Respondent-Appellant

Commission No. 02 SH 37

Synopsis of Review Board Report and Recommendation
(December 7, 2004)

Dotson was charged, in a two-count complaint, with making a statement of material fact or law to a tribunal that he knew or should have known was false, making statements of material fact or law to a third person that he knew or should have known were false, and engaging in conduct involving fraud, dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation, conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, and conduct that brings the courts or legal profession into disrepute. Dotson denied misconduct and some of the Administrator's factual allegations.

The Hearing Board found that Dotson engaged in all the misconduct charged, except for the allegation that he made a false statement to a third person as alleged in Count II. The Hearing Board recommended that Dotson be suspended for one year.

The case was before the Review Board on Dotson's exceptions. Dotson objects to the Hearing Board's findings of misconduct, certain evidentiary rulings, and its recommendation as to discipline.

Dotson purchased a souvenir deed conveying a non-possessory interest in one square inch of a one acre lot that formerly belonged to Abraham Lincoln. Subsequently, Dotson executed a quitclaim deed, purporting to convey the lot as a whole, to his wife, and directed the assessor's office to send the property tax bills to his wife. A series of deeds followed, executed by Dotson, his first wife, or his second wife, which purported to convey the lot as a whole, to members of Dotson's immediate family and, ultimately, to Dotson's newborn son. Dotson or a member of his immediate family paid property taxes on the lot for at least seven years. Dotson then filed a action to quiet title to the lot in his son. In connection with the action to quiet title, Dotson filed an affidavit to support service by publication. In this affidavit, Dotson stated that the prior owners of the land could not be found and, despite diligent efforts by Dotson, their addresses could not be determined. The prior owners were shareholders of a dissolved corporation. Documents filed with the Illinois Secretary of State showed the names and addresses of the corporate officers. The Hearing Board heard evidence as to the extent of Dotson's attempts to locate the individuals involved. Dotson also formed a corporation, bearing a very similar name to that of the dissolved corporation, that purported to convey three other lots, which had been owned by the dissolved corporation, to a third party.

The Review Board affirmed the Hearing Board's evidentiary rulings, findings of misconduct, and recommendation as to discipline.

This case was heard on the Administrator-Appellee's two-count complaint against Respondent-Appellant, Lewis Stanton Dotson. After hearing, the Hearing Board found that Dotson made a false statement of material fact or law to a third person which he knew or reasonably should have known was false in violation of Rule 4.1(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (134 Ill. 2d R. 4.1(a)) (Count I), made a statement of material fact or law to a tribunal that he knew or should have known was false in violation of Rule 3.3(a)(1) (134 Ill. 2d R. 3.3(a)(1)) (Count II), and engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4) (188 Ill. 2d R. 8.4(a)(4)), conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(5) (188 Ill. 2d R. 8.4(a)(5)), and conduct that tends to defeat the administration of justice or bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute in violation of Supreme Court Rule 771 (134 Ill. 2d R. 771) (Counts I and II). ¹ The Hearing Board recommended that Dotson be suspended for one year.

The case is before the Review Board on Dotson's exceptions. Dotson objects to the Hearing Board's findings of misconduct, its ruling excluding four exhibits he proffered, and its sanction recommendation. The Administrator seeks to have the Review Board affirm the Hearing Board's findings of misconduct and sanction recommendation.

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Raymond W. Phipps, Jr. owned a tract of rural land in Coles County, Illinois that once belonged to Abraham Lincoln. On May 8, 1976, Phipps executed a warranty deed conveying four one-acre lots of the tract to the Abraham Lincoln Land and Cattle Company, Inc. ("Lincoln I"). Phipps had established Lincoln I in 1975 and was its primary, though not sole, shareholder.

Phipps planned to sell souvenir portions of one of these lots, i.e. Lot 1. Each portion was one square inch of the one-acre lot. Proceeds from these sales were used to support the Lincoln Log Cabin Historical Site, which was located on a lot adjacent to Lot 1. The purchaser of each one-inch parcel received a deed under which he or she became a tenant in common with the other owners of the lot. The deeds included various waivers by the grantee, limited the grantee's right of possession, and provided that Lincoln I would pay taxes on the property.

Approximately 3,000 of these souvenir deeds were sold. In 1976, Dotson purchased one of the one-inch parcels, for $35, and received a souvenir deed. Dotson recorded that deed shortly after receiving it.

