed about the status of their case. Although Respondent neglected the Krasniqis' case and a default judgment was entered against them, Respondent had the default judgment vacated, and the Krasniqis rights were not prejudiced. Additionally, the Administrator did not present sufficient evidence to prove that Respondent failed to keep the Krasniqis informed about the status of their case.

We decline to make a separate finding relating to the sanctions imposed by the Circuit Court. It is undisputed that the Circuit Court imposed sanctions against Respondent in the amount of $6,000. These sanctions were based on Respondent's delays in handling the underlying matter for the Krasniqis. We have already found misconduct based on those delays. The fact that the Circuit Court imposed sanctions, by itself, does not warrant an additional finding of misconduct.

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We find that the Administrator proved that Respondent engaged in all of the misconduct alleged in Count III of the Amended Complaint. Specifically, RESPONDENT: 1) failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; 2) failed to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; 3) failed to promptly refund an unearned fee; and 4) engaged in conduct that tends to defeat the administration of justice or brings the legal profession into disrepute in violation of Rules 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.16(e) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct and Supreme Court Rule 770.

In May 2004, Respondent agreed to represent Medwin Gob in attempting to obtain expungement of his arrest record. Gob paid Respondent $200 toward the attorney's fees. Gob called Respondent's office on numerous occasions between June and November 2004 to inquire about the status of his case and to request the return of the $200. During this time period, Respondent failed to return Gob's calls, failed to communicate with Gob in any way, and failed to take any steps to expunge Gob's arrest record. In November 2004, Gob filed a complaint regarding Respondent with the ARDC. In March 2005, Respondent informed the ARDC that he would either complete the expungement or refund the $200. By that time, Gob had retained another attorney and wanted a refund. Respondent did nothing for more than three years, when he sent Gob a check for $250 in September 2008, after the commencement of the hearing in this matter, after Gob had testified, and shortly before Respondent testified. Between May 2004 and September 2008, Respondent failed to perform sufficient work to justify the $200 fee and failed to timely refund any portion of the fee to Gob. These facts are sufficient to prove the all of the alleged misconduct.

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We find that the Administrator proved that Respondent engaged in all but one of the misconduct alleged in Count IV of the Amended Complaint. Specifically, RESPONDENT: 1) failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; 2) failed to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; 3) failed to reduce a contingent fee agreement to writing; 4) engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; 5) engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and 6) engaged in conduct that tends to defeat the administration of justice or brings the legal profession into disrepute in violation of Rules 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.5(c), 8.4(a)(4) and 8.4(a)(5) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct and Supreme Court Rule 770.

Respondent failed to adequately represent Ciura in her case. Respondent agreed to represent Ciura in an action to recover her son's life insurance proceeds. On June 3, 2005, he filed a Complaint on her behalf. On March 1, 2005, the court ordered Respondent to issue a summons by March 3, 2005. He failed to issue a summons and effect service, and on April 18, 2006, the Complaint was dismissed. Respondent's failure to serve the defendant caused the case to be dismissed. Respondent claimed he did not know where the defendant lived, and it was advantageous to his case to wait as long as possible to serve her. We find neither of these reasons justifies his inaction in the matter. The court ordered him to have the defendant served, but Respondent failed to do so. If he had legitimate reasons for not issuing a summons, he had an obligation to inform the court. Instead, he did nothing, and his client's case was dismissed. Accordingly, we find that Respondent neglected Cirua's case and engaged in the other misconduct alleged by the Administrator.

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Respondent failed to reduce the contingent fee agreement to writing. Respondent accepted a $2,000 retainer from Ciura and agreed to take one-third of any recovery as his fee. This was clearly a contingent fee agreement. According to Rule 1.5(c), this agreement was required to have been in writing. Respondent admitted that it was not in writing and, therefore, there is no doubt that he violated this Rule.

We also find that the Administrator did not prove that Respondent failed to promptly refund, upon withdrawal from employment, that part of a fee paid in advance that had not been earned, in violation of Rule 1.16(e) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct. In August 2003, Respondent accepted a $2,000 retainer and agreed to take that retainer and one-third of any recovery as his fee. As discussed above, the lawsuit was dismissed in May 2006. Respondent testified that after the case was dismissed, he returned $1,372.50 to Ciura. That amount was what remained of the $2,000 after court costs were deducted. Based on these facts, we find that Respondent refunded the unearned fee to his client.