Lincoln I leased the four lots to the Lincoln Heritage Trail Memorial Foundation ("the Foundation") for a period of 99 years. Under the lease, the Foundation was to pay the taxes on the four lots. The Foundation, however, did not always pay the taxes in a timely manner. After learning of this situation, Phipps paid the taxes and later directed the assessor's office to send the property tax bills directly to him. Phipps paid all the tax bills that he received and redeemed any taxes that were sold for non-payment. No tax deed was ever issued on the property.

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Over time, Lincoln I and Phipps experienced financial problems. Effective March 1, 1985, the Illinois Secretary of State dissolved Lincoln I because it did not file an annual report or pay the annual franchise tax. Once the corporation was dissolved, its property was owned by its shareholders as individuals.

In 1985-86, Dotson learned that Lincoln I had been dissolved. He also learned that, at times, property taxes on Lot 1 had not been paid. Dotson testified that his subsequent conduct was motivated by a desire to protect his interest and those of the other fractional owners in Lot 1.

In July 1989, Dotson prepared and signed a quitclaim deed that purported to convey Lot 1 in its entirety and without restriction to Judith Anna Dotson, to whom Dotson was then married. Dotson recorded this deed. At the time, Dotson told Judith that he would quitclaim his interest in the property to her, thereby giving Judith "color of title." Dotson also told Judith that, after paying taxes on the property for seven years, and filing suit to quiet title, if necessary, she would own the property. ² The deed and accompanying real estate tax declaration that Dotson prepared provided that future tax bills should be mailed to Judith.

Thereafter, the tax bill pertaining to Lots 2, 3, and 4 continued to be sent to the "Abe Lincoln Land & Cattle Co.," in care of Phipps. A separate tax bill for Lot 1 was sent to the "Abe Lincoln Land & Cattle Co.," in care of Judith. The amount of the tax bills varied. The taxes on Lots 2, 3, and 4 were less than in prior years, but not substantially so. Prior to the purported conveyance of Lot 1 to Judith, the tax on all four lots was approximately $350 per year. For example, the bill on Lots 2, 3, and 4 was $267.26 for the taxes due in 1992 and $355.84 for the taxes due in 1994. Bills for Lot 1 were small, generally less than $45 per year. Phipps did not realize that one of the lots had been removed from his tax bill and thought that he 

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was paying taxes on all four lots.

In 1991, Dotson and Judith divorced. On March 28, 1991, Judith executed a warranty deed to Dotson in conjunction with the dissolution of their marriage. This deed conveyed Judith's interest in several parcels of real estate to Dotson. One of these parcels was Lot 1, in its entirety and without restriction. The deed, which was recorded, directed that future tax bills be sent to Dotson.

Dotson remarried shortly thereafter. On June 7, 1991, he signed a quitclaim deed conveying various parcels of real estate, including Lot 1 in its entirety and without restriction, to his new wife, Laurie Ann Roley Dotson. This deed, which was also recorded, directed that future tax bills be sent to Laurie.

On May 31, 1992, Dotson and Laurie executed a warranty deed, purporting to convey Lot 1, in its entirety and without restriction, to their newborn son, Joseph Dotson. This deed was recorded and directed that all future tax bills be sent to Joseph.

Dotson and Laurie later executed and recorded other deeds relating to Lot 1. None of these deeds corrected the legal description to correspond to the actual interest Dotson first obtained in Lot 1. From 1989 through at least 1997, tax bills for Lot 1 were sent to Dotson or a member of his immediate family and they paid the taxes on Lot 1.

In June 1992, Dotson incorporated, as a not-for-profit corporation, the Abraham Lincoln Land and Cattle Co., Inc. (Lincoln II). Dotson and Laurie were officers of Lincoln II.

On December 1, 1997, Lincoln II passed a corporate resolution and executed a quitclaim deed to Lots 2, 3, and 4 to Bernard McAlister. The deed included an easement over Lot 1 for ingress and egress. Neither Lincoln II nor Dotson had any ownership interest in Lots 2, 3, or 4. McAlister was a client of Dotson's who owned property near these lots. McAlister had 

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served as caretaker of the property for many years. In Dotson's opinion, McAlister had possessed Lots 2, 3, and 4 for at least 20 years and thereby established adverse possession to that land. The corporate resolution and the deed were recorded on December 2, 1997. Thereafter, consistent with the instructions on the deed, tax bills were sent to McAlister. ³

On January 29, 1998, Lincoln II passed a corporate resolution and issued a warranty deed for Lot 1 to Joseph. The resolution and deed were recorded on January 30, 1998. Dotson also placed a single strand of barbed wire across the southern boundary of Lot 1 adjacent to a road and posted a no trespassing sign on this fence. No other boundary of Lot 1 was fenced.

With the execution of these transactions, Dotson intentionally and knowingly initiated a chain of deeds that purported to convey a property interest that far exceeded what he, or any of the grantees whose interests derived from his, rightfully owned.

On March 4, 1998, Dotson filed a petition to quiet title to Lot 1. Joseph was the named plaintiff. The petition was based on the theory that Joseph had color of title and had paid taxes on the property for more than seven years. Dotson filed an affidavit of nonresidence with the petition. In this affidavit, Dotson stated that all stockholders of Lincoln I and unknown owners of Lot 1 "on due inquiry cannot be found, so that process cannot be served upon them; and … that upon diligent inquiries, the addresses or places of residence are all unknown."

Documents filed with the Secretary of State listed the names and addresses of officers and directors of Lincoln I and, though not listing the shareholders, showed that the company had issued 220 shares of stock. Phipps was listed on each of these documents with a street address in Springfield. The certificate of dissolution listed a street address and a post office box for Phipps.

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Dotson knew that Phipps was from Springfield. Phipps had lived in Springfield since 1964. He worked in radio broadcasting in Springfield. In addition to his residence address, Phipps had maintained two post office boxes in Springfield for over 25 years. At all relevant times, Phipps was listed in the Springfield telephone directory and his phone number was available through directory assistance. Phipps testified that McAlister had his address and telephone number. Howard Weitekamp, an officer listed in Lincoln I's 1978 annual report, was also a shareholder. At all relevant times, Weitekamp lived in the Springfield area and his phone number was listed in the Springfield telephone directory.

Dotson did not look up Phipps or Weitekamp in the Springfield telephone book. While he testified that he unsuccessfully checked directory assistance for Weitekamp, Dotson did not check directory assistance for Phipps. Dotson testified that he mailed one document to Phipps using a street address, but that the letter was returned. Dotson did not attempt a second mailing nor used Phipps' post office box. Dotson testified that he tried, unsuccessfully, to locate Phipps in Charleston and Champaign after hearing that Phipps may have moved or planned to move to one of those communities.

Dotson never attempted to personally serve Phipps in the action to quiet title. Rather, he published notice of the suit in a local newspaper. Phipps and three other parties learned of the lawsuit and filed an answer. ⁴ While the trial court quieted title in Joseph, the Appellate Court reversed, finding that Joseph had not established a right to title, particularly as the good faith element required by 735 ILCS 5/13-110 was lacking. Dotson v. Former Shareholders of Abraham Lincoln Land & Cattle Co., 332 Ill. App.3d 846, 773 N.E.2d 792, 266 Ill. Dec. 57 (4th Dist. 2002).

Dotson's affidavit of nonresidence therefore contained false statements in that the 

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affidavit falsely stated that the former shareholders of Lincoln I could not be found for purposes of service of process, that their addresses were unknown, and that Dotson had made diligent inquiries in attempting to locate the former shareholders of Lincoln I.

Dotson challenges the Hearing Board's findings of misconduct. In a disciplinary proceeding, the Administrator has the burden of proving the allegations of misconduct by clear and convincing evidence. In re Ingersoll, 186 Ill. 2d 163, 168, 710 N.E.2d 390, 237 Ill. Dec. 760 (1999). While this is a heavy burden of proof, the standard of review is deferential. The Hearing Board's determinations on factual issues, particularly those involving witness credibility, are not disturbed unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Smith, 168 Ill. 2d 269, 283, 659 N.E.2d 896, 213 Ill. Dec. 550 (1995); In re Witt, 145 Ill. 2d 380, 390, 583 N.E.2d 526, 164 Ill. Dec. 610 (1991). A factual finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only where an opposite conclusion is clearly evident or the finding appears unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. Leonardi v. Loyola University, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 106, 658 N.E.2d 450, 212 Ill. Dec. 968 (1995); Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 215, 647 N.E.2d 273, 207 Ill. Dec. 311 (1995).