We further find that the Administrator proved that Respondent engaged in the misconduct alleged in Count V of the Amended Complaint. Specifically, we find that RESPONDENT: 1) failed to respond to a lawful demand for information from the ARDC; 2) engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and 3) engaged in conduct that tends to defeat the administration of justice or brings the courts or the legal profession into disrepute in violation of Rules 8.1(a)(2) and 8.4(a)(5) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, Commission Rule 53, and Supreme Court Rule 770.

On October 16, 2006, the Administrator sent Respondent a letter requesting he submit information regarding the Ciura matter. On November 7, 2006, the Administrator sent

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Respondent a second letter containing the same request. Respondent failed to respond to either letter. On January 3, 2007, the Administrator served Respondent with a subpoena to appear for a sworn statement and to produce documents relating to the Ciura matter. On the date of the scheduled sworn statement, Respondent informed the Administrator that he was unable to appear, and agreed to give his statement on March 6, 2007. On that date, Respondent again informed the Administrator that he was unable to appear. He also failed to produce the requested documents.

Respondent failed to respond to the Administrator's lawful demand for information. Rule 8.1(a)(2) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct provides that every attorney has an obligation to respond to the Administrator's lawful demands for information. Respondent failed to fulfill that obligation when he did not appear at two sworn statements. He duplicated that shortcoming when he failed to produce requested documents. There is no question that the Administrator's demand was lawful. We understand that Respondent submitted himself for other sworn statements at the Administrator's request, but his prior cooperation does not negate his subsequent lack of cooperation. Accordingly, we find that Respondent engaged in all of the misconduct alleged in this count.

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Having considered the mitigating and aggravating factors, we must now recommend the appropriate sanction. The Administrator recommends Respondent be suspended for eighteen months and until further order of the court, and bases this recommendation on several cases. See In re Houdek, 113 Ill.2d 323, 497 N.E.2d 1169 (1986); In re Pass, 105 Ill. 2d 366, 475 N.E.2d 525 (1985); In re Holman, 05 CH 123, M.R. 21952 (January 23, 2008); In re McGlynn, 03 CH

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After reviewing the cases cited by the Administrator and Respondent, and other relevant cases, we believe that a nine month suspension from the practice of law is the appropriate sanction in this matter. We find the cases cited by the Administrator, while instructive, are distinguishable from the present case because they either involve more egregious misconduct or misconduct that is not analogous to the misconduct in the present case. Similarly, the cases cited by Respondent involve less serious misconduct or more mitigating evidence than the present case. We believe that a nine month suspension is appropriate. See In re Odom, 01 CH 69, M.R. 10772 (May 19, 2005); In re Freethy, 99 CH 95, M.R. 18830 (September 19, 2003).

In Odom, the attorney was suspended for nine months for engaging in four instances of misconduct involving three clients. In the first matter, Odom commingled and converted client funds, failed to maintain a client trust account, and lied to his client about receiving a settlement check and about the conversion. In the second matter, he failed to reduce a contingent fee

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agreement to writing and divided funds with another attorney without his client's consent. In the third matter, Odom appeared on behalf of a criminal defendant in the State of Michigan when he was not licensed to practice law in that State. In re Odom, 01 CH 69, M.R. 10772 (May 19, 2005).

In Freethy, the attorney was suspended for nine months after converting funds from three clients and making false statements to third parties in three matters, including a bank and estate creditors. The total amount converted was between $7,500 and $9,000. Freethy offered substantial mitigating evidence, including a lack of a prior discipline, and there was no aggravating evidence. In re Freethy, 99 CH 95, M.R. 18830 (September 19, 2003). The established evidence in the present case is sufficiently analogous to the misconduct involved in Odom and Freethy to warrant a similar sanction.

We agree with Respondent that the suspension should not continue until further order of the court. A suspension until further order of the Court is appropriate where and attorney demonstrates an inability to conform to normal standards of the legal profession. See In re Houdek, 113 Ill. 2d 323, 497 N.E.2d 1169 (1986); In re Levinson, 71 Ill. 2d 486, 376 N.E.2d 998 (1978). In the present case, the Administrator has not proven that Respondent is unable to conform to the normal standards of the profession and is likely to repeat his misconduct. We find no compelling reason to our recommended sanction subject to further order of the Court. Importantly, as the Respondent correctly points out, six of the cases cited by the Administrator to support the inclusion of this provision involved either default or consent proceedings. This provision is invariably included in default matters where attorneys fail to participate in the proceedings, and can be included in consent matters where the attorney agrees to it.

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Therefore, in light of Respondent's misconduct, and considering the mitigating and aggravating factors, and relevant case law, we recommend that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for nine months.