Dotson's challenges to the Hearing Board's findings of misconduct essentially involve issues of fact. The Hearing Board's findings of misconduct, however, are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

As to Count I, Dotson contends that he had a legal theory on which to base his claim. Relying on 735 ILCS 5/13-100, Dotson asserts ownership over the lot as a whole because Dotson, or his family members, had color of title and had paid taxes on the property for at least seven years. However, the issues in this case concern Dotson's underlying conduct, whether 

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that conduct was fraudulent, and Dotson's state of mind. The fact that Dotson had a legal theory on which to support a claim of title does not obviate his conduct nor render the Hearing Board's conclusions as to his state of mind against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Fraud includes any conduct, statement, or omission that is calculated to deceive, regardless of whether the conduct at issue is a single act or a combination of circumstances, whether the case involves the suppression of truth or the suggestion of what is false, and whether the conduct or statement is direct or by innuendo. Witt, 145 Ill. 2d at 390, 583 N.E.2d 526, 164 Ill. Dec. 610. Whether fraud has been proven is an issue of fact. Gerrill Corp. v. Jack L. Hargrove Builders, Inc., 128 Ill. 2d 179, 192-93, 538 N.E.2d 530, 131 Ill. Dec. 155 (1989). Issues as to intent and state of mind also are factual issues, within the province of the Hearing Board. See Ingersoll, 186 Ill. 2d 163, 710 N.E.2d 390, 237 Ill. Dec. 760.

Dotson intentionally and knowingly initiated a chain of deeds that purported to convey a property interest that far exceeded anything that he, or any of the grantees whose interests derived from his, rightfully owned. These deeds did not result from arms length transactions with a bona fide purchaser for value. Instead, particularly as to Lot 1, the deeds primarily involved transfers between Dotson and members of his immediate family. Dotson owned a fractional, one square-inch, non-possessory, limited interest in a one-acre lot. Through the series of deeds, some of which were warranty deeds, Dotson created the false appearance of owning Lot 1 in its entirety and without restrictions. The deeds omitted the essential fact that Dotson's only property interest in Lot 1 was a limited non-possessory interest to only a small portion, i.e. one square inch, of the lot. The successive deeds purport to convey far larger interests, typically the lot as a whole, thereby obfuscating the true facts. The diversion of the tax bills and the use of the name Abraham Lincoln Land and Cattle Co. further served to conceal 

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Dotson's actual purposes.

As to the purported conveyance to McAlister, Dotson contends that he was acting on behalf of a client whom he believed had a colorable interest in the property. Even assuming that is true, Lincoln II had absolutely no ownership interests in Lots 2, 3, or 4 and no legitimate basis on which to attempt to convey that property. The issue is not whether or not McAlister may have had a legitimate basis for a claim of adverse possession. As Dotson's own expert witness testified, a court proceeding was necessary to confirm title in a person claiming by adverse possession. Dotson attempted to circumvent that requirement by the corporate resolution and deed from Lincoln II to McAlister.

The falsity underlying the transaction is not excused even if Dotson were acting to benefit a client. A desire to benefit a client does not relieve an attorney of the obligation to comply with the rules of ethics. See In re Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d 531 538-39, 533 N.E.2d 790, 127 Ill. Dec. 708 (1988).

Thus, the evidence amply supports the Hearing Board's findings of misconduct as to Count I. As to Count II, the issues involve whether Dotson made sufficient attempts to find the former shareholders of Lincoln I or other owners of the property. This is a question of fact. Given the facts described above, the Hearing Board could reasonably conclude that Dotson's efforts were not sufficient.

Dotson objects to the Hearing Board's exclusion of four proffered documentary exhibits. The Hearing Board's evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. In re Joyce, 133 Ill. 16, 29, 549 N.E.2d 232, 139 Ill. Dec. 720 (1989).

Dotson withdrew one of the exhibits at the hearing. Therefore, his objections relating to that exhibit are waived. See In re Petrulis, No. 96 CH 546 (Review Board Dec. 9, 

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1999) p. 15, approved and confirmed, No. M.R. 16556 (June 30, 2000).

The remaining documents are legal texts and a copy of a published Appellate Court opinion. Dotson offered these documents to support his position that he acted in good faith, based on specific legal theories. The Hearing Board sustained the Administrator's relevancy objection. This ruling was not an abuse of discretion. The existence of the legal principles on which Dotson allegedly relied was not in dispute. The issues concerned Dotson's good faith, or lack thereof, in executing deeds that purported to convey property that he knew that neither he nor the grantor owned. The exhibits at issue had little, if any, relevance to those issues, and Dotson argued his position fully to the Hearing Board.

The remaining issue concerns the Hearing Board's recommendation of a one-year suspension. Dotson seeks to have the Review Board recommend a less severe sanction. ⁵ The Administrator seeks to have us affirm the Hearing Board's sanction recommendation.

In fashioning the proper sanction in any given case, the Review Board must consider each case based on its own particular facts and circumstances, while remaining aware that the system seeks to impose sanctions consistent with those imposed in other similar cases. In re Timpone, 157 Ill. 2d 178, 197, 623 N.E.2d 300, 191 Ill. Dec. 55 (1993). In imposing discipline, the purpose is not to punish the individual respondent, but to protect the public, maintain the integrity of the profession, and protect the administration of justice from reproach. Timpone, 157 Ill. 2d at 197, 623 N.E.2d 300, 191 Ill. Dec. 55. The Hearing Board's recommendation as to discipline is advisory and does not bind the Review Board. Ingersoll, 186 Ill. 2d at 178, 710 N.E.2d 390, 237 Ill. Dec. 760. The Hearing Board's recommendation, however, is entitled to some deference, particularly where that recommendation is based on factors such as an assessment of the respondent's intentions, motivations, or level of remorse. 

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See In re Jakubowski, No. 93 CH 455 (Review Board May 10, 1996), approved and confirmed, No. M.R. 12728 (Sept. 24, 1996).

After reviewing the record and the applicable case law, and considering the factors in aggravation and mitigation, we concur in the Hearing Board's recommendation of a one-year suspension. The Hearing Board endeavored to strike a proper balance between the nature of Dotson's misconduct and the aggravating and mitigating factors present in this case. The Hearing Board's detailed discussion of the rationale for its recommendation reflects a very thorough, well-reasoned consideration of the factors in aggravation and mitigation and convinces us that a one-year suspension is the proper quantum of discipline in this case.

Given all the circumstances, suspension is warranted, rather than censure or probation. See generally In re Segall, 117 Ill. 2d 1, 509 N.E.2d 988, 109 Ill. Dec. 149 (1987); In re Thebeau, 111 Ill. 2d 251, 489 N.E.2d 877, 95 Ill. Dec. 315 (1986); In re Passman, 93 CH 573 (Review Board Dec. 27, 1995), approved and confirmed, No. M.R. 12249 (Mar. 26, 1996). While Dotson's misconduct is unique, the cases on which the Hearing Board relied involve analogous misconduct and the recommendation of a one-year suspension is within the range of discipline imposed in those cases. E.g. Segall, 117 Ill. 2d 1, 509 N.E.2d 988, 109 Ill. Dec. 149 (two year suspension); Thebeau, 111 Ill. 2d 251, 489 N.E.2d 877, 95 Ill. Dec. 315 (suspension for one year, rather than two, as Thebeau had stopped practicing law); Passman, No. 93 CH 573 (nine month suspension); In re Sorkin, No. 91 CH 434 (Hearing Board Aug. 11, 1992), approved and confirmed, No. M.R. 10091 (May 19, 1994) (one year suspension). ⁶

There are significant aggravating factors present, including the damage caused by Dotson's misconduct and Dotson's failure to understand his misconduct. See generally In re Samuels, 126 Ill. 2d 509, 535 N.E.2d 808, 817, 129 Ill. Dec. 43 (1989). Phipps incurred 

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substantial legal fees as a result of Dotson's conduct. Additionally, the Hearing Board found that Dotson does not understand the wrongfulness of his conduct. While Dotson disputes the finding, this conclusion is a factual determination within the discretion of the Hearing Board. In re May, 93 CH 320 (Review Board Sept. 6, 1995), approved and confirmed, Nos. M.R. 11764 & 11457 (Dec. 1, 1995). The Hearing Board's determination is supported by the record.

Conversely, Dotson has been practicing law since 1964, roughly 40 years. He has no prior discipline. Dotson performs pro bono work, often taking cases for people he knows will not be able to pay his fees. Dotson also presented very favorable character evidence. A retired judge and several attorneys testified that Dotson had a strong reputation for honesty and integrity. These are significant factors in mitigation. See In re Owens, 144 Ill. 2d 372, 380, 581 N.E.2d 633, 163 Ill. Dec. 479 (1991).

As the Hearing Board observed, it appears that Dotson acted as he did partly because he developed an ethical blind spot in relation to the land at issue. Dotson's focus on this land apparently arose because the land was formerly owned by Abraham Lincoln.

Given all of the circumstances, and for the reasons stated by the Hearing Board, a one-year suspension strikes an appropriate balance between the serious nature of Dotson's misconduct and the factors in aggravation and mitigation.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Hearing Board's evidentiary rulings and findings as to the misconduct charged, as well as its recommendation that Respondent-Appellant, Lewis Stanton Dotson, be suspended for one year.

Respectfully submitted,

Kevin M. Forde

Bruce J. Meachum

John W. Rapp, Jr.

Dated: December 7, 2